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PHILIP A. HAMBURGER
EQUALITY AND DIVERSITY: THE
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY DEBATE
ABOUT EQUAL PROTECTION
AND EQUAL CIVIL RIGHTS
Living, as we do, in a world in which our discussions of equality
often lead back to the desegregation decisions, to the Fourteenth
Amendment, and to the antislavery debates of the 1830s, we tend
to allow those momentous events to dominate our understanding
of the ideas of equal protection and equal civil rights. Indeed,
historians have frequently asserted that the idea of equal protection
first developed in the 1830s in discussions of slavery and that it
otherwise had little history prior to its adoption into the U.S.
Constitution.1 Long before the Fourteenth Amendment, how-
ever-long before even the 1830s-equal protection of the laws
and equal civil rights were hardly notions unknown to Americans,
who used these different standards of equality to address problems
of religious diversity. In late eighteenth-century America-a na-
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scent nation in which territories, peoples, and religions were
multiplying-Americans employed ideas of equal protection and
equal civil rights to discuss their heterogeneity, and the ways in
which they did this cannot help but be of interest. By examining
how Americans used different standards of equality to address their
diversity, we will be able, among other things, to observe the early
development of ideas that have become increasingly central to our
perceptions of ourselves and our polity and thereby have affected
the development of our nation. Although more spacious than two
hundred years ago, America is also more crowded with people and
their perceptions of their differences, and, therefore, the history of
how we addressed our heterogeneity in the eighteenth century may
be of greater interest now than at any time before.
It is unavoidable that this inquiry concentrate on eighteenth-
century debates concerning religious liberty. During the nine-
teenth century, Americans engaged in a variety of controver-
sies-most dramatically that concerning slavery-in which they
discussed versions of the ideas of equality examined here: equal
protection and equal civil rights. Nonetheless, slavery will not be
the focus of this article, for, in the eighteenth century, it was
the diversity of Christian sects rather than racial differences that
prompted Americans to contend over equal protection and equal
civil rights.2 The familiarity of much of the clergy with the state-of-
nature analysis, the alignment of interests among religious sects,
and the nature of the controversy about religious freedom permit-
ted eighteenth-century Americans to engage in remarkably sophis-
ticated, albeit polemical debates about equal protection and equal
civil rights. Therefore, to study the early history of these notions
of equality, we must turn to the eighteenth-century debates about
religious freedom.
3
In recent decades, historians have produced a substantial and
important body of literature on equality. Historians of the Four-
teenth Amendment, including Howard Jay Graham, Jacobus Ten
Broek, and Earl Michael Maltz, have shown that equal protection
2 Of course, religious differences frequently were associated with ethnic and other social
differences.
' The Massachusetts controversy about equal rights of suffrage is of great interest to
historians of equality, but it did not generate debate between advocates of equal protection
and advocates of equal civil rights.
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was discussed in connection with slavery already in the 1830s.
4
They have not, however, traced the idea back to the eighteenth-
century disputes about religious equality. In contrast, historians of
religious liberty in the eighteenth century have discussed the gen-
eral notion of equality, yet they have not focused on the idea of
equal protection. For example, Nathan Hatch has traced the "de-
mocratization" of religion in America, including the attempts of
late eighteenth- and especially early nineteenth-century preachers
to encourage religious sentiments among all Americans.' In elic-
iting expressions of religious feeling among a wide variety of
Americans, these preachers drew upon desires for political and
social equality that, although hardly new, had new potency as a
result of America's changing demographics. Of particular impor-
tance for this article is the work of William G. McLoughlin and
Thomas E. Buckley, who have examined how legal developments
came to reflect expectations of equality.6 Buckley has shown that
the notion of equality was of central importance in the Virginia
debates about religious freedom, and McLoughlin has traced in
rich detail its crucial role in New England. On the whole, however,
just as scholars of equality have not sufficiently explored the eigh-
teenth-century debates about religion, so students of religious
liberty have not attempted systematically to differentiate the stan-
dards of equality for which various religious groups were con-
tending. In particular, they have not examined the idea of equal
protection or how it differed from the notion of equal civil rights.
Thus, the eighteenth-century history of the idea of equal protection
remains unknown to historians of the Fourteenth Amendment and
unexplored by historians of religion.
7
4 Howard J. Graham, The Early Anti-Slavery Background of the Fourteenth Amendment, in
Everyman's Constitution; Ten Broek, Equal Under Law; Earl M. Maltz, Fourteenth Amendment
Concepts in the Antebellum Era, 32 AmJ Legal Hist 305 (1985). J. R. Pole writes that "Jackson
introduced the phrase 'equal protection.'" J. R. Pole, The Pursuit of Equality in American
History 146 (U of Calif, 1979). Obviously, Pole could have pursued equal protection farther
than he did.
'Nathan Hatch, The Democratization of American Christianity (1989).
6 William G. McLoughlin, New England Dissent, 1630-1833 (Hary U, 1971) (McLoughlin,
"New England Dissent"); Thomas E. Buckley, S.J., Church and State in Revolutionary Virginia,
1776-1787 (U of Va, 1977) (Buckley, "Church and State in Revolutionary Virginia"). See also
Thomas J. Curry, The First Freedoms (Oxford U, 1986).
1 For a brief recognition of the connection, see Michael A. Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and
the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment Clause Adjudication 61 Notre
Dame L Rev 311, 326 (1986). Paulsen notes Madison's use of equal protection in his 1785
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A joint examination of these two subjects-religion and equal-
ity-provides an opportunity for each to be illuminated by the
other. For example, in eighteenth-century debates about religious
liberty, Americans employed the ideas of equal protection and
equal civil rights and, in so doing, repeated and refined formula-
tions that remain familiar and that have contributed much to our
perceptions of equality and our response to the variegated character
of our nation. Conversely, eighteenth-century discussions of equal-
ity can reveal much about early views of religious liberty. Indeed,
an examination of how eighteenth-century Americans understood
different standards of equality can shed light on some of their
various state and federal guarantees of religious freedom.
It cannot be over-emphasized that modern egalitarian assump-
tions must be put aside. Americans debated about equal protection
and equal civil rights during the ferment of the Great Awakening
and then, more prominently, during the revolutionary turmoil of
the 1770s, when, having begun to demand equal rights from Brit-
ain, Americans increasingly also sought equal rights from their
domestic governments. In the context of these stirrings of egalitar-
ian desires and these suggestions that equality could and should be
demanded as a right, eighteenth-century Americans who claimed
equality with respect to religion can be viewed as having contrib-
uted to the much broader social and cultural developments that
have made egalitarianism so important for our understanding of
American law. Yet eighteenth-century Americans often gave their
ideas of equality a relatively narrow focus. Among other things,
when they adopted positions on equality, they tended to assume
that government had relatively limited purposes and capabilities.
Therefore, we should not be surprised if the ideas eighteenth-
century Americans called "equal protection" and "equal civil
rights" were less egalitarian or were egalitarian in different ways
than the ideas we associate with these phrases.
8
A willingness to put aside modern assumptions is particularly
Memorial but appears to equate equal protection with an equality of civil rights. For scholar-
ship on the use of equal protection in the nineteenth century, see note 173 and accompanying
text.
' This study is in accord with Professor Stanley N. Katz's argument that eighteenth-
century Americans typically did not seek to establish social equality by law. Stanley N.
Katz, The Strange Birth and Unlikely History of Constitutional Equality, 75 J Am Hist 747
(1988). Katz writes that "[t]here was a constant attempt to rein in the notion of social
equality." Id at 752.
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important if we are to distinguish between "equal protection" and
"equal civil rights." Today, these phrases are often considered al-
most interchangeable labels for an undefined, broad egalitarianism.
In the eighteenth century, however, these terms referred to two
distinct standards of equality, the one requiring equality with re-
spect to only a portion of the legal rights for which equality was
required by the other. Equal civil rights was a standard demanding
that civil law treat individuals the same-that it not distinguish
among individuals on the basis of their religious differences. 9 By
comparison, equal protection of the laws was a lesser degree of
equality-an equality only of the protection provided by civil law
for natural liberty. As a result of this definition, equal protection
allowed preferences or unequal privileges-that is, it permitted
inequalities in rights not existing in the state of nature."0 Thus,
equal civil rights was a standard so rigorous it prevented civil laws
from allocating either protection or privileges on the basis of reli-
gious differences, and equal protection was so lax it generally per-
mitted civil laws to distribute privileges unequally. The struggle
between dissenters and establishments over these two standards
of equality and over related approaches for harmonizing religious
differences is the primary subject of this study.
I. THE STATE-OF-NATURE ANALYSIS
AND THE IDEA OF PROTECTION
When eighteenth-century Americans spoke about equal pro-
tection, they drew upon a political theory derived from assump-
tions about the state of nature. On the assumption that natural
' Today, the phrase "civil rights" refers to only some of our legal rights; in the eighteenth
century, at least in the context of the debates about religious liberty, it often referred to all
legal rights-the rights held by individuals under the civil laws of civil government. (This
usage was related to English discussion of the need to end the "civil disablities" of dissent-
ers-to give them the same "civil capacities" as Anglicans.) Already in the eighteenth cen-
tury, however, the phrase "civil rights" could, in many circumstances, be ambiguous. Al-
though it sometimes clearly referred to legal rights in general, it also could refer either to
privileges or merely to the natural rights held under civil government. The last of these
usages prevailed in the nineteenth century. See text at notes 229-33.
I' Americans often used the word "privileges" to refer to rights individuals could only
acquire by leaving the state of nature-those rights held under the laws of civil government
that could not be enjoyed in the state of nature. It is in this sense that the word is used
here. In contrast, it should be noted, Americans often used the word to refer to natural
rights or rights in general.
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liberty was the freedom of individuals in the state of nature, many
Americans held that individuals sought protection for their natural
liberty by submitting some of it to government to be controlled or
"restrained" by the laws. Protection thus was the protection for
natural liberty obtained by means of government and its legal re-
straints on the sacrificed portion of such freedom. More generally,
Americans who discussed the protection of natural liberty appear
to have assumed that it was a goal of government rather than a
legally enforceable right to a particular degree of liberty or of pro-
tection."1 They seem to have taken for granted that the different
laws of different societies would protect natural liberty in varying
ways and to varying degrees.
12
Although the word "protection" will be described here as a term
of art in the state-of-nature or contract theory of government, it
hardly requires to be noted that Americans also often used the
word in other ways. For example, any constitution or law could
be said to protect various rights. Moreover, all legal rights were
protected by courts and judicial process. These ordinary senses of
the word "protection" must be distinguished from the specialized
sense discussed in the following pages, that is, the protection of
government and its laws for natural liberty."
" Although protection certainly was, in a sense, a "benefit" of government, it was not a
legal right or legally enforceable benefit of government. See text at notes 44-46.
2 The importance of the state-of-nature analysis for the idea of protection has been
recognized by Stephen J. Heyman, who points out that protection was considered the initial
purpose, duty, or obligation of government and, accordingly, was a right of individuals.
Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty and the Fourteenth Amend-
Juent 41 Duke L J 507 (1991) (Heyman, "First Duty of Government"). Although Heyman's
discussion of the idea of protection is detailed and interesting, another point of view is
possible. For example, Heyman argues that protection was typically understood to be a
potentially enforceable legal right of individuals to an ascertainable degree of what might
otherwise be considered discretionary police intervention or "protection." Yet the American
and English material emphasized by Heyman and the American sources discussed here
indicate, on the contrary, that protection, as such, was considered a "moral" rather than a
legally enforceable right and that protection was not typically understood to be a particular
degree of protection. (See text at notes 25-49 & 184-90.) Second, although Heyman focuses
on historical evidence concerning protection rather than equal protection, his argument
assumes that equal protection was the right of each individual to a particular degree of
protection. Yet, as will be seen, Americans who talked about equal protection appear to have
assumed that equal protection was merely an equality of such protection as was provided by
government and the laws. (See text at notes 185-89.) Third, Heyman assumes that protec-
tion, in the sense of police or, more generally, executive branch intervention, was the
protection of the laws mentioned in the Fourteenth Amendment. In the nineteenth century,
however, Americans, particularly those who campaigned against slavery, often distinguished
between the protection of the laws and the protection of government-and only the second
of these categories included police or executive protection. (See text at notes 174-84.)
3 This article focuses on the common notion that government was instituted for the
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The eighteenth-century Americans who discussed "protection"
each, surely, talked about this subject on the basis of somewhat
different assumptions. Nonetheless, large numbers of these Ameri-
cans appear to have shared at least some assumptions relating to
protection, and it is these commonly held views that this article will
attempt to elucidate. Of course, religious and political differences
divided the Americans who talked in terms of the state-of-nature
analysis, but these religious and political distinctions do not appear
to have prevented such Americans from sharing many ideas about
the state of nature and about the protection of natural liberty.
Although some Baptists and some new lights, for example, did not
use the relatively secular, state-of-nature analysis as frequently or
with as much sophistication as did some other Protestants, 4 and
although individuals of different theological persuasions tended to
use the analysis for different reasons and in different ways, more
or less all who employed the theory appeared to have done so on
the basis of some common suppositions, and these are what will
be examined here.'S
protection of natural rights. Some writers also argued that, once government was estab-
lished, it acquired other, additional obligations, which could be discussed in terms of protec-
tion. In particular, some writers pointed out that government had to protect itself. See,
e.g., quotation from the 1780 Massachusetts Constitution in note 46. So too, government
was expected to protect individuals in the rights they had under its laws, including privi-
leges. Nonetheless, as a term of art, "protection" typically referred to the protection of
natural rights.
" For example, readers may question whether the Baptist leader, Isaac Backus, employed
the state-of-nature analysis. Yet he could propose a bill of rights that began: "All men are
born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and unalienable rights,
among which are the enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and
protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." Isaac Backus's Draft
for a Bill of Rights for the Massachusetts Constitution, 1779 § 1 in William G. McLoughlin, ed,
Isaac Backus on Church, State and Calvinism 486 (Harvard U, 1968) ("Backus on Church, State,
and Calvinism"). See also §§ 2, 4, & 7, id at 486-87. Other Baptists, moreover, such as
John Leland and Samuel Stillman, employed the state-of-nature analysis with considerable
sophistication. John Leland, The Rights of Conscience Inalienable (1791), in The Writings of the
Late Elder John Leland 179-81 (1845) ("Writings of Leland"); Samuel Stillman, A Sermon 8-10
(Mass election sermon 1779) (Evans 16537).
Although the division between supporters and opponents of establishments will receive
much attention in this account, more detailed distinctions relating to religion are approached
here with considerable caution, for the theological opinions of late eighteenth-century
Americans cannot always be summarized with brief and convenient labels. For example,
among Congregationalists, theological divisions were extensive and subtle, and only the
broadest differentiations can be captured by distinguishing between new lights and old
lights or between "consistent Calvinists" and so-called "Arminians." Theological differences
among the persons quoted will be mentioned only occasionally, when the differences seem
particularly relevant.
"5 Of course, some Americans expressly rejected the notion of a state of nature, and yet
they did not thereby necessarily abandon the analysis traditionally drawn from suppositions
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Following European writers, large numbers of Americans as-
sumed that individuals established government to obtain protection
for the liberty enjoyed in the state of nature.' 6 In the state of
nature, said Americans, individuals were equally free. 7 The 1776
Virginia Declaration of Rights, for example, declared that "all Men
are by nature equally free and independent."' 8 This equal freedom
about the state of nature. For example, in 1794, Timothy Ford argued that the state of
nature was a "fairy tale." "Americanus" [i.e., Timothy Ford], The Constitutionalist: Or, An
Inquiry How Far It Is Expedient and Proper to Alter the Constitution of South Carolina, City
Gazette and Daily Advertizer (Charleston, 1794), in 2 American Political Writing of the Found-
ing Era, 1760-1805 902 (Liberty Press, 1983) (hereafter "American Political Writing"). Even
while denying the existence of the state of nature, however, he argued on the basis of the
assumption that "[t]he natural rights of men undoubtedly form the rational foundation of
the social compact." Id at 906. As he explained, he did not consider the state of nature an
essential part of the analysis: "It is not requisite to frame the fanciful system of a state of
nature, in order to learn what these [natural rights] are .... Id. For a brief discussion of
how Americans could reject the idea of the state of nature but still retain much of the rest
of the state-of-nature analysis, see note 197.
Note that this article draws evidence of the state-of-nature analysis and the idea of protec-
tion largely from the states in which Americans debated equal protection. To avoid repro-
ducing familiar sources and to illustrate the extent to which American ministers were ac-
quainted with the state-of-nature analysis, this article frequently quotes sermons. Evidence
of the state-of-nature analysis could have been taken, however, from a broader array of
states and from a great number of exclusively secular sources.
16 Incidentally, the word "men" is used here to refer to individuals without regard to their
sex. In modem analysis relating to the state of nature, the word "individual" is useful for
its greater clarity. In descriptions of eighteenth-century accounts of that analysis, "men"
can be useful for its capacity to suggest eighteenth-century conventions and, sometimes,
ambiguities.
17 Note that Locke wrote: "Though I have said . . . That all Men by Nature are equal, I
cannot be supposed to understand all sorts of Equality . .. [Tihe Equality I there spoke of,
as proper to the Business in hand, [was] that equal Right that every Man hath, to his Natural
Freedom, without being subjected to the Will or Authority of any other Man." John Locke,
Two Treatises of Government, bk II, ch vi, § 54, at 346, Peter Laslett, ed (Mentor, 1963)
(Locke, "Two Treatises of Government").
18 Va Decl of Rights of 1776, § 1. It continued: "and have certain inherent rights, of
which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or
divest their posterity. ... Id. This language was designed to reflect an assumption that
slaves were not parties to the compact and had not become members of society.
So common was the assumption of equal freedom in the state of nature that "[n]o man
denies but that originally all were equallyfree." Samuel Webster, A Sermon 22 (Mass election
sermon 1777) (Evans 15703). In the 1787 Constitutional Convention, Luther Martin ad-
dressed the issue: "In order to prove that individuals in a State of nature are equally free &
independent he read passages from Locke, Vattel, Lord Summers-Priestly." Max Farrand,
ed, I Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 437 (Madison's notes, June 27, 1787) (Yale,
1974) (hereafter "Farrand"). At Princeton, Witherspoon lectured that "men are originally
and by nature equal, and consequently free." John Witherspoon, An Annotated Edition of
Lectures on Moral Philosophy, Lect X, at 124, ed Jack Scott (U of Del, 1982) (Witherspoon,
"Lectures"). A leading Anti-Federalist, "Brutus," wrote: "If we may collect the sentiments
of the people of America, from their own most solemn declarations, they hold this truth as
self evident, that all men are by nature free." "Brutus," Herbert J. Storing, ed, 2 The
Complete Anti-Federalist 372 (Chicago, 1981) ("Complete Anti-Federalist"). Quoting Locke, the
Rev. Stillman-a Baptist-said that ". . . 'creatures of the same species and rank, promiscu-
ously born to all the same advantages of nature, and the use of the same faculties, should
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of individuals in the state of nature from subordination to other
humans was the basis of their natural liberty-what frequently
was described as their life, liberty, and property, or more simply
(in the language of Locke) their property. 9 Unfortunately, if indi-
viduals in the state of nature had no common superior, some would
use their freedom to injure other individuals. The state of nature
was, therefore, if not a "state of war," at least a situation of "incon-
venience," in which natural liberty was insecure.20 On this account,
also be equal one amongst another without subordination or subjection....... we ought
firmly to maintain the natural equality of all men." Samuel Stillman, A Sermon 8 (Mass
election sermon 1779) (Evans 16537). Many examples have survived in the election sermons
of establishment New England ministers: Israel Evans, A Sermon 9-10 (NH election sermon
1791) (Evans 23358); Asa Burton, A Sermon 110 (Vt election sermon 1786) (Evans 19536);
Peter Powers,Jesus Cbrist the True King and Head of Government 10 (Vt election sermon 1778)
(Evans 16019); Gershom C. Lyman, A Sermon 6 (Vt election sermon 1784) (Evans 18566);
Jonas Clark, A Sermon 9 & 11 (Mass election sermon [1781]) (Evans 17114); Henry Cumings,
A Sermon 6 (Mass election sermon 1783) (Evans 17899).
19 Locke, Two Treatises of Government, bk II, ch v, § 27, at 328. For American illustrations,
see note 22.
20 In the tradition of Hobbes, some Americans said that the state of nature was a state of
war. E.g., "Philodemus" [i.e., Thomas Tudor Tucker], Conciliatory Hints (Charleston, 1784),
in I American Political Writing 613. Many examples of this point of view have been preserved
among the printed sermons of New England ministers. E.g.: "Government is necessary ....
is founded in the corruption and vices of human nature; for if mankind were in a state of
rectitude there would be no need of the sanctions of human laws .... But in the present
disordered state of our nature there would be no safety of life or property without the
protection of law. A state of nature would be a state of continual war and carnage." Samuel
McClintock, A Sermon 44 (1784) (Evans 18567). See also: Joseph Lyman, A Sermon 9 (Mass
election sermon 1787) (Evans 20469); Zabdiel Adams, A Sermon 35 (Mass election sermon
[1782]) (Evans 17450); William Welsteed, The Dignity & Duty of the Civil Magistrate 32 (Mass
election sermon 1751) (Evans 6793). For the influence of Hobbes, see Walter Berns, "The
New Pursuit of Happiness," Const Comm 65, 67-69 (1987).
Many other Americans, including many New England ministers, described men as social,
but these authors also viewed society as safer than the state of nature. E.g., "[Tihe social
Nature of Man, and his natural Desire of Happiness, strongly urge him to Society as
eligible;-to which, if we add, the natural Principle of Self-Preservation, the Dangers Mens
Lives and Properties are exposed to, when considered as unconnected with others, Society
will appear necessary." Abraham Williams, A Sermon 4 (Mass election sermon 1762) (Evans
9310). See also: Noah Hobart, Civil Government the Foundation of Social Happiness 1, 15, and
16 (Conn election sermon 1750, printed 1751) (Evans 6692); "The Preceptor" II in Mass
Spy (May 21, 1772), in 1 American Political Writing 176.
Even with differing views of the state of nature, American commentators often empha-
sized either the violence or at least the sinfulness of men in the state of nature, as this
permitted the commentators to describe the necessity of government in terms of man's fallen
character. For example, Thomas Paine wrote that "[slociety is produced by our wants, and
government by our wickedness; . . . Government, like dress, is the badge of lost inno-
cence; . . ." Thomas Paine, Common Sense 65, ed Isaac Kramnick (Penguin, 1986) (Paine,
"Common Sense"). New England ministers were particularly eloquent on the subject. E.g.:
"Were mankind perfect in wisdom and virtue, civil laws and rulers would be needless."
Gershom C. Lyman, A Sermon 6 (Vt election sermon 1782, printed 1784) (Evans 18566).
"[W]hile this womb of hell, the selfish heart, is ever pregnant, and ever bringing forth such
trains of destructive evils, there can be no safety in the enjoyment of the blessings of heaven
in a state of nature. In any state, men, like beasts, would destroy each other, unless the
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as Americans noted again and again, individuals sought protection
for their natural freedom by sacrificing a portion of it for the cre-
ation of government. According to a common maxim, "[w]hen peo-
ple enter into society, they must, in order to obtain protection,
give up some part of their natural liberty, in order to secure the
rest."'" Put another way, individuals created government to protect
their "life, liberty, and property,"22 to secure happiness, or to en-
able themselves to pursue happiness.
2 3
corrupt heart is under some powerful restraint. This was the case in fact in the early ages
of the world, before government was formed . . . 'the earth wasfilled with violence.' In such
a state neither the lives, liberty, rights, or property, or any thing man possesses is secure
or safe one moment." Asa Burton, A Sermon 9-10 (Vt election sermon 1785, printed 1786)
(Evans 19536). "Government then is a necessary evil; a scheme invented to supply the want
of true virtue. ... Id at 11. "[Al the social affections concur to urge the importance of
civil government. But ... these arguments ... would be, at best, but a feeble support to
the peace and order of society,-would never have availed to establish government, over
the lawless lusts of vicious, aspiring, or blood-thirsty men.-It is Necessity, Necessity alone,
which combines men in society. ... Jonas Clark, A Sermon 8-9 (Mass election sermon
[1781]) (Evans 17114). See also: Josiah Whitney, The Essential Requisites 11 (Conn election
sermon 1788) (Evans 21601); Timothy Stone, A Sermon 9 (Conn election sermon 1792) (Evans
24820).
21 "Publicola" [Archibold Maclaine], An Address to the Freemen of North Carolina (State Gaz
of NC, March 20, 1788), in John P. Kaminski et al, eds, 16 Documentary History of the
Ratification of the Constitution 437 (State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1986) ("Documentary
History").
22 For some relatively unfamiliar, clerical examples from New England, see the following:
"[T]he great and only design of government," said the Rev. Webster, was "the security of
the lives, liberty and property of the people." Samuel Webster, A Sermon 12 (Mass election
sermon 1777). "And the most barbarous heathen nations have found it necessary to have
established rules and customary laws strictly observed for the punishment of vice, and for
the safety of life, and preservation of property .... The people of any nation, country or
community, have an undoubted right to set upon such form of government as they judge
will most effectually secure their safety, prosperity and happiness .... "Peter Powers, Jesus
Christ the True King and Head of Government 12 (Vt election sermon 1778) (Evans 16019).
"Were there no civil government, laws, magistracy, nor Shields of the earth, for the preserva-
tion of peace, the guard of liberty, the protection of property and the defence of life, it is
easy to see ... that anarchy, confusion, blood and slaughter, waste and destruction, would
soon take place in the earth." Jonas Clark, A Sermon 8 (Mass election sermon [1781]) (Evans
17114). "The protection of life, liberty and property, is the principal object of law and
government." William Morrison, A Sermon 13-14 (NH election sermon 1792) (Evans 24563).
See also Noah Hobart, Civil Government the Foundation of Social Happiness 9 & 16 (Conn
election sermon 1750, printed 1751) (Evans 6692).
Some spoke of protection for "property." E.g., "The great Design of mens coming into
Society, and making up one civil Polity, is the preservation of their Property, which in the
state of Nature, they could not Singly, and each one by himself Defend." Benjamin Lord,
Religion and Government Subsisting Together in Society, Necessary to their Compleat Happiness and
Safety 26 (Conn election sermon for 1751, printed 1752) (Evans 6868). Thomas Paine wrote
of "man" that "he finds it necessary to surrender up a part of his property to furnish means
for the protection of the rest;..." Paine, Common Sense 65. He added that "security" is "the
true design and end of government." Id.
23 According to the Pennsylvania Constitution, "all men.., have certain natural, inherent
and inalienable rights, amongst which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty,
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Of course, the necessity of sacrificing natural liberty in order
to secure it was no paradox. Individuals seeking protection for
their natural liberty from the depredations of others sacrificed a
portion of it in a constitution, which authorized government
to impose legal obligations in restraint of the sacrificed portion of
their natural liberty. Some of these restraints were, for example,
the laws prohibiting violence and the laws requiring military ser-
vice and payment of taxes.24 By restraining some natural lib-
acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and
safety." Pa Const of 1776, Declaration of Rights, Art 1. In emphasizing the differences
among writers, one began by admitting that they agreed about happiness: "Although all
writers agree in the object of government, and admit that it was designed to promote and
secure the happiness of every member of society, yet their opinions, as to the systems most
productive of this general benefit, have been extremely contradictory." "A Native of this
Colony" [i.e., Carter Braxton], An Address to the Convention of tbe Colony andAncient dominion of
Virginia... (1776), in 1 American Political Writing 330. See also Declaration of Independence;
"Brutus," in 2 Complete Anti-Federalist 373; James Iredell, Charge to the Grand Jury of the
Circut Court for the District of Massachusetts (Oct 12, 1792), in Maeva Marcus, ed, 2
Documentary History of the Supreme Court of the United States 310 (Columbia U, 1988) ("Documen-
tary History of the Supreme Court"); Morton White, The Philosophy of the American Revolution
162-64 (Oxford U, 1978).
For the views of New England ministers of varying religious perspectives, see, e.g., the
following: "Public Happiness is the original Design and great End of Civil Government."
Noah Hobart, Civil Government the Foundation of Social Happiness 3 (Conn election sermon
1750, printed 1751) (Evans 6692). "[Tihe true original end of civil government was, the
safety and happiness of the people; that every man, so far as possible, might enjoy his
immunities and priviledges in peaceable and quiet possession." Peter Powers,Jesus Christ the
True King and Head of Government 11 (Vt election sermon 1778) (Evans 16019). "As their
leaving a state of nature for a state of civil society, is a matter of their own choice, so they
are equally free to adopt that form of government which appears to them the most eligible,
or the best calculated to promote the happiness of themselves and of their posterity." Samuel
Stillman, A Sermon 9 (Mass election sermorr 1779) (Evans 16537).
Some writers said that safety was the original reason for establishing government and that
happiness became a purpose of government only subsequently. Typically, this distinction
is not apparent in American writing. Note, however, this example: "The immediate end of
government was then at first designed, as it is now, to be a restraint upon the human heart,
to keep it from breaking forth into violent outrages .... But the ultimate end of government
is the happiness or well-being of men in this world. In order to this, it is not only necessary
that mens lives, property, and natural rights should be safe guarded; but also, that they
should discharge the duties, and grant that help and assistance which they in justice owe
each other. Government then by restraining the selfish heart, and by obliging men to
perform acts of kindness and benevolence, (seemingly so if no more) and to discharge the
duties they owe each other, reaches its final term, the promotion of the happiness and well-being
of the world." Asa Burton, A Sermon 10 (Vt election sermon 1785, printed 1786) (Evans
19536).
24 Civil "restraints" on natural liberty included not only negative commands but also other
laws controlling or restricting an individual's liberty as it existed in the state of nature.
Thus, such restraints consisted of all civil obligations, if these are understood as the duties
imposed by law on individuals-not including, however, conditions on privileges.
Of course, the obligations included moral duties. In this regard note that ministers of
established churches, at least in New England, sometimes suggested that dissenters took a
position on religious liberty that was incompatible with moral regulation. In response to
dissenters' arguments that civil governments should only regulate civil matters, some mem-
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erty, these laws protected or at least facilitated protection of the
remainder.
As has already been suggested, the sacrifice of natural liberty
was assumed to occur by means of a contract, fundamental law, or
constitution, in which the people stipulated what they gave up
and what they retained.25 In the words of one Anti-Federalist, "[a]
bers of establishments justified state support for their establishments by saying, inter alia,
that the regulation of morality was a regulation of religion and that, therefore, civil govern-
ment had to be able to regulate religion in order to achieve its civil purposes. With this
argument, establishment writers could simultaneously justify an establishment and could
suggest that dissenters were against moral regulation. E.g., "[I]t is the duty of rulers to give
all that countenance and support to religion that is consistent with liberty of conscience.
And it is perfectly consistent with that liberty and equal protection which are secured to
all denominations of christians, by our excellent constitution, for rulers in the exercise of
their authority to punish profane swearing, blasphemy, and open contempt of the institu-
tions of religion, which have a fatal influence on the interests of society, and for which no
man, in the exercise of reason, can plead conscience." Samuel McClintock, A Sermon 33
(1784) (Evans 18567). "With respect to articles of faith or modes of worship, civil authority
have no right to establish religion. The people ought to choose their own ministers, and
their own denomination, as our laws now permit them; but as far as religion is connected
with the morals of the people, and their improvement in knowledge, it becomes of great
importance to the state; and legislators may well consider it as part of their concern for
the public welfare, to make provision that all the towns may be furnished with good teach-
ers ...." Samuel Langdon, A Sermon 47-48 (NH election sermon 1788) (Evans 21192).
Few canards were more annoying for dissenters than to suggest that their opposition to
government tax support for religion would destroy the state's right to regulate morality.
Dissenters, illustrated by the two Baptists quoted below, tended to justify moral regulation
as relating to civil interests. According to Caleb Blood, the government's obligation to
treat people equally notwithstanding religious differences "by no means prohibits the civil
magistrate from enacting those laws that shall enforce the observance of those precepts in
the christian religion, the violation of which is a breach of the civil peace; viz. such as forbid
murder, theft, adultery, false witness, and injuring our neighbor, either in person, name,
or estate. And among others, that of observing the Sabbath, should be enforced by the civil
power. . . .As to the aid of the civil power to force men to support gospel ministers, I
humbly conceive that it can never be necessary." Caleb Blood, A Sermon 35 (Vt election
sermon [1792]) (Evans 24126). When Stillman-a leading Baptist-preached an election
sermon, establishment critics allegedly said: "'That upon the principles contained in the
sermon, the civil magistrate ought not to exercise his authority to suppress actions of immo-
rality.'" Stillman responded that had his words been "properly observed, this objection had
been superseded. Immoral actions properly come under the cognizance of civil rulers, who
are the guardians of the peace of society. For then I beg leave to observe in the words of
Bishop Warburton, 'That the magistrate punishes no bad actions, as sins or offenses against
God, but only as crimes injurious to, or having a malignant influence on society.'" Samuel
Stillman, A Sermon 20 note (Mass election sermon 1779) (Evans 16537).
5 A contrary interpretation, according to which Americans desired or assumed an unwrit-
ten constitution, has been suggested by Bernard Bailyn, Gordon Wood, Thomas Grey,
and, more recently, Susanna Sherry. Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American
Revolution 175-89 (1967); Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787
259-305 (1969); Thomas Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution, 27 Stan L Rev 703,
715-16 (1975); Susana Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U Chi L Rev 1127
(1987). See, however, Walter Berns, Judicial Review and the Rights and Laws of Nature, 3
Supreme Court Review 49 (1982); Isaac Kramnick, Republican Revisionism Revisited, 87 Am
Hist Rev 629 (1982); Helen K. Michaels, The Role of Natural Law in Early American Constitu-
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people, entering into society, surrender such a part of their natural
rights, as shall be necessary for the existence of that society ...
They are conveyed by a written compact, expressing those which
are given up, and the mode in which those reserved shall be se-
cured. 26
Because the people sacrificed their natural liberty by means of
constitutions made by themselves, they could exercise their re-
maining natural liberty-it was protected-only in accord with
tionalism: Did the Founders Contemplate Judicial Enforcement of'Unwritten' Individual Rights? 69
NC L Rev 421 (1991); Ronald M. Peters, Jr., The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780: A Social
Compact (1978); Rozann Rothman, The Impact of Covenant and Contract Theories on Conceptions
of the U.S. Constitution, Publius 149 (Fall 1980); see also Gary J. Schmitt and Robert H.
Webking, Revolutionaries, Antifederalists, and Federalists: Comments on Gordon Wood's Understand-
ing of the American Founding, Political Sci Reviewer 195 (Fall 1979).
A brief sampling of some the evidence can be presented here. In 1771, Josiah Tucker
preached that "the fundamental laws, which are the basis of government, and form the
political constitution of the state,-which mark out, and fix the chief lines and boundaries
between the authority of Rulers, and the liberties and privileges of the people, are, and can
be no other, in a free state, than what are mutually agreed upon and consented to." Josiah
Tucker, An Election Sermon (Boston, 1771), in 1 American Political Writing 162. After urging
that a "continental conference" should meet, Thomas Paine said that "their business" should
"be to frame a CONTINENTAL CHARTER, or Charter of the United Colonies; (answer-
ing to what is called the Magna Charta of England) fixing the number and manner of
choosing members of Congress, members of Assembly .... Securing freedom and property
to all men, and above all things the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of
conscience ...." Paine, Common Sense 97. This charter was a "constitution." Id at 98. See
also id at 109. Another author wrote: "The constitution is a social covenant entered into by
express consent of the people, upon a footing of the most perfect equality with respect to
every civil liberty." "Philodemus" [i.e., Thomas Tudor Tucker], Conciliatory Hints (1784),
in I American Political Writing 612. On the commencement of the New Hampshire Constitu-
tion, the Rev. McClintock preached: "Were it necessary, I might shew with what precision
the rights belonging to men in a state of society are defined in the Declaration of Rights, and
the life, liberty and property of the subject guarded with a jealous care against oppressive
power... ." Samuel McClintock, A Sermon 23-24 (1784) (Evans 18567). Witherspoon said:
"Society I would define to be an association or compact of any number of persons, to deliver
up or abridge some part of their natural rights, in order to have the strength of the united
body, to protect the remaining, and to bestow others." Witherspoon, Lectures, Lect X, at 123.
Nathaniel Chipman wrote: "In the exercise of this right of free consent by the people,...
constitutions of government are formed. The constitution is no other than the fundamental
law made and ratified by such compact." Nathaniel Chipman, Sketches of the Principles of
Government 116 (1793). Thomas Reese-a Presbyterian minister in Salem, South Carolina-
noted that "[i]f Mr. Locke, and the American politicians, argue right, all legitimate govern-
ment is originally founded on compact." Thomas Reese, An Essay on the Influence of Religion
in Civil Society 20 (1788) (Evans 21418). See also notes 26-29 & 39.
26 "John De Witt," 4 Complete Anti-Federalist 21. He continued: "Language is so easy of
explanation, and so difficult is it by words to convey exact ideas, that the party to be
governed cannot be too explicit. The line cannot be drawn with too much precision and
accuracy." Id. He also wrote that the only difference between a constitution for the United
States and an individual state is "in the numbers of the parties concerned; they are both a
compact between the Governors and Governed, the letter of which must be adhered to in
discussing their powers. That which is not expressly granted, is of course retained." Id
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the varying demands of different constitutions. As the Rev. Moses
Hemmingway told the Governor and legislature of Massachusetts:
Though the natural rights of men may, in general, seem much
alike, they being, in this respect, "all FREE and EQUAL;" yet
it is in different degrees that they are permitted to use them.
According to the different civil constitutions which men are
under, their civil liberty is larger, or more restricted. 7
Anti-Federalists had frequent occasion to use this analysis. For example, a constitution
that granted broad powers and failed to mention freedom of the press worried Anti-
Federalists because "[t]he people's or the printers claim to a free press, is founded on the
fundamental laws, that is, compacts, and state constitutions. . . . The people, who can
annihilate or alter those constitutions, can annihilate or limit this right." "Federal Farmer,"
2 Complete Anti-Federalist 329. The "Federal Farmer" also wrote: "The constitution, or whole
social compact, is but one instrument, no more or less, than a certain number of articles,
or stipulations agreed to by the people, whether it consists of articles, sections, chapters,
bills of rights, or parts of any other denomination, cannot be material." Id at 323; see also
id at 325. Another Anti-Federalist wished "that the freedom of the press may be previously
secured as a constitutional and unalienable right, and not left to the precarious care of popular
privileges [i.e., public opinion about rights] which may or many not influence our new
rulers." "Cincinnatus," 6 id at 11. Speaking of natural rights in general, the "Impartial
Examiner" wrote: "There can be no other just origin of civil power, but some such mutual
contract of all of the people: and although their great object in forming society is an intention
to secure their natural rights; yet the relations arising from this political union create certain
duties and obligations to the state, which require a sacrifice of some portion of those rights
and of that exuberance of liberty, which obtains in a state of nature.-This, however, being
compensated by certain other adventitious rights and privileges, which are aquired by the
social connection; . . . they ought to give up no greater share than what is understood to
be absolutely necessary:-and they should endeavor so to organize, arrange and connect it's
several branches, that when duly exercised it may tend to promote the common good of all,...
It is evident, therefore that they should attend most diligently to those sacred rights, which
they have received with their birth, and which can neither be retained to themselves, nor
transmitted to their posterity, unless they are expressly reserved: for it is a maxim, I dare say,
universally acknowledged, that when men establish a system of government, in granting
the powers therein they are alvays understood to surrender whatever they do not so ex-
pressly reserve." "Impartial Examiner," 5 Complete Anti-Federalist 176; see also id at 177 &
185. According to "An Old Whig," "To define what portion of his natural liberty, the
subject shall at all times be entitled to retain, is one great end of a bill of rights." "An Old
Whig," 3 id at 33. "Brutus" wrote that "the portion of their natural liberty, which they give
up for the enjoyment of civil government, should be expressly mentioned, in the constitu-
tion." "Brutus," in 8 Documentary History 212. Federalists did not disagree that natural rights
were retained only to the extent they were reserved in the Constitution, but they argued
that the unamended federal Constitution adequately reserved natural liberty and that the
spirit of the people was a more important means of preserving rights than any paper guar-
antees.
27 Moses Hemmingway, A Sermon 29-30 (Mass election sermon 1784) (Evans 18526). See
also id at 13-14. Josiah Whitney said: "Nations or states are left to chuse and adopt such
[forms of government] as are most agreeable to their genius and circumstances. [New ]
Some natural rights are to be given up into the hands of one, or more, for the preservation
of the rest. [New ] One form may be best for one people, and a different one for another.
In general, that ought to have the preference, which best secures the lives, liberties, and
properties of men." Josiah Whitney, The Essential Requisites to Form the Good Ruler's Character
12 (Conn election sermon 1788) (Evans 21601).
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Similarly, when George Washington transmitted the product of
the 1787 Constitutional Convention to the Congress, he mentioned
the difficulties the framers had encountered in attempting to delin-
eate the sacrifice of natural rights to the Federal government:
Individuals entering into society, must give up a share of liberty
to preserve the rest. The magnitude of the sacrifice must de-
pend as well on situation and circumstance, as on the object to
be obtained. It is at all times difficult to draw with precision
the line between those rights which must be surrendered, and
those which may be reserved; and on the present occasion this
difficulty was encreased by a difference among the several
States as to their situation, extent, habits, and particular in-
terests.
28
More generally, in the words of Jefferson's 1790 official opinion on
the right of Congress to adjourn itself- "It is a natural right and,
like all other natural rights, may be abridged or regulated in it's
exercise by law."29 The degree of natural liberty protected and
enjoyed under government depended upon the varying require-
ments of the constitutions and other laws adopted in different soci-
eties.
According to Americans who employed the state-of-nature anal-
ysis, the limited natural liberty permitted and protected by the
laws of civil government was much preferable to the insecure lib-
erty enjoyed in the state of nature.3 ° Because of civil government
and because of the obligations or "restraints" of civil laws, such
natural liberty as the civil laws left to individuals was protected.
Moreover, because of this security, liberty was more assured when
28 George Washington, letter to the President of Congress, Sept. 17, 1787, in I Documen-
tary History 305.
29 Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Residence Bill, 17 Papers of
Thomas Jefferson 197, Julian P. Boyd, ed (Princeton U, 1965). He also wrote: "This like all
other natural rights, may be abridged or modified in it's exercise, by their own consent....
but so far as it is not abridged or modified, they retain it as a natural right .... Id at 195.
Jefferson also wrote that "our rulers can have authority over such natural rights, only as we
have submitted to them." Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, Paul L. Ford, ed,
Question 17, at 197 (1894).
3o In this sense, Americans were not exclusively "individualistic" or "communitarian,"
and, for this reason, it can be anachronistic to speak of competing ideologies of liberalism
and republicanism. See Thomas L. Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism: The Moral
Vision of the American Founders and the Philosophy ofJohn Locke (U of Chi, 1988). The differences
among most eighteenth-century Americans on these issues can easily be overdrawn or de-
picted in modem terms that obscure the extent to which those older Americans held shared
assumptions.
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subject to government than when it was not; .there was a greater
enjoyment of liberty under the restraints of law than independent
of law.31 What typically was discussed in terms of liberty could
also be addressed in terms of interests: "In vain would it be for
individuals to have distinct interests, were they not preserved in
the enjoyment of them, by the combined power of the whole."
32
Of course, not all types of natural liberty could be sacrificed to
obtain protection; Americans often denied that there could be any
restraints upon the natural right of free exercise of religion. Draw-
ing on Locke, eighteenth-century Americans said that each individ-
ual possessed, as part of his equal freedom in the state of nature,
an inalienable liberty to worship or to exercise his religion as he
pleased. Dissenters and even, increasingly, members of establish-
ments opined that a person's relationship to his Maker was so "per-
sonal" and important that it could not be surrendered to the control
of society. It was a matter of which an individual had an inalienable
right "to judge for himself."33 This argument that the natural right
3 Zephaniah Swift-later Chief Justice of Connecticut-wrote that "the natural rights
which we sacrifice are of but very little value, when compared with the civil rights we
acquire in a free and well regulated government." Zephaniah Swift, I A System of the Laws
of the State of Connecticut 16 (1795). According to a Massachusetts minister, "it is indeed
much for the People's Good that they are put in Subjection to the Power of the Magistrate;
that they are certainly more effectually secured of their Lives, Liberties & Estates, under
the Direction & Restraint of Laws and Government, than they possibly could be without.
For if there were not king in Israel, every Man might do what was right in his own Eyes." William
Welsteed, The Dignity and Duty of the Civil Magistrate 22 (Mass election sermon 1751) (Evans
6793). A Connecticut minister preached: "Men ... are by no means, to remain in a State of
Nature; each one to possess by himself, and use for himself his natural Rights & Liberties,
without any borrowed Strength and Advantage from others by Compact: ..." Benjamin
Lord, Religion and Government Subsisting Together in Society, Necessary to their Compleat Happiness
and Safety 2 (Conn election sermon for 1751, printed 1752) (Evans 6868). Also: "Every
Member may have the Strength of the whole employed for the Security of his own Life
and Property. And also rejoyce in his Neighbours having the same Protection and Advantage
with himself: So that, the Privileges of Society must be vastly greater than all the Rights of
Nature separately Consider'd and Used .. " Id at 3. The Rev. Hemmingway said: "It is
true, the interests of society require subordination: but this deprives none of liberty, but
helps all to enjoy it better." Moses Hemmingway, A Sermon 27 (Mass election sermon 1784)
(Evans 18526). See also id at 16.
32 Zabdiel Adams, A Sermon 35 (Mass election sermon [1782]) (Evans 17450). On the same
page, he added a Hobbesian flourish: "Althou' a state of nature may have some attendant
advantages; yet the inconveniences of it are a thousand times greater.-It is a state of war."
Id.
" For example, in Massachusetts dissenters petitioned that "God hath given to every Man
an Unalienable Right in Matters of His Worship to Judge for himself as his Conscience
reserves ye Rule from God." 1749 Petition to the Mass Assembly from the Separate congre-
gations in 17 towns in Anson Phelps Stokes, 1 Church and State in the United States 422
(Harper, 1950). The Baptist leader Isaac Backus wrote: "In civil states particular men are
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of religious judgment and worship was inalienable was reinforced
by another argument, based on assumptions about the secular pur-
pose of government. The principle of self-preservation-the as-
sumed goal of humans to preserve themselves-suggested that men
formed government to secure their "secular Welfare." Thus, an
establishment minister preached: "The Nature of civil Society or
Government, is a temporal worldly Constitution, formed upon
worldly Motives, to answer valuable worldly Purposes."3 4 So com-
mon was the assumption that men formed civil government by
consent "to promote their temporal interests" that a leading Baptist
minister could mimic his own use of the state-of-nature analysis
by saying of heaven that "[t]hey who enter into this kingdom do it
voluntarily, with a design of promoting their spiritual interests."35
Having been established for secular purposes, civil government
invested with authority to judge for the whole; but in Christ's kingdom each one has an
equal right to judge for himself." Isaac Backus, A Fish Caught in His Own Net (1768), in
William G. McLoughlin, ed, Isaac Backus on Church, State, and Calvinism 198 (Belknap, 1968)
("Backus on Church, State, and Calvinism"). See also id at 332, 335. Another Baptist leader,
Samuel Stillman, also asserted that religion was a "right of private judgment." It was a
matter "in which every man is personally interested; and concerning which every man ought
to be fully persuaded in his own mind." Samuel Stillman, A Sermon 25 (Mass election
sermon 1779) (Evans 16537). In Virginia, Presbyterians petitioned: "The thoughts, the
intentions, the faith, and the consciences of men, with their modes of worship, lie beyond
their reach, and are ever to be referred to a higher and more penetrating tribunal. These
internal and spiritual matters cannot be measured by human rules, nor be amenable to
human laws." Memorial of the Presbytery of Hanover to the General Assembly of Virginia
(Oct 1784), in William A. Blakely, ed, American State Papers 109 (Religious Liberty Assoc,
1911) ("American State Papers"). Later, Presbyterians said: "Religion is altogether personal,
and the right of exercising it unalienable; and it is not, cannot, and ought not to be, resigned
to the will of the society at large; and much less to the legislature, which derives its authority
wholly from the consent of the people, and is limited by the original intention of civil
associations." Memorial of the Presbyterians of Virginia to the General Assembly (Aug 13,
1785), in American State Papers 113-14. See also Witherspoon, Lectures, Lect XIV, at 160.
Madison wrote that this right "is unalienable, because the opinions of men, depending only
on the evidence contemplated in their own minds, cannot follow the dictates of other men."
James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance (1785), American State Papers 120-21. An
establishment minister in New Hampshire preached: "As the conscience of man is the image
and representative of God in the human soul; so to him alone it is responsible." Israel Evans,
A Sermon 6 (NH election sermon 1791) (Evans 23358). Another preached that, "as piety and
our mode of faith are matters only between GOD and our own souls, we ought to be
amenable to no human tribunal; but only answerable to GOD and our consciences." Samuel
Shuttlesworth, A Discourse 14 (Vt election discourse 1791, printed 1792) (Evans 24788). For
additional evidence of both dissenting and establishment opinion, see Philip A. Hamburger,
A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical Perspective, 60 Geo Wash L Rev
933-38 (1992).
34 Abraham Williams, A Sermon 8 (Mass election sermon 1762) (Evans 9310).
35 Samuel Stillman, A Sermon 33 & 26 (Mass election sermon 1779) (Evans 16537). See
quotation of the Rev. Booth in note 149.
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arguably lacked authority to deny an individual's free exercise of
religion. On the basis of these arguments, dissenters and their allies
could insist that the natural right of religious freedom was "exactly
the same" in civil society as in the state of nature.36 Although some
establishment writers argued that government had a right to deny
religious liberty to persons whose religious opinions might pose
a threat to civil government, this point of view increasingly was
questioned.37 In the decades following 1776, the natural right of
the free exercise of religion was, to large numbers of dissenters and
even many members of establishments, a right simply beyond the
reach of civil government.
In contrast, Americans did not typically consider most other
natural rights-even "inalienable" natural rights-immune from
government restraints. Life, liberty, property, and the pursuit of
happiness were inalienable natural rights but were to be protected
under the regulations of civil government. So too, freedom of
speech was governed by the laws concerning, among other things,
defamation, blasphemy, and fraud.3" Taking up the cause of South
Carolina's dissenters, the Rev. William Tennent-a Presbyteri-
an-acknowledged that individuals could give government the
power to regulate the rights often described as inalienable-the
only exception being in matters of religion: "I can communicate to
my representative, a power to dispose of part of my property, for
the security of the remaining part: I may give him a right to resign
a part of my personal liberty to the obligation of good laws, as a
means of preserving the rest,-but, cannot,-I say it is out of my
power, to communicate to any man on earth, a right to dispose of
my conscience, and to lay down for me what I shall believe and
11 Stillman wrote of the "Rights of Conscience" that "in a state of nature, and of civil
society [they] are exactly the same. They can neither be parted with nor controled, by any
human authority whatever." Samuel Stillman, A Sermon 11 (Mass election sermon 1779)
(Evans 16537). See also the opinion of the Connecticut Separate, Israel Holly, A Word in
Zion's Behalf 18 ([1765]) (Evans 10005). Madison wrote "that in matters of religion no man's
right is abridged by the institution of civil society, and that religion is wholly exempt from
its cognizance." James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance, American State Papers 121.
See also quotations in note 39 and accompanying text.
31 Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religions Exemption: An Historical Perspec-
tive, 60 Geo Wash L Rev 915, 918-26 (1992).
" The right of contract also was subject to variation by civil laws. Zephaniah Swift, 1 A
System of the Laws of the State of Connecticut 16 (1795). For a later example, see the dissent of
Marshall in Ogden v Saunders, 12 Wheat 213, 345 (1827).
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practice in religious matters." 39 Whereas the free exercise of religion
might be "exactly the same" under government as in nature, other
inalienable natural rights were different under government and
therefore were inalienable in a rather qualified way. In order to
obtain protection for their natural rights, individuals could submit
even "inalienable" natural rights to particular legal forms or re-
straints.
40
Not surprisingly, Americans frequently associated protection
with obedience and allegiance. According to an establishment cler-
gyman in Massachusetts, "[a]s every Subject has a Right or Claim
to be protected by the Magistrate, so the Magistrate has an equal
39 William Tennent, Mr. Tennent's Speech on the Dissenting Petition, Delivered In the House of
Assembly, Charles-Town, South-Carolina, Jan. 11, 1777 6 (1777) (Evans 15612). He also said:
"The rights of conscience are unnalienable [sic], and therefore, all laws to bind it, are, ipso
facto, null and void." Id at 6-7. After defining property to include "everything to which a
man ...may have a right," Madison wrote that "[clonscience is the most sacred of all
property; other property depending, in part, on positive law, the exercise of that [conscience]
being a natural and unalienable right." James Madison, "On Property" (1792), in American
State Papers 159. According to Jefferson, "our rulers can have authority over such natural
rights, only as we have submitted to them. The rights of conscience we never submitted,
we could not submit. We are answerable for them to our God." Thomas Jefferson, Notes on
the State of Virginia, P. L. Ford, ed, 197 (1894). In presenting their draft to the public, the
1782 New Hampshire Constitutional Convention explained of the Bill of Rights: "We have
endeavor'd therein to ascertain and define the most important and essential natural rights
of men. We have distinguished betwixt the alienable and unalienable rights: For the former
of which, men may receive an equivalent; for the latter, or the RIGHTS of CONSCIENCE,
they can receive none." An Address of the Convention for Framing a New Constitution or Form
of Government for the State of New Hampshire 15 (1782) (Evans 17616). Nathaniel Chipman
quoted Paine: "The natural rights, which he [i.e., an individual] retains, are all those, in
which the power to execute is as perfect in the individual as the right itself. Among this
class are ... all intellecutal rights, or rights of the mind; consequently Religion is one of
those rights. The natural rights, which are not retained, are all those, which, though they
are perfect in the individual, the power to execute them is defective." Nathaniel Chipman,
Sketches of the Principles of Government 107 (1793). Later, Alexander Addison wrote: "The
right of conscience is a natural right of a superior order for the exercise of which we are
answerable to God. The right of publication is more within the control of civil authority,
and was thought a more proper subject of general law." Alexander Addison, Analysis of the
Report of the Committee of the Virginia Assembly (1800), in American Political Writing 1090. See
also Zephaniah Swift, 1 A System of the Laws of the State of Connecticut 16 (1795); McLoughlin,
1 New England Dissent 610.
o This summary of how Americans analyzed restraints on inalienable natural rights has,
for the sake of simplicity, described only the physical natural freedom or power of individu-
als in the state of nature to do as they pleased. When discussing the moral liberty of
individuals, Americans said that this moral freedom did not include a liberty to infringe the
equal rights of others or otherwise to violate natural law. With respect to an individual's
moral freedom in the state of nature, Americans could say that no natural rights-alienable
or inalienable-were sacrificed to society.
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Claim and Right to be obeyed by every Subject."'" Another
preached:
as by the social compact, the whole is engaged for the protec-
tion and defence of the life, liberty and property of each indi-
vidual; so each individual owes all that he hath, even life itself,
to the support, protection and defence of the whole, when the
exigencies of state require it. And no man, whether in authority
or subordination, can justly excuse himself from any duty, ser-
vice or exertions, in peace or war, that may be necessary for
the publick peace, liberty, safety or defence, when lawfully
and constitutionally called thereto.4"
Protection required submission to law.
43
By the same token, however, a constitution's or government's
failure to provide satisfactory protection justified disobedience.
"Nothing is more true," wrote Theophilus Parsons, "than that
ALLEGIANCE AND PROTECTION ARE RECIPROCAL." 44
With this double-edged maxim, Americans explained not only obe-
dience to the restraints that provided protection for natural liberty
but also the repudiation of constitutions that did not adequately
supply protection. For example, the North Carolina Constitution
began by declaring that "[w]hereas allegiance and protection are,
in their nature, reciprocal, and the one should of right be refused
when the other is withdrawn, . . ."4 Similarly, the Massachusetts
Constitution described the protection or safety of individuals in the
enjoyment of their natural rights as at least one of the purposes of
government, and said that "whenever these great objects are not
obtained, the people have a right to alter the government, and to
take measures necessary for their safety, prosperity and happi-
41 William Welsteed, The Dignity and Duty of the Civil Magistrate 40 (Mass election sermon
1751) (Evans 6793).
41 Jonas Clark, A Sermon 29 (Mass election sermon [1781]) (Evans 17114). He also said,
"every member is engaged for the peace, safety and defence of the state; and the whole for
the peace, safety and protection of every member .... " Id at 21.
'3 It was a common sentiment. Among others, Swift wrote: "Every citizen owes obedience
to the laws of the state, and is entitled to protection and security in his life, liberty, and
property. The duties of protection and allegiance, are reciprocal." Zephaniah Swift, I A
System of the Laws of the State of Connecticut 13 (1795). See also Calvin's Case, 7 Coke 1 (1608),
cited by Earl M. Maltz, "The Concept of Equal Protection of the Laws-An Historical
Inquiry," 22 San Diego L Rev 499, 507 (1985); Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ch ii, § 21, at
153, and Review & Conclusion, 491, Richard Tuck, ed (Cambridge U, 1991).
4 The Esser Result (1778), in Theophilus Parsons, Memoirs of Theophilus Parsons 367 (1861).
45 NC Const of 1776.
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ness."' The people had subjected some of their natural liberty to
civil government through a constitution, and if, by so doing, they
did not obtain protection for the rest of their natural liberty, they
could alter their mode of government-by constitutional amend-
ment or even revolution. The protection of natural liberty, far
from being a legal right with a remedy at law, was a purpose of
government the people achieved by establishing and, if necessary,
changing the system of law.
The balance between restraint and liberty that constituted the
desired protection was not always entirely clear. Protection re-
quired a sacrifice of liberty to legal obligations, but an excess of
these obligations could endanger the very liberty they were de-
' Mass Const of 1780, preamble. This quotation was preceded by the following: "The
end of the institution, maintenance and administration of government, is to secure the
existence of the body-politic; to protect it; and to furnish the individuals who compose it,
with the power of enjoying, in safety and tranquility, their natural rights, and the blessings
of life:". Id. The New Jersey Constitution declared that "allegiance and protection are, in
the nature of things, reciprocal ties, each equally depending upon the other, and liable to
be dissolved by the others being refused or withdrawn." NJ Const of 1776, preamble. The
Virginia Declaration of Rights proclaimed "[t]hat Government is, or ought to be, instituted
for the common benefit, protection, and security of the people, nation, or community; of
all the various modes and forms of government, that is best which is capable of producing
the greatest degree of happiness and safety, and is most effectually secured against the
danger of maladministration; and that, whenever any government shall be found inadequate
or contrary to these purposes, a majority of the community hath a indubitable, inalienable,
and indefeasible right to reform, alter, or abolish it, in such manner as shall be judged most
conducive to the public weal." Va DecI of Rights of 1776, § 3.
The Apostle Paul, according to the Rev. Goodrich, "well knew the rights of human
nature," and, after quoting the Apostle on the subject of submission to civil authority,
Goodrich said: "When a constitutional government is converted into tyranny, and the laws,
rights and properties of a free people are openly invaded, there ought not to be the least
doubt but that a remedy consistent with this doctrine of the apostle, is provided . . . for
their preservation; nor ought resistance in such case to be called rebellion .... Civil society
can exist no longer, than while connected by its laws and constitution: These are of no
force, otherwise than as they are maintained and defended by the members of the common-
wealth. This regular support of authority is the only security, a people can have against
violence and injustice, feuds and animosities, in the unmolested enjoyment of their honest
acquisitions: Hence the very end of civil society demands, that the orders of government
be enforced." Elizur Goodrich, The Principles of Civil Union 25 (Conn election sermon 1787)
(Evans 20393). In other words, the principle of self-preservation required revolution if
government so abandoned its obligations as to invade rather than secure liberty, but, in
normal circumstances, security or protection was achieved through enforcement of the laws
of civil society. According to Moses Hemmingway, "no man has ever any rightful liberty
to consent to any constitution or compact inconsistent with his own safety and welfare,
and that of his fellow men: for instance, to authorize any to govern unrighteously and
oppressively. ... and if any people have been so imprudent and blameable as to consent
to, and put themselves under a tyrannical government, they are so far from being bound in
honor or conscience to support it, that it is their duty to overthrow and abolish it as soon
as they can." Moses Hemmingway, A Sermon 14-15 (Mass election sermon 1784) (Evans
18526).
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signed to protect. On the ground that individuals established gov-
ernment to protect natural liberty, Americans frequently said they
did not want more legal restraints on natural liberty than were
necessary. 47 Yet even the Americans who said this recognized that
substantial legal obligations were necessary to the degree required
for self-preservation-for the protection of individual liberty and
interests. 48 The challenge was to create constitutions and laws that
restrained natural liberty as little as possible but that, nonetheless,
imposed restraints adequate for the preservation of such liberty.49
Thus, protection-in the sense of protection for natural liber-
ty-was the protection individuals obtained by sacrificing part of
their natural liberty for the creation of civil government and its
47 See note 225. James Madison's cousin, the Rev. James Madison, wrote to him that one
of the "Principles common to Am[erican]ns" was "ye Desire of enjoying all the Advantages
of Gov[ernment] at ye least possible Expense to Natural Liberty." Rev. James Madison,
Letter to James Madison (Feb 9, 1788), in 8 Documentary History 358. See also "Publicola"
[Archibold Maclaine], An Address to the Freemen of Nortb Carolina (State Gaz of NC, March
20, 1788), 16 Documentary History 437.
" E.g., Noah Hobart, Civil Government the Foundation of Social Happiness 7-8 (Conn election
sermon 1750, printed 1751) (Evans 6692); Israel Evans, A Sermon 10 (NH election sermon
1791) (Evans 23358); "Brutus," 2 Complete Anti-Federalist 373; "Impartial Examiner," 5 id at
176; Zephaniah Swift, 1 A System of the Laws of the State of Connecticut 13 (1795). See also
William Blackstone, I Commentaries 125-26 (1765).
' In the words of an Anti-Federalist: "To yield up so much, as is necessary for the
purposes of government; and to retain all beyond what is necessary, is the great point,
which ought, if possible, to be attained in the formation of a constitution." "An Old Whig,"
3 Complete Anti-Federalist 33. Similarly, "Brutus" wrote: "[lit was necessary that a certain
portion of natural liberty should be surrendered, in order, that what remained should be
preserved: how great a proportion of natural freedom is necessary to be yielded by individu-
als, when they submit to government, I shall not now enquire. So much, however, must
be given up, as will be sufficient to enable those, to which the administration of government
is committed, to establish laws for the promoting the happiness of the community, and to
carry those laws into effect." "Brutus," 2 Complete Anti-Federalist 373. A supporter of a
Congressional ticket that included Anti-Federalists wrote that "we ought to preserve our
liberties, if possible, so far as they may consist with our essential protection." "A Friend to
Liberty and Union," "To the Freemen of Pennsylvania," Federal Gazette (Phila.) (Nov 7,
1788, No. 33). Justice James Iredell told a grand jury: "True liberty certainly consists in
such restraints, and no greater, on the actions of each particular individual as the common
good of the whole requires. The exact medium it may be difficult to find, . . ." James
Iredell, Charge to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts
(Oct 12, 1792), in 2 Documentary History of the Supreme Court 310. In this sense, Paine had
written that '[Ithe science of the politician consists in fixing the true point of happiness and
freedom.'" Paine, Common Sense 97-98. James Witherspoon said that "The end of union
should be the protection of liberty, as far as it is a blessing." Witherspoon, Lectures, Lect
X, at 124. In its instructions to its delegates to the Connecticut ratifying convention, the
town of Preston ungrammatically observed that "We are willing to give up such share of
our rights as to enable government to support, defend, and preserve the rest. It is difficult
to draw the line." Instructions of the Town of Preston, Nov. 26, 1787, in 3 Documentary
History 439. See also notes 27-28.
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laws. In order to protect natural liberty, government and its laws
had to restrain a portion of it, and the balance between the liberty
protected and the restraints on liberty varied from one society to
another, according to their different constitutions and laws. Rather
than a legally enforceable right to a particular degree of protection
or natural liberty, protection was a purpose of government and, in
this sense, was a moral claim on government enforced by the power
of the people to alter their constitutions by amendment or even
revolution. This specialized idea of protection-protection for nat-
ural liberty-was distinct from ordinary notions of protection, and
it was this specialized idea of protection that came to be of such
importance for American debates about equality. If individuals
obtained protection for their natural liberty by submitting to legal
restraints on a portion of that freedom, then equal protection may
have been an equality of these restraints or civil obligations-and,
concomitantly, an equality of the natural liberty protected.
II. EQUAL PROTECTION
The idea of equal protection was the position of establish-
ments, which increasingly conceded an equal protection of the laws
for natural rights but did not want to give up the possibility of
unequal "privileges." Whereas dissenters typically demanded equal
civil rights-not only equal protection but also equal privileges-
establishments frequently asserted that the only equality govern-
ment was obliged to provide was equal protection.
Put more concretely, equal protection appealed to establishment
writers who sought to justify a combination of privilege and tolera-
tion-who wanted to retain the "privileges" of their religion but
were willing to allow dissenters an equality of natural rights and
obligations under civil law. Proponents of equal protection typi-
cally said that government should provide their established religion
with financial support or other privileges not available to dissenters.
These advocates of equal protection, however, tended to criticize
the intolerant governments that not only distributed privileges un-
equally among religions but also imposed unequal legal restraints
on the natural liberty of dissenters.50 Such governments, according
to increasing numbers of establishment writers, did not equally
" E.g., if dissenters had to pay penalties or if dissenters could not enforce contracts.
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protect the natural rights of individuals with respect to their reli-
gious differences. These tolerant establishment writers condemned
unequal legal restraints as violations of equal protection and justi-
fied their unequal privileges as compatible with that standard.
Although the alternative standard of equality-equal civil
rights-will not be discussed until later, it must be mentioned at
this point, because equal protection was an idea that was contrasted
to equal civil rights. In both England and America, dissenters of
varying sects sought equal civil rights-an equality of rights under
civil law. They thereby were requesting not only an equality of
the natural liberty permitted and protected under civil law but also
an equality of legal privileges. It was as an alternative to equal civil
rights that establishment authors, in England and then America,
proposed equal protection-a standard with which they could ad-
vocate toleration without sacrificing their unequal privileges.
American establishment writers who borrowed the idea of equal
protection ordinarily did not alter it, but they put that idea to
varying uses, according to the circumstances in which they found
themselves. In the middle of the eighteenth century, supporters of
American establishments advocated equal protection in a context
in which it was a relatively tolerant standard: they used equal
protection as a basis for condemning unequal legal restraints on
dissenters. Later, particularly by the time of the Revolution, when
dissenters had obtained equal legal obligations and sought, in addi-
tion, equal privileges, supporters of establishments employed the
idea of equal protection to defend their unequal privileges against
the claims of dissenters. With the idea of equal protection, an estab-
lishment could provide dissenters an egalitarian reassurance that
no one would be subjected to greater legal obligations or "re-
straints" than anyone else on account of his or her religion, but an
establishment did not thereby promise to share equally or to forgo
its privileges, such as state financial support. In short, equal protec-
tion required equal obligations and permitted unequal privileges;
it was a greater degree of equality than many American dissenters
had in the middle of the eighteenth century but less than they
increasingly demanded; it was a tolerant establishment position
that establishments could employ both against establishment penal-
ties on dissent and against dissenting demands for equal privileges.
The typical eighteenth-century understanding of equal protec-
tion appears to have been drawn in most instances from the auda-
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cious Anglican apologist, William Warburton."1 Equal restraints
on natural liberty and even "equal protection" had been discussed
by English political theorists of the previous century, sometimes in
connection with religious liberty and sometimes as a more generally
applicable standard, but it was Warburton's analysis of religious
liberty that eighteenth-century Americans most clearly drew upon
in their debates about equal protection.2 In the 1730s, Warburton
, Warburton eventually became Bishop of Gloucester. For the English controversies
concerning Warburton, see Arthur W. Evans, Warburton and the Warburtonians (Oxford U,
1932). It is not possible to measure the use of Warburton's ideas in America simply by
counting citations. In addition to the usual difficulties with this approach, it should be noted
that the strongest American establishments were Congregationalist and that the Anglican
establishments were politically weak. For these reasons, Americans often did not cite the
controversial Bishop even when directly borrowing his arguments. Nonetheless, it seems
clear that many American writers drew upon Warburton's ideas.
52 For an early discussion of equal protection, see Englands Safety in the Laws Supremacy 5
(1659). The anonomous pamphleteer urged "such a settlement where every man may be as
to Law and publick Countenance, in a equal capacity (except by past actions for a time
disabled) and alike protected in the enjoynment of propriety and exercise of honest Indus-
try." Id. This sort of language was related to earlier complaints about monopolies and, as
will be seen, was employed in the eighteenth and especially the nineteenth century both to
criticize monopolies and to describe a generally applicable standard of equal protection.
In connection with religion, Richard Hooker had written: "As for such abatements of
civil state as take away only some privilege, dignity, or other benefit which a man enjoyeth
in the commonwealth, they reach only unto our dealing with public affairs, from which
what should let but that men may be excluded and thereunto restored again, without
diminishing or augumenting the number of persons in whom either church or common-
wealth consisteth? He that by way of punishment loseth his voice in a public election of
magistrates, ceaseth not thereby to be a citizen. A man disenfranchised may nothwithstand-
ing enjoy as a subject the common benefit of protection under laws and magistrates." Richard
Hooker, Hooker's Ecclesiastical Polity Book VIII, Raymond A. Houk, ed, ch 1, at 164-65
(Columbia Univ, 1931).
More generally, European theorists-including Hobbes and Pufendorf-argued that an
equality of taxes, of punishments, and, more generally, of civil constraints was an important
means of avoiding dangerous resentments and disturbances. E.g., Pufendorf said that "an
equality is to be observed in punishments, namely, that those who are equally guilty should
suffer equally, and the misdeed which in the case of one is punished, should not in the case
of the other be condoned, without a very weighty cause; since, forsooth, an inequality of
that kind frequently furnishes matter for dangerous disturbances to commonwealths .... "
Samuel Pufendorf, 2 Elementorum Jurispurdentiae Universalis Libri Duo bk I, ch xxi, § 11, at
205 (Oxford U, 1931). See also: Samuel Pufendorf, Of the Laws of Nature and Nations bk
VIII, ch v, §§ 5-6, at 828-29 (1710) (re taxes); Thomas Hobbes, Philosophical Rudiments
Concerning Government and Society, in William Molesworth, ed 2 Works Of Dominion, ch xiii,
§ 10, at 173 (1841) (re public burdens). Others discussed the necessity of equal restraints
on natural liberty without mentioning the danger of disturbances. In a very late assertion
of leveller ideas, an anonomous pamphleteer wrote that "the Laws ought to be the Protectors
and Preservers, under God, of all our Persons and Estates." The Leveller (1659), in 4 Harleian
Miscellany 515-16 (1808). He sought "equal justice and safety." Id at 518. Sydney said that
"the equality in which men are born is so perfect, that no man will suffer his natural liberty
to be abridged, except others do the like: I cannot reasonably expect to be defended from
wrong, unless I oblige myself to do none; or to suffer the punishment prescribed by the
law, if I perform not my engagement." Algernon Sidney, Discourses Concerning Government
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laid the foundation for his controversial reputation by publishing
two tracts, Alliance Between Church and State (1736) and The Divine
Legation of Moses Demonstrated (1737), in which he prominently used
the idea of equal protection to argue both for a "free toleration" of
religious worship and for an established church supported by a
test." At the heart of Warburton's arguments was the distinction
between "the sanctions of reward and punishment."54 Reasoning that
temporal punishments were in many instances inappropriate and
that the civil government could not efficaciously alter the behavior
of individuals by distributing temporal rewards, Warburton
proved, he thought, the necessity of an alliance between church
and state. The church supplied the sanction of future rewards nec-
essary for the success of the state, and the state attended to the
interests of the church.
Warburton discussed equal protection when arguing for the
proposition that "by the original constitution of civil government,
the sanction of rewards was not enforced. '55 In accord with the
state-of-nature analysis, Warburton assumed that individuals
formed government to obtain protection and that this protection
was "security to our temporal liberty and property."56 "In entering into
society," he wrote, "it was stipulated, between the magistrate and
people, that protection and obedience should be reciprocal condi-
tions." 57 Consequently, punishment could include a denial of pro-
tection. Yet a withdrawal of protection was not an appropriate
punishment for all types of disobedience: "for though all obedience
548, Thomas G. West, ed (Liberty Classics, 1990). It is not altogether clear, however,
whether he assumed each individual would have the same protection.
For somewhat ambiguous suggestions of a greater degree of equality-equal legal rights-
see John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration 24 & 55 (Bobs Merrill, 1955); Benjamin
Hoadly, The Original and Institution of Civil Government Discti'd 162 (1710) (re an equality
with respect to civil government but particularly legal restraints).
" William Warburton, 1 Works, ed Richard Hurd, 13 (1811) (Warburton, "Works"). Note,
however, that he qualified his support for toleration. Like Locke, Warburton excepted from
complete toleration any "sects" that threatened the state in certain ways; unlike Locke, he
had a detailed list of such undesirable groups and varied the restraints upon them: "The
ATHEIST, the ENGLISH PAPIST, the GERMAN ANABAPTIST, and the QUAKER,
all hold opinions pernicious to civil society. But these having different degrees of malignity,
must have different degrees of restraint." 7 id at 255.
5' Alliance Between Church and State, in id at 32.
55 Id.
16 Id at 36.
17 Id at 32-33.
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be the same; and so, uniform protection a proper return for it; yet
disobedience being various both in kind and degree, the withdraw-
ing protection would be too great a punishment for some crimes,
and too small for others." 8 Thus, Warburton assumed that individ-
uals deserved "uniform protection" for their obedience. Moreover,
he propounded this uniformity as part of an argument for both a
toleration and a government alliance with an established church.
Incidentally, in contrast to this uniform protection for individu-
als of varied religions was the state's rather different protection
of the established religion, "which was under the more immediate
protection of the civil Magistrate, in contradistinction to those
which were only TOLERATED."59 Thus, the uniform protection,
which amounted to a toleration, concerned the specialized idea of
protection drawn from the state-of-nature analysis, but the magis-
trate's protection of the establishment was a "more immediate pro-
tection" of the sort expected from a monarch traditionally known
as "the defender of the faith." Of course, this more immediate
protection of the establishment consisted not only of "uniform pro-
tection" or toleration but also of various unequal "rewards," includ-
ing a test (to assure that government would be in the hands of the
established church) and the provision of "a settled maintenance for
its ministers."
60
In response to dissenters who were clamoring for equal civil
rights-for equal rewards as well as uniform protection-
Warburton offered only the uniform protection he had derived
from the state-of-nature analysis:
[This pretended right of every qualified subject to a share of the
honours and profits in the disposal of the supreme magistrate is alto-
gether groundless and visionary.
Let it be remembered, that,... it hath been proved at large,
that REWARD IS NOT ONE OF THE SANCTIONS OF
CIVIL SOCIETY: the only claim which subjects have on the
magistrate, for obedience, being protection.
Now the consequence of this is, that all places of honour and
profit, in the magistrate's disposal, are not there in the nature
of a TRUST; to be claimed, and equally shared by the subject:
but of the nature of a PREROGATIVE; which he may dispose
SS Id at 33.
59 The Divine Legation of Moses Demonstrated, in 2 id at 264.
10 Id at 278.
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of at pleasure, without being further accountable, than for hav-
ing such places ably supplied.6
On account of the obedience of its subjects, the state was obliged
to provide protection-"uniform protection"-but it was not
obliged to distribute rewards equally. Therefore, although it had
to offer uniform protection, it could use unequal "rewards" to se-
cure its alliance with the established church.62
To Warburton, this combination of equal protection and unequal
rewards-of toleration and establishment-held out the promise
of religious harmony. Religious disturbances, argued Warburton,
had tended to arise when sects were denied toleration or when all
were tolerated but they quarrelled to achieve supremacy in a state.
Therefore, he reasoned, a state could end such disturbances only
by tolerating different religions and establishing one in a way that
precluded the political ambitions of the others:
What persecutions, rebellions, revolutions, loss of civil and reli-
gious liberty, these intestine struggles between sects have occa-
sioned, is well known even to such as are least acquainted with
the history of mankind.
To prevent these mischiefs was ... one great motive for the
state's seeking alliance with the church. For the obvious remedy
was to establish one church, and give a free toleration to the rest.63
In the course of advocating a tolerant establishment as a solution to
religious discord, Warburton adumbrated the role equal protection
would have for decades to come. Yet-notwithstanding the ab-
stract quality of his argument-we may wonder whether he fore-
saw that his ideas would be adopted by establishments so distant
and different from that which he defended.
Relying upon the conventional understanding of protection-
that government was established to protect natural liberty-
Warburton used the idea of a uniform protection to justify estab-
lishments; in contrast, however, a small number of Protestant
anti-establishment writers attempted to resist that conventional un-
"Alliance Between Churcb and State, in 7 id at 252.
62 For one of the more detailed American arguments based on Warburton's analysis, see
Thomas Reese, An Essay on the Influence of Religion in Civil Society (1788) (Evans 21418).
Among other things, the Rev. Reese speculated that "[it may perhaps be said that protection
is the reward conferred on every individual for his observance of the laws." Id at 7, note.
He then explained that this was a "mistake" or misnomer. Id.
63 Alliance Between Church and State, in Warburton, 7 Works 250.
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derstanding. Between 1735 and 1738, in England, The Old Whig-a
series of radically anti-establishment essays-argued that individu-
als should be equally protected in their rights, whether natural or
acquired under civil government. That individuals should have
equal civil rights-neither extra restraints nor extra privileges on
account of their religion-was a radical but not unusual position.
The Old Whig, however, associated this with the words "equal pro-
tection." According to one of the essays, men entered into society
with a view to their better security in the possession of [their
most valuable and sacred rights], whether natural or acquired;
and think that the great end of all just law and government is
the full and intire proteciion of all those who contribute by a
peaceable and useful behaviour to the common welfare, and do
not by any wilful violation of the public peace forfeit those
privileges, which they have otherwise an equal claim to with the
rest of mankind.'r
This was an explicit attempt to redefine protection to include privi-
leges. Later, The Old Whig urged its readers "to deliver our constitu-
tion from every foreign or domestic insult ... and secure it to our
children's children by such laws as may give equal liberty and
equal protection to all its friends, however differing from us in
trifling opinions, or in useless ceremonies."6 Apparently, The Old
Whig came close to associating the phrase "equal protection ' with
equal civil rights-with an equality both of natural rights and of
privileges. As will be seen, this approach was occasionally repeated
in subsequent decades but remained a minority view. Far more
often, dissenters plainly demanded equal civil rights, and establish-
ments preserved their unequal privileges by offering only equal
protection.
The idea of equal protection that Warburton used to defend
England's establishment permitted unequal privileges but generally
forbade unequal restraints on natural liberty, and therefore it could
be used by tolerant supporters of establishments not only to defend
'4 1 The Old Wbig 15 (1739). The first essay is dated March 13, 1735; the final essay is
dated March 13, 1738. 2 id at 440.
65 2 The Old Whig 431. Incidentally, the periodical appears to have been concerned with
"common" rights: "And 'tis equally ridiculous to imagine, that a man can forfeit any of the
common rights of the subjects, because he scruples a bit, a gesture, or particular form of
words, that others may think fit to make use of ... " 1 id at 16. For the significance of
this, see note 239.
324 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW
their unequal privileges but also to condemn the unequal restraints
of excessively severe establishments. In his 1758 treatise, Vattel,
like Warburton, discussed two types of protection. Vattel argued
that a prince should encourage devotion to the established religion
66
and, indeed, that it was a condition of his wearing the crown that
he "protect and maintain the religion of the state." 67 This was the
protection that could not be equal. Vattel, however, also urged
toleration, and, in this regard, he talked about the other sort of
protection-the protection that was to be equal. 8 He preceded his
discussion of equal protection by noting that the prince should not
force compliance with the established religion, for "by constraint"
the prince could only "produce uneasiness or hypocrisy." 69 He then
explained:
[I]n general.., the most safe and equitable means of preventing
the disorders that may be occasioned by difference of religion,
is an universal toleration of all the religions that have nothing
dangerous in them, either with respect to manners, or the
state.... Holland and the states of the king of Prussia furnish a
proof of this: Calvinists, Lutherans, Socinians, Jews, Catholics,
Pietists, all live in peace, because they are equally protected by
the sovereign; and none are punished, but the disturbers of the
tranquility of others.7 °
To prevent religious disputes, individuals of these different reli-
gions were to be "equally protected"; they were to be punished for
disturbing others but not on account of their religion.
Americans similarly could use the idea of equal protection to
argue against unequal restraints on dissenters without questioning
establishment privileges. Eighteenth-century Connecticut had one
Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, bk I, ch xii, §§ 133-34, at 116-17 (1820).
6 Id, bk I, ch xii, § 138, at 118.
Of course, the equal protection provided to individuals of varied religions was quite
different from the prince's protection of the state religion. Equal protection was an equality
of constraint-"protection" being a term of art in the state-of-nature analysis that referred
to protection of natural liberty. In contrast, the prince's protection of the "true" religion
was protection in an ordinary and broader sense. It concerned the prince's role as defender
of the faith and obviously required more of him than that he merely avoid imposing greater
legal restraints on that favored religion than on others.
69 Id, bk I, ch xii, § 134, at 117.
70 Id, bk I, ch xii, § 135, at 117-18. For a continental discussion of equal protection in
connection with taxation, including an attempt to reconcile equal protection with a gradua-
ted tax, see Jean Jacques Burlamaqui, 2 Principles of Natural and Political Law pt III, ch 5,
§§ 14-16, at 148 (1807).
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of America's most intransigent establishments. 7 Not only did the
government provide financial assistance and other privileges to
Congregationalists but also, particularly in reaction to the Great
Awakening, it restricted and penalized the increasing numbers who
wished to separate from establishment churches. In 1742, the Con-
necticut legislature prohibited individuals from going into a parish
and preaching, unless they had permission from the minister and
a majority of the church of the parish.72 In 1743, the legislature
enacted that dissenting congregations had to obtain its permission
to hold meetings, and it further indicated, what hardly required
saying, that new light and other Congregational requests for such
permission would not be considered favorably.
73
By far the most eloquent attack on this intolerance came in an
anonymous 1744 pamphlet, The Essential Rights and Liberties of Protes-
tants, possibly by Elisha Williams-a member of the Connecticut
General Assembly and eventually a judge of the Colony's Superior
Court. Like Warburton and Vattel, Williams had no quarrel with
an establishment that consisted of government support for a partic-
ular religion. What Williams objected to was the imposition of a
religion upon individuals:
- . . if by the word establish be meant only an approbation of
certain articles of faith and modes of worship, of government,
or recommendation of them to their subjects; I am not arguing
against it. But to carry the notion of a religious establishment
so far as to make it a rule binding to the subjects, or on any
penalties whatsoever, seems to me to be oppressive of Chris-
tianity, to break in upon the sacred rights of conscience, and
the common rights and priviledges of all good subjects.
74
7 It provoked Ebenezer Frothingham to inveigh: "The Most High hath condescended to
speak heavy things to Connecticut." Ebenezer Frothingham, A Key to Unlock the Door 194
(1767) (Evans 10621).
72 An Act for Regulating Abuses and Correcting Disorders in Ecclesiastical Affairs, §§ 2,
4, & 5 (May 1742), in 8 Public Records of the Colony of Connecticut 456 (1874). Violators who
were not ordained ministers could (merely upon complaint to aJ.P.) be bound over to their
peaceable and good behavior in an amount of 100 pounds, and a noninhabitant or person
not ordained who violated the law could be "sent (as a vagrant person) ... out of the bounds
of this Colony." Id at §§ 4 & 5.
73 "An Act Providing Relief Against the Evil and Dangerous Designs of Foreigners and
Suspected Persons" (May 1743), in 8 Public Records of the Colony of Connecticut 522 (1874),
discussed by McLoughlin, New England Dissent 362.
71 [Elisha Williams?], The Essential Rights and Liberties of Protestants (Boston, 1744), in Ellis
Sandoz, ed, Political Sermons of the American Founding Era 1730-1805 73 (Liberty, 1991)
("Political Sermons"). Like so many of the American clergy who wrote after the 1730s,
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Opposed to penalties on dissenters, Williams, like Vattel, used
the idea of equal protection to encourage the establishment to be
tolerant:
That the civil authority ought to protect all their subjects in the
enjoyment of this right of private judgement in matters of religion,
and the liberty of worshipping GOD according to their con-
sciences. That being the end of civil government (as we have
seen) viz. the greater security of enjoyment of what belongs to
every one, and this right of private judgment, and worshipping
GOD according to their consciences, being the natural and un-
alienable right of every man, what men by entering into civil
society neither did, nor could give up into the hands of the
community; it is but a just consequence, that they are to be
protected in the enjoyment of this right as well as any other.
A worshipping assembly of Christians have surely as much
right to be protected from molestation in their worship, as the
inhabitants of a town assembled to consult their civil interests
from disturbance &c.
75
Because individuals had not sacrificed to government their natural
right of worship and judgment in matters of religion, they were to
be equally protected by government in this right as in any other,
secular freedom. Of course, the molestation that concerned Wil-
liams here was that which occurred under the laws restricting sepa-
ratist and new light preaching. 76 Drawing on an historical example,
Williams added that
the right of private judgment in matters of religion being un-
alienable, and what the civil magistrate is rather oblig'd to pro-
tect his subjects equally in, both Wickliff, and they who desired
to hear him, had a just right to remain where they were, in the
enjoyment of that right, free from all molestation from any
persons whatsoever...77
Williams appears to have been familiar with Warburton's arguments in favor of estab-
lishment.
71 Id at 97.
76 Williams talked about molestation by individuals, but he clearly understood such indi-
viduals to be acting through the legal system. He was complaining about the inequality of
legal restraints or obligations rather than a failure to enforce those restraints. Incidentally,
the description of religious intolerance as "molestation" was quite common. For an example
in an equal protection clause, see article 33 of the 1776 Maryland Constitution, reproduced
in the text below at note 88.
17 Id at 115.
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Individuals did not submit their natural right of judgment in reli-
gious matters to civil government, and individuals were to be
equally protected by civil government in that right. Consequently,
accord ing to Williams, individuals had a right to enjoy their natural
right of judgment, without molestation from anyone. Whereas
Warburton had said that individuals should be equally protected
in their natural liberty, regardless of their religious differences,
Williams talked about equal protection for the natural liberty of
worship and judgment, and, in this respect, he slightly recast and
narrowed the idea of equal protection to focus it on Connecticut's
prohibition of certain religious meetings.78 In other regards, how-
ever, Williams employed an understanding of equal protection con-
sistent with that of Warburton.
As one might expect, many dissenters were not satisfied to claim
a mere equal protection of their natural liberty but demanded, in
addition, equal privileges, which, together with equal protection,
would have given them a full equality of civil rights. In 1750, a
prominent Connecticut dissenter, Ebenezer Frothingham, em-
ployed the idea of equal protection, not to ask for equal protection
only of.natural rights, but to insist upon an "equal protection" of
the privileges of government and thereby a full equality of civil
rights:
The moral Rule, and civil Power, is to protect every one; that
supposing there is in one Society, some of the Church of E7-
gland, and them that profess the Seabrook Regulation, and them
that are Congregationals, and Baptists, and Quakers: Now all
these ought equally to be protected by this moral Rule, or civil
Power, in their proper Rights and Privileges, and each one be
left to support their own Worship ... 7
Like The Old Whig, Frothingham argued for equal "protection" of
civil rights. Yet the end of government was typically understood
to be the protection of natural rights, and therefore Frothingham's
"8 Of course, the laws of Connecticut did protect the natural liberty of individuals un-
equally, but, because they did so by directly prohibiting certain religious meetings, Williams
was able to focus his argument on the unequal protection of a particularly valuable portion
of natural liberty, the freedom of worship.
79 Ebenezer Frothingham, The Articles of Faith and Practice 296 (1750) (Evans 6504). The
"Seabrook regulation" is, of course, the "Saybrook Platform"-representing the position in
1708 of Connecticut's Congregational establishment. He also said he favored "the Protecting
and Defending every Man ... in their moral and civil Rights and Privileges." Id.
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argument was vulnerable to being turned against him. Indeed, the
response did not take long.
In the 1751 Connecticut election sermon, the Rev. Benjamin
Lord used the idea of equal protection to defend the religious role
of Connecticut's civil government. Whereas Williams had discussed
equal protection in order to urge intolerant establishments to aban-
don their unequal restraints on dissenters, now, when dissenters
prominently demanded equal privileges, Lord could employ the
idea of equal protection to defend the establishment against these
claims for greater equality. Like Frothingham, Lord defined the
purpose of government in terms of protection, but, unlike Froth-
ingham, Lord conformed to the conventional view that government
was created to protect the life, liberty, and property of the mem-
bers of the community-their natural liberty rather than their priv-
ileges.8" Moreover, according to Lord, "[elvery Member may have
the Strength of the whole employed for the Security of his own
Life and Property. And also rejoyce in his Neighbours having the
same Protection and Advantage with himself ... ."" Apparently
in reaction to Frothingham's demand that Connecticut provide
equal civil rights on grounds of "equal protection," Lord handily
pointed out that the Colony already provided equal protection-
equal protection of natural liberty-which was a sufficient basis
for ending dissentions. As it happens, Lord's position was not as
convincing as it might have been, for Connecticut, in fact, still
penalized Congregational dissenters, and consequently Lord had
to devote much of his sermon to an explanation that separation was
a threat to the state-indeed, a danger akin to "anarchy"-and so,
perhaps, was to be prohibited rather than protected.82 Nonetheless,
0 "[AIII civil Government of the right Stamp, must be agreeable to Scripture and Reason,
and so to the Nature and Ends of a civil Community, the Preservation of the Lives, Liberties
& Estates of all the Members thereof, against the force of Rapine, Injustice & all manner of
destructive Violence." Benjamin Lord, Religion and Government Subsisting Together in Society,
Necessary to their Compleat Happiness and Safety 28 (Conn election sermon for 1751, printed
1752) (Evans 6868).
8' Id at 3. The word "advantage" does not necessarily relate to anything other than
natural rights.The immediate context, a discussion of rights in the state of nature and their
preservation under government, suggests this limited meaning. At the very least, Lord did
not want equal privileges for dissenters.
" Lord passionately asserted that the separations of dissenters were an anarchical threat
to civil government, see note 150, and he seems to have understood this threat to be grounds
for denying toleration, though he said so only indirectly. Id at 23, 34-35, 40-41. Lord's
ambiguity or, perhaps, ambivalence may have been connected to his difficult position in his
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Lord clearly had an advantage over Frothingham, for Lord argued
on the basis of the widely-held assumptions that government was
formed to protect natural rights and that natural rights were dis-
tinct from privileges. Thus, just as tolerant supporters of establish-
ments used the idea of equal protection against penalties on dissent-
ers, so too establishment writers could use the idea to defend a
supposedly tolerant establishment against dissenters' demands for
equal privileges and equal civil rights.
Even so, it was only after mid-century that American establish-
ments used the idea of equal protection as an important part of
their position in a broad political debate rather than merely as
an occasional argument. Whereas, in England, already in the late
seventeenth century, a substantial number of Anglicans urged tol-
erance for dissenters, in America, before the 1760s and '70s, rela-
tively few establishment writers were inclined to advocate tolera-
tion. It was one thing to be willing to concede an equality of
restraints, but it was another actively to seek such an equality.
Consequently, although the argument that government had to treat
individuals equally only with respect to protection was a useful
establishment response to demands for equal privileges, it was not
likely to be an identifying position of America's mid-century estab-
lishments.
In the 1770s, however, many dissenters intensified their claims
for equal civil rights. The Great Awakening and the migrations of
people to and through America had left many colonies with large
numbers of dissenters of various denominations, some of whom
formed majorities in their localities. In the turbulence of the 1770s,
emboldened by the freedom and equality claimed for America as
a whole, some dissenting sects began to feel their strength and
importuned colonial and then state legislatures for equal rights.
83
Throughout America, the justice of their claims, their strength,
and the sympathy they elicited from members of establishment
parish. In 1748, Separates in Lord's parish "obtained a majority and were able to block a
vote to levy the annual taxes for Lord's salary and for the . . . new meeting house."
McLoughlin, 1 New England Dissent 373. It is difficult to resist speculating that Lord's
unusual difficulties in his parish may have affected the peculiar tone of his sermon and even
other aspects of his life. For Lord's years of controversy and his eventual poverty, insanity
and death, see id at 373-76.
" H. J. Eckenrode, Separation of Cburcb and State in Virginia 41-73 (Da Capo, 1971 reprint
of 1910 edition) (Eckenrode, "Separation of Cburcb and State in Virginia"); Buckley, Churcb and
State in Revolutionary Virginia 177 & passim.
330 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW
religions created a climate of opinion in which establishment minis-
ters often sought, rather defensively, to show that they too were
against "persecution." A constitutional guarantee of the natural
right of free exercise was rapidly becoming the minimal degree of
religious liberty one could respectably acknowledge.
In these new circumstances, in which restraints on natural lib-
erty on account of religious differences were no longer possible and
establishment privileges were at risk, some establishments de-
fended their privileges by asserting their support for religious free-
dom and equality-but only the free exercise of religion and equal
protection. What, for Lord, had been a useful argument against
equal civil rights now became a central principle for several Ameri-
can establishments. By acknowledging the natural right of free
exercise and offering an equal protection, establishments could take
an attractively egalitarian position and thereby could resist de-
mands for equal civil rights; establishments could be for equality
and yet could retain their unequal privileges. Thus, in several
states, the Revolution was accompanied by a struggle in which
anti-establishment forces demanded equal civil rights, and estab-
lishments offered, instead, equal protection.
The importance of equal protection to the position of establish-
ments is apparent from three state constitutions. In 1776, the
Maryland Constitution guaranteed that "all persons, professing the
Christian religion, are equally entitled to protection in their reli-
gious liberty., 84 In 1780, the Massachusetts Constitution promised
equal protection to Christian sects, and New Hampshire in 1784
copied this provision and others from its neighbor's constitution.
85
The Anglican church in Maryland was the first establishment to
use an equal protection clause to help fend off claims for equal
rights. Having long received government support, Maryland's An-
glicans in 1776 attracted considerable resentment. Indeed, with
George III as head of their church, Anglicans had particular diffi-
culty resisting egalitarian and anti-establishment demands.86 At the
November 1776 convention, however, Anglicans constituted a ma-
'4 Md Const of 1776, Art 33.
85 See note 92 and accompanying text.
I Arthur Pierce Middleton, From Daughter Church to Sister Church: The Disestablishment of




jority, and, of the committee responsible for drafting the Declara-
tion of Rights, all members but one were Anglican.87 Therefore,
although Anglicans apparently felt obliged to sacrifice their old tax
privileges, they at least had an opportunity, in drafting the Mary-
land Declaration of Rights, to preserve some opportunities for a
future establishment. Article 33 said:
... all persons, professing the Christian religion, are equally
entitled to protection in their religious liberty; wherefore no
person ought by law to be molested in his person or estate on
account of his religious persuasion or profession, or for his
religious practice; . . . nor ought any person to be ompelled
to frequent or maintain, or contribute, unless on contract, to
maintain any particular place of worship, or any particular min-
istry; yet the Legislature may, in their discretion, lay a general
and equal tax, for the support of the Christian religion; leaving
to each individual the power of appointing the payment over
of the money, collected from him.88
In other words, Anglicans abandoned exclusive claims on tax sup-
port. The best they could retain for themselves with respect to
financial assistance was to leave open the prospect of a tax to sup-
port all Christian denominations. As for other privileges, however,
the possibility of an inequality even among Christians was left
intact. Indeed, in the first half of the 1780s, Anglicans sought tax
support for Christians and incorporation for themselves. Yet these
attempts encountered substantial and ultimately successful opposi-
tion. That the Anglicans of Maryland failed after 1776 to obtain
much from government was a consequence of political resistance
rather than the provisions of their state's Constitution.
89
Of the two northern constitutions that contained equal protec-
tion clauses, that of Massachusetts may be taken as an example, for
extensive information about that constitution is available. 9 After
guaranteeing the right of individuals to worship according to con-
science, the Massachusetts Bill of Rights, in article three, required
11 Id at 190.
88 Md Const of 1776, Art 33.
89 79 Md Hist Mag 193-94; Norman K. Risjord, Chesapeake Politics 1781-1800 211-13
(Columbia U, 1978). For the documents produced by the Anglicans in 1783 and 1784, see
William Smith, 2 The Works of William Smith 509-23 (1803).
' Unfortunately, there is little evidence concerning contemporary interpretation of New
Hampshire's religion clauses. See McLoughlin, 2 New England Dissent 846. See, however,
quotation of McClintock in note 24.
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legislation ensuring that towns would tax individuals for the sup-
port of Protestantism-an arrangement that was advantageous for
the most numerous sect in each town, typically the Congregational-
ists.9 According to article three and the scheme created under it,
individuals who did not wish to support the dominant sect in their
locality could direct their tax payments to their own religious soci-
ety, but, in order to do this, they had to take the initiative to have
themselves recognized as members of dissenting denominations.
Consequently, the taxes paid by dissenters unwilling or unable to
get such official recognition ended up in the pockets of Congre-
gationalists, who thereby received what was considered an un-
equal government privilege. A subsequent clause of article three
of the Massachusetts Bill of Rights-the Christian-denominations
clause-provided that "every denomination of christians, de-
meaning themselves peaceably, and as good subjects of the Com-
monwealth, shall be equally under the protection of the law." A
second half of this clause added: "And no subordination of any one
sect or denomination to another shall ever be established by law."
92
The authors of the Massachusetts Constitution apparently un-
derstood the first, equal-protection half of the Christian-
denominations clause to require equal protection for rights existing
in the state of nature. The natural rights context of equal protection
is apparent in article ten of the Massachusetts Bill of Rights, which
explained that "[e]ach individual of the society has a right to be
protected by it [i.e., the society] in the enjoyment of his life, liberty
and property, according to standing laws." 93 Individuals sacrificed
some of the liberty they enjoyed in the state of nature-some of
their "life, liberty and property"-and, by means of this sacrifice,
91 The legislation was to apply "in all cases where such provision shall not be made
voluntarily." Mass Const of 1780, Bill of Rights, Art 3. In practical terms, this meant that
Boston was exempted.
92 Mass Const of 1780, Bill of Rights, Art 3. When addressing the establishment of
religion, the New Hampshire Constitution approximately followed the Massachusetts pro-
visions, including the Christian-denomination passage already quoted: "And every denomi-
nation of christians, demeaning themselves quietly, and as good subjects of the state, shall
be equally under the protection of the law: and no subordination of any one sect or denomi-
nation to another, shall ever be established by law." NH Const of 1784, Bill of Rights,
Art 6.
Whereas the religion provisions in Maryland used the idea of equal protection in connec-
tion with individuals, the provisions in Massachusetts and New Hampshire used the notion
of equal protection in connection with denominations.
93 Mass Const of 1780, Bill of Rights, Art 10.
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they obtained the protection of society or government "according
to standing laws." As the similar New Hampshire Constitution
said, "[w]hen men enter into a state of society, they surrender up
some of their natural rights to that society, in order to insure the
protection of others."94 An equality of natural freedom in society
and a concomitant equality of legal obligations or "restraints" is
also suggested by the communication of the largely Congregational-
ist town of Gorham to the Massachusetts drafting convention:
"That no Restriction be laide on any Profession of Christianity or
denomination of Christians, but all Equally intiteled to protection
of the Laws."
95
The second half of the Massachusetts Christian-denominations
clause (which said that "no subordination of one sect or denomina-
tion to another shall ever be established by law") looked, at first
glance, as if it provided an equality of at least privileges or benefits,
9' NH Const of 1784, Bill of Rights, Art 3.
9S Oscar & Mary Handlin, eds, Popular Sources of Political Authority-Documents on the
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, at 430 (Belknap, 1966) ("Popular Sources of Political Author-
ity"). Since 1820, Gorham has been part of the state of Maine. For the power of Congrega-
tionalists in Gorham, see Hugh D. McLellan, History of Gorham, Me. ch 9-10, at 169-221
(1903). In addition to the general information found in this volume, note the following. In
1781, at least 66 men sought certification as Baptists so as to be free of paying taxes in
support of the Congregational ministry. Id at 206-7. To these Baptists must be added an
indeterminate number of new lights. Id at 204. However, Gorham's tax records for 1780
indicate an adult (over 16) male population of approximately 380. Id at 336.
The constitutional guarantee of equal protection for all Christian denominations posed
some difficulties with regard to Catholicism. In a meeting to consider ratification of the
Massachusetts Constitution, the town of Dunstable recognized that the guarantee extended
to Catholicism and was uncomfortable with this: "[Tlhese Sentances are so general as to
Engage full Protection to the Idalatrous worshippers of the Church of Rome [and] therefore
they wore not Clear in their judgment to give so much Incoragement to Idol worship as to
Engage any full protection in their Idolatry[,] for if the government should not Disturbe
such in their pretended worship it would be as much as they might Expect without our
being under special obligation to protect them there in by the laws of the land." Popular
Sources of Political Authority 641. In contrast, George Washington was not reluctant to grant
Catholics equal protection. He wrote to American Catholics that "[a]s mankind becomes
more liberal they will be more apt to allow that all those who conduct themselves as worthy
members of the community are equally entitled to the protection of civil government."
George Washington, letter to the Roman Catholics in the U.S., March 15, 1790, in William
B. Allen, ed, George Washington: A Collection 546 (Liberty Classics, 1988). Like so many other
late eighteenth-century supporters of establishments, Washington approved of government
financial benefits for Protestantism and gladly conceded equal protection. (For Washington's
position on establishments, note his letter to Mason, in which he refused to sign Madison's
1785 Remonstrance: "Although no man's sentiments are more opposed to any kind of restraint
upon religious principles than mine are, yet I must confess, that I am not amongst . ..
those, who are so much alarmed at the thoughts of making people pay towards the support
of that which they profess." Quoted by Eckenrode, Separation of Church and State in Virginia
105.)
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and thus, if taken together with the first half of the clause-which
concerned equal protection-it seemed to concede equal civil
rights. Yet the no-subordination language only proscribed the sub-
ordination of one sect to another; it did not forbid a scheme that
established in each town whichever sect formed a majority there.
Indeed, as has been seen, earlier paragraphs of article three of the
Bill of Rights authorized tax support for Protestantism through a
system that gave privileges to persons whose religion constituted a
majority in a locality. Of course, it was no coincidence that such
persons tended to be Congregationalists. Thus, an establishment
minister could quote the equal-protection and no-subordination
language of the Constitution and claim with satisfaction that it
prohibited the establishment of any one church over others: "Any
denomination of Christians, who would endeavor to bring the Civil
Authority of the State to grant any peculiar privileges to their
church, and to give it a pre-eminence over others, ought to be
watched over and guarded against .... While this frame of Govern-
ment continues, no one church or denomination of Christians can
oppress another with constitutional law on their side."96 Although
he was correct that no church had been given peculiar privileges-
that no particular sect had been established-he omitted to men-
tion that privileges had been granted to local majority churches. In
other words, the no-subordination requirement had been carefully
drafted to permit the establishment of majority sects. As the town
of Middleborough observed, "in saying that no Subordination etc.
Shall ever be Established by Law: and in another part of the same
article: in Saying, that all monies paid by the Subject etc; where
it must be understood: if any thing can be Learnt by it: that individ-
uals may at some Times and under Some Circumstances be obliged
to pay money as aforesaid, Contrary to the Dictates of their Con-
sciences for the Support of Teachers as aforesaid."97 To meet egali-
tarian pressures while retaining some unequal privileges, Maryland
6 Joseph Willard, Persecution Opposite to the Genius of the Gospel, sermon preached at Harvard
on Sept. 7, 1785, Widener Library Archives, Harvard Univ, as quoted by James H. Smylie,
Protestant Clergy, the First Amendment and Beginnings of a Constitutional Debate, 1781-91, in
Elwyn A. Smith, ed, The Religion of the Republic 116, 130 (Fortress, 1971).
9' Popular Sources of Political Authority 693. Isaac Backus had a parish that included part of
Middleborough or Middleboro, and eventually the town had additional Baptist churches.
Although Congregationalists remained dominant, the complaint quoted above appears to
reflect some deference to the views of the Baptists. The rest of the town's return, however,
was less accommodating. McLoughlin, 1 New England Dissent 629.
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had used the idea of equal protection, and now, for similar pur-
poses, Massachusetts used both equal protection and a very narrow
guarrantee against the subordination of "any one sect . . . to an-
other."
Thus, the men who drafted the constitutions of Massachusetts,
New Hampshire and Maryland used the idea of equal protection
to preserve establishments. Whereas a constitutional right to the-
free exercise of religion was a right to a particular degree of free-
dom, a constitutional right of equal protection was, apparently,
not a legal right to enjoy natural liberty or any portion of it to any
particular degree, but simply the right to enjoy the same natural
liberty in civil society and to be subjected to the same legal obliga-
tions as other persons. Therefore, to a constitution that already
guaranteed the natural right of free exercise of religion, an equal
protection clause added a clarification or reassurance that the docu-
ment prohibited discriminatory restraints on natural liberty; an
equal protection clause made clear that the document not only
forbade direct denials of free exercise but also forbade unequal
restraints, on account of religion, of other natural liberty. An equal
protection provision did this, moreover, with a phrase that gave
the constitution an egalitarian luster-that secured the political
advantages of discussing religious liberty in terms of equality. But
equal protection did not give the equality of benefits or privileges
so many dissenters desired. The constitutions of Maryland, Massa-
chusetts, and New Hampshire employed egalitarian language but
did not preclude unequal privileges.
98
Dissenters and other opponents of establishment understood that
they had not achieved full equal civil rights with respect to religion.
They knew they had obtained guarantees of their natural right of
free exercise and clarifying prohibitions against unequal protection
of natural liberty but not a provision for equal privileges. Recollect-
ing his work in drafting most of the Massachusetts Constitution,
John Adams observed that "[t]he Article respecting Religion ...
9' In Massachusetts and New Hampshire, tax support could vary according to religious
differences among Christian sects. In Maryland, only benefits other than tax support could
vary among such denominations. The idea of equal protection was also used to describe
Connecticut's religious liberty. Zephaniah Swift, I A System of tbe Laws of the State of Connecti-
cut 144 (1795). For the limited character of such equality, see id at 146 & 144 n. As observed
above, relatively little information survives concerning the contemporary interpretation of
New Hampshire's religion clauses.
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was the only Article which I omitted to draw."' Later he explained
that he "could not sketch [it], consistent with my own sentiments
of perfect religious freedom, with any hope of its being adopted
by the Convention, so I left it to be battled out in the whole
body."'' ° Although in a minority, John Adams was not alone.
During ratification of the Massachusetts Constitution, the mostly
Baptist town of Swansea complained that "[t]he Legislature cannot
act agreeable to such a Power as is Vested in them by the third
article [which included the equal protection clause] without Ren-
dering individuals unhappy who have an Equal Right to the Bless-
ings of government."' 0 ' The town of Bellingham-which also had a
Baptist majority-suggested replacing the third article with several
brief statements, including: "Nor can any man who acknowledges
the being of a God Be justly abridged or Deprived of any Civil
Right as a citizen on account of his Religious Sentiment or Peculiar
mode of Religious Worship."'0 2 Dissenters sought equal civil rights
and were fobbed off with equal protection.
III. EQUAL CIVIL RIGHTS
In the 1770s, when many Americans claimed equal rights
from Britain, increasing numbers of dissenters demanded equal
rights with respect to religion from their American governments. 1
03
As already observed, the requests of these dissenters for equal civil
rights prompted some establishments to obtain equal protection
clauses in state constitutions. Rather than accept mere equal protec-
tion, however, dissenters continued to press for equal civil rights.
9 John Adams, letter to William D. Williamson, Feb 28, 1812, quoted in Gregg L. Lint
et al, eds, 8 Papers of John Adams 262, n 12 (Harvard U, 1989) ("Papers ofJohn Adams"). He
continued: "I could not satisfy my own Judgment with any Article that I thought would be
accepted: and farther that Some of the Clergy, or older and graver Persons than myself
would be more likely to hit the Taste of the Public." Id. Later, there were unconfirmed
suggestions that Parsons had drafted Article 3. E.g., Independent Chronicle (Boston), June
13, 1811 (XLIII, No 3147). These may have been based merely on Parson's committee
assignment in the drafting convention.
,"0 Josiah Quincy's diary (entry for May 31, 1820), as quoted by Edmund Quincy, Life of
Josiah Quincy 379 (1867), in 8 Papers ofJohn Adams 262, n 12.
"I' Popular Sources of Political Authority 530. For the Baptist majority, see McLoughlin, 1
New England Dissent 675; see also id at 628.
1o Popular Sources of Political Authority 740. For the Baptist majority, see McLoughlin, 1
New England Dissent 675; see also id at 628.
103 A useful collection of Massachusetts discussions of equality and suffrage may be found
in Popular Sources of Political Authority.
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Dissenters did not repudiate the idea of equal protection, because
an equal protection for natural liberty was something they wanted
and, indeed, had already largely achieved in practice, if not in
name; yet they also, in addition to equal protection, desired an
equality of privileges. Among other things, dissenters tended to
resent state systems of tax support that in one way or another
favored other denominations over their own. Even plans that al-
lowed dissenters to direct their payments to their own sects were
often understood to establish unequal benefits."0 By requiring dis-
senters to inform the civil government that they were not of the
majority sect, such plans signified government approbation of the
established religion and, moreover, transferred the tax payments
of noncomplying dissenters to the establishment. In opposition to
these unequal privileges, many dissenters demanded equal privi-
leges, which, together with the equal protection they already had,
would have given them equal civil rights. They insisted that all civil
laws rather than merely those protecting natural freedom avoid
inequalities on account of religion.
Demands for what amounted to equal civil rights with respect
to religion took several forms, each of which used different lan-
guage to refer to the desired type of equality. Often, dissenters
treated these different forms or modes of analysis as equivalents
and employed them interchangeably. A brief survey of the most
common of these approaches for discussing equal civil rights can,
perhaps, illustrate the extent of anti-establishment demands.
Some analysis was explicitly in terms of an equality of civil
rights. For example, the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 de-
clared: "Nor can any man, who acknowledges the being of a God,
be justly deprived or abridged of any civil right as a citizen, on
account of his religious sentiments or peculiar mode of religious
worship." 1 5 Similarly, at least with respect to a narrower class of
individuals, the New Jersey Constitution said "[t]hat there shall
be no establishment of any one religious sect in this Province, in
preference to another; and that no Protestant inhabitant of this
104 Incidentally, Americans may have distinguished between general taxes and taxes raised
to support specific government benefits. An unequal distribution of the benefits supported
by general revenues was an inequality of privileges and was not considered contrary to
notions to equal protection. In contrast, a tax system for support of religion may have been
considered a form of special assessment. If so, then a mechanism permitting an individual
at least to direct his payment to his own religious society may have been necessary to avoid
a constraint of natural liberty that discriminated among religions.
"0s Pa Const of 1776, Art 2.
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Colony shall be denied the enjoyment of any civil right, merely on
account of his religious principles; but that all persons, professing
a belief in the faith of any Protestant sect .. shall fully and freely
enjoy every privilege and immunity, enjoyed by others their fellow
subjects."'
10 6
Another, far more common approach was to distinguish natural
rights from the privileges, advantages, benefits, or emoluments of
civil government-that is, from rights not existing in the state of
nature. There were numerous variations in the language with
which this approach was described. For example, although many
Americans used the words "right" and "privilege" interchangeably
to denote either a natural right or a right existing only under civil
government, they often employed these words to distinguish be-
tween the two types of rights and demanded not only the right to
the free exercise of religion but also equal privileges. For purposes
of this bifurcated analysis, they also used the words "discrim-
ination" and "preference." Thus, in New York, where anti-
establishment sentiment found strength in the state's religious di-
versity, the 1777 Constitution prohibited an establishment by
requiring that "the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profes-
sion and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall for-
ever hereafter be allowed .... 107 Not only would the natural
right of free exercise be shielded from discriminatory restraints-in
the document's words, "without discrimination"-but also prefer-
ences on account of religious differences would be prohibited.
Anti-establishment Americans frequently attempted to use ver-
sions of this bifurcated analysis of equal civil rights in order to
guarantee the free exercise of religion and then prohibit an estab-
lishment. 108
'06 NJ Const of 1776, Art 19. For other examples, note the following. The 1778 South
Carolina Constitution provided that Protestants "shall enjoy equal religious and civil privi-
leges." SC Const of 1778, Art 38. In this context, the word "privileges" appears to have
been interchangeable with "rights." Among other things, the presbytery of Hanover, Vir-
ginia, wanted government "to restrain the vicious and to encourage the virtuous, by whole-
some laws equally extending to every individual." Memorial of the Presbytery of Hanover
to the General Assembly of Virginia (Oct 24, 1776), in American State Papers 94; see also the
same language in the Memorial of April 25, 1777 in id at 97.
"' NY Const of 1777, Art 38.
10' E.g., in 1790, South Carolina employed the same language as New York to prohibit
an establishment. SC Const of 1790, Art 8, § 1. As suggested in the text, the bifurcated
analysis had many variants. In 1788, New York's ratification convention proposed as an
amendment to the U.S. Constitution: "That the people have an equal, natural, and unalien-
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A third analysis was that civil government had no authority to
legislate with respect to religion-a claim commonly assumed to
preclude unequal civil rights on account of religion. It will be re-
called that large numbers of Americans, following Locke, said that
individuals could not relinquish their natural right of free exercise
and that civil government was erected for exclusively secular pur-
poses."0 On the basis of such arguments, some Americans, in addi-
tion, insisted that all religious matters were beyond the jurisdiction
of civil government."' According to these Americans, civil govern-
ment had no authority to legislate with respect to religion-
whether to restrain free exercise and other natural rights or even
to give privileges to one or more religions. For example, Madison
able right freely and peaceably to exercise their religion, according to the dictates of con-
science; and that no religious sect or society ought to be favored or established by law in
preference to others." Elliot, I Debates 328. Virginia's proposal concluded with a similar
guarantee: "[A]I men have an equal, natural, and unalienable right to the free exercise of
religion, according to the dictates of conscience, and that no particular religious sect or
society ought to be favored or established, by law, in preference to others." 3 id at 659. In
Delaware, section 2 of the Declaration of Rights said that Christians "ought ... to enjoy
equal Rights and Privileges in this State, unless, under Colour of Religion, any man disturb
the Peace, Happiness or Safety of Society." Del Const of 1776, Bill of Rights, § 3. See also:
NJ Const of 1776, Art 19, quoted in text at note 106; proposal of 1788 NC ratification
convention, Elliot, 4 Debates 244. Israel Holly wanted "civil rulers to tolerate and protect
all conscientious professors of religion, and establish none." Israel Holly, An Appeal to the
Impartial (1778), as quoted in Ezra H. Gillett, Historical Sketch of the Cause of Civil Liberty in
Connecticut 1639-1818, 4 Historical Magazine 20 (2nd Ser) (July 1868). Some of Virginia's
dissenters petitioned that "That your memorialists have never been on an equal Footing
.with the other good People of this Colony in respect of religious Priviledges, having been
obliged by Law, to contribute to the Support of the Established Church." Memorial and
Petition of the Dissenters from the Church of England and others in the Counties of Alberm-
arle, Amherst, and Buckingham (Oct 22, 1776), Va State Library, Mfm of Misc Ms 425.
Other dissenters in Virginia petitioned that, being "[flully Persuaded ... That the Religion
of JESUS CHRIST may and ought to be Committed to the Protection Guidance and
Blessing of its Divine Author, & needs not the Interposition of any Human Power for its
Establishment & Support[,] We most earnestly desire and Pray that not only an Universal
Toleration may take Place, but that all the Subjects of this Free State may be put upon the
same footing and enjoy equal Liberties and Privileges." Petition of Divers of the Freeholders
and other Free Inhabitants of Amherst County (Nov 1, 1779), Va State Library, Mfin of
Misc Ms 425.
119 See text accompanying notes 33-35.
I0 These Americans were expanding upon the ideas of earlier, European writers. Pufen-
dorf had argued that civil law has no need to inquire as to things merely of the mind or as
to things that do not disturb the peace. Samuel Pufendorf, ElementorumJurisprudentiae Uni-
versalis Libri Duo, ed W. A. Oldfather, bk I, ch xiii, § 19, at 162 (Oxford U, 1931). Locke
wrote: "The commonwealth seems to me to be a society of men constituted only for the
procuring, preserving, and advancing their own civil interests. [New ] Civil interests I call
life, liberty, health, and indolency of body; and the possession of outward things, such as
money, lands, houses, furniture, and the like." Locke, Letter Concerning Toleration 17. Locke
argued, however, that government could prohibit some religions, and he did not explicitly
preclude the possibility of some government recognition of an established church.
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wrote "that in matters of religion no man's right is abridged by the
institution of civil society, and that religion is wholly exempt from
its cognizance.'' 1 This position, that religion was free from civil
control and even civil recognition, was a powerful argument against
unequal privileges on the basis of religious differences. Indeed, a
prohibition of any legislation with respect to religion could have a
still broader effect: It could bar even equal privileges.
Any of these three approaches could be generically described by
eighteenth-century Americans as freedom of conscience or religious
liberty. For a long time, Englishmen and Americans had sometimes
called the free exercise of religion "freedom of conscience" or "reli-
gious liberty." They also, however, could use these phrases to refer
to a right against establishments." 2 For example, some assumed
. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance (1785), in American State Papers 121. The
Presbytery of Hanover petitioned: "In the fixed belief of this principle, that the kingdom
of Christ, and the concerns of religion, are beyond the limits of civil control, we should
act a dishonest, inconsistent part, were we to receive any emoluments from any human
establishments for the support of the gospel." Memorial of the Presbytery of Hanover to
the General Assembly of Virginia (April 25, 1777), in American State Papers 98; see also
Memorial of Presbytery of Hanover (Oct 24, 1776) in id at 94. Some attributed this position
to Locke: ". . . any Majestrait or Legislative Body that takes upon themselves the power of
Governing Religion by human Laws Assumes a power that never was commited to them
by God nor can be by Man for the Confirmation of which Opinion we shall Cite no less
Authority than the Great Mr: Lock who says 'that the whole Jurisdiction of the Majestrait
reaches only to civel Concernments and that all civel power Right and Dominion is bounded
and confined to the only care of promoting these things' which is so Pertinent that we need
not Expatiate on it Onely say that if you can do any thing in Religion by human laws you
can do every thing if you can this Year take five Dollars from me and give it to A Minister
of any Denomitation you may next year by the same Rule take Fifty or what not and give
it to one of another or to them of all other Denominations." Petition of Sundry of the
Inhabitants of Rockingham County (Nov 18, 1784), Va State Library, Mfm of Misc Ms
425. (Note, however, that the petitioners admired South Carolina's equal establishment of
Protestant sects. In other words, the no-legislation-repsecting language may sometimes have
been interpreted simply to require equality among Protestants.) A petition from Rockbridge,
Virginia, said: "Let the Ministers of the Gospel of all denominations enjoy the Privileges
common to every good Citizen protect them in their religious exercises in the Person and
Property and Contracts and that we humbly conceive is all they are entitled to and all a
Legislature has power to grant." Petition from Rockbridge County, Virginia in Eckenrode,
Separation of Church and State in Virginia 97. The Baptist leader John Leland wrote that "[t]o
indulge [ministers] with an exemption from taxes and bearing arms is a tempting emolument.
The law should be silent about them; protect them as citizens, not as sacred officers, for
the civil law knows no sacred religious officers." John Leland, The Rights of Conscience Inalien-
able, and, Therefore, Religious Opinions Not Cognizable By Law (1791), in Writings of Leland 188.
See also notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
"' Americans frequently spoke of "free exercise" or "free exercise, according to con-
science." "Free exercise," however, tended to be understood to suggest the natural right.
Therefore, the broader degree of liberty-not only the natural right but also equal civil
rights or freedom from government legislation with respect to religion-often was said to
be freedom of conscience or freedom of religion.
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that these phrases referred to equal civil rights among Christians
or, at least, among Protestants. On this basis, in the South Carolina
Assembly, the Rev. William Tennent said: "My first, and most
capital reason, against all religious establishments is, that they are
an infringement of Religious Liberty."'113 For yet other Americans,
"freedom of consicence" and "freedom of religion" could refer to
an absence of laws respecting religion or to an unspecific absence
of establishments. These phrases could be used as convenient
catch-alls. 114
With a somewhat more descriptive label, dissenters, particularly
Baptists, generically claimed equal liberty or equality of religious
liberty. For example, Samuel Stillman-a prominent Baptist-
preached in a Massachusetts election sermon that the governor
should secure to all peaceable Christians "the uninterrupted enjoy-
ment of equal religious liberty." Such language (like the phrase
"freedom of conscience" or "religious liberty") could be ambiguous,
"13 William Tennent, Mr. Tennent's Speech on the Dissenting Petition, Delivered in the House of
Assenbly, Charles-Town, South-Carolina,Jan. 11, 1777 5 (1777) (Evans 15612). Tennent made
it clear that he understood religious liberty in terms of equality. See John Wesley Brinsfield,
Religion and Politics in Colonial South Carolina 107-8, 116, 120-22 (Southern Historical Press,
1983). Recalling how he had collected signatures for the petition supported by Tennent,
Colonel William Hill later wrote of himself that, "in order to get as many names as possi-
ble-(and not believing in the doctrine of the turks that women have no souls) he got the
women to sign their names with the men." Id at 111.
..4 For some uses of these phrases against establishments, see the following. According
to a minority of the Pennsylvania ratification convention, "[tihe right of conscience shall be
held inviolable." "The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority," 2 Documentary
History 623. In 1779, Isaac Backus prepared a draft Bill of Rights for the Massachusetts
Constitution. Among other things, it said that "every person.has an unalienable right to act
in all religious affairs according to the full persuasion of his own mind, where others are
not injured thereby." Backus on Church, State, and Calvinism 487. In 1780, Backus wrote:
"Our Convention at Cambridge passed an act last Wednesday to establish an article in our
bill of rights which evidentally infringes upon the rights of conscience." McLoughlin, 1 New
England Dissent 604. Also in Massachusetts, Joseph Hawley wrote: "Pray give over the
impossible (task) of endeavoring to make a religious establishment, (consistent) with the
unalienable Rights of Conscience." Joseph Hawley, Protest to the Constitutional Convention of
1780, in Mary C. Clune, ed, Joseph Hawley's Criticism of the Constitution of Massachusetts, in 3
Smith College Studies in Hist 50 (1917). According to Leland, "[tihe question is, 'Are the
rights of conscience alienable, or inalienable?'" John Leland, The Rights of Conscience Inalienable
(1791), in Writings of Leland 180. Although he discussed this as an inalienable natural right,
he had a broad view of it, apparently considering it a freedom from all legislation concerning
religion, including taxes in support of religion. See also J. Leland, The Yankee Spy (1794), in
id at 239; Popular Sources of Political Authority 693. For a much narrower understanding of
"religious rights," see Noah Hobart, Civil Government the Foundation of Social Happiness 30
(Conn election sermon 1750, published 1751) (Evans 6692). In many of these writings, the
precise definiton of the "right of conscience" or the "right of religion" was not altogether
clear.
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for it could refer either to the equal natural right of free exercise
or to a religious liberty involving equal civil rights. Stillman, how-
ever, clarified that, for him, "equal religious liberty" was an equal-
ity of civil rights with respect to religion:
The authority by which he [i.e., the "magistrate"] acts he de-
rives alike from all tbepeople, [and] consequently he should exer-
cise that authority equally for the benefit of all, without any
respect to their different religious principles....
Stillman wanted "equal treatment of all the citizens."'
Of course, these various modes of analysis were often used to-
gether, as may be illustrated by the First Amendment to the Con-
stitution of the United States. Like some earlier constitutional pro-
visions concerning religion, the First Amendment drew upon the
bifurcated approach that distinguished between natural rights and
government privileges. As indicated above, the bifurcated analysis
took various forms. Some state constitutions, for example, pro-
tected the natural right of free exercise in one clause and proscribed
unequal privileges in a second. Other constitutional provisions-
including New Hampshire's 1787 proposal to amend the United
.. Samuel Stillman, A Sermon 29 (Mass election sermon 1779) (Evans 16537). Stillman
also said that "as all men are equal by nature, so when they enter into a state of civil
government, they are entitled precisely to the same rights and privileges; or to an equal degree
of political happiness." Id at 11. For other uses of the phrase "equal liberty" or "equal
religious liberty" to refer to an equality of civil rights, see the following. In Virginia,
Baptists petitioned that "the full equal and impartial Liberty of all Denominations, may be
indubitably secured." Petition of the Ministers and Messengers of the Baptist Denomination
assembed at Noel's Meeting House in Essex County on May 3, 1783 (May 30, 1783), Va
State Library, Mfm of Misc Ms 425. Baptists also told the legislature: "Your Memorialists
have hoped for a removal of their Complaints, and the enjoyment of equal Liberty; ...
And that in every Act, the bright beams of equal Liberty, and Impartial Justice may
shine,..." Memorial of the Committee of Several Baptist Associations, Assembled at Dover
Meeting House, Oct 9, 1784 (Nov 11, 1784), Va State Library, Mfm of Misc Ms 425. The
Presbyterians of Hanover, Virginia, tendentiously interpreted the 1776 Declaration of
Rights as "declaring that equal liberty, as well religious as civil, shall be universally extended
to the good people of this country." Memorial of the Presbytery of Hanover to the General
Assembly of Virginia (April 25, 1777), in American State Papers 96. An anti-establishment
Virginian said: "When every society of Christians is allowed full, equal, and impartial
liberty, what can they desire more?" The Freeman's Remonstrance Against an Ecclesiastical Es-
tablishment ... By a Freeman of Virginia 5 (1777) (Evans 43750).
In contrast, the July 1789 House Committee Report on the Bill of Rights may have
equated equal rights of conscience merely with the natural right of free exercise: "No religion
shall be established by law, nor shall the equal rights of conscience be infringed." House
Committee Rep of July 28, 1789, in Creating the Bill of Rights 30. The phrase concerning
establishment may have made unnecessary any further anti-establishment clause, and there-




States Constitution, and, later, the First Amendment-took a simi-
lar bifurcated approach, yet, in place of the clause prohibiting un-
equal privileges, these provisions more broadly forbade legislation
with respect to religion.
116
Incidentally, a prohibition of all legislation with respect to reli-
gion may have been considered too broad. In particular, it might
have precluded legislation protecting the free exercise of religion.
Americans of many persuasions, both dissenters and members of
establishments, had argued that government should protect their
right freely to exercise their religion, 117 and, in effect, they thereby
added a caveat to their claim that government was created only to
protect civil or temporal interests. In the words of some of Vir-
ginia's more prominent Presbyterians, "The end of civil govern-
ment is security to the temporal liberty and property of mankind,
116 The New Hampshire ratification convention proposed that "Congress shall make no
Laws touching Religion, or to infringe the rights of Conscience." Creating the Bill of Rights
17. Typically, as has been seen, it was dissenters who sought a prohibition of legislation
with respect to religion, but, for purposes of the federal government, this position of dissent-
ers may have also appealed to state establishments. See note 122.
..7 For example, Witherspoon, who thought that "[tihe magistrates ... have a right to
instruct, but not to constrain," argued that "[tihe magistrate ought to defend the rights of
conscience, and tolerate all in their religious sentiments that are not injurious to their neigh-
bors." Witherspoon, Lectures, Lect XIV, at 160-61. He added that, "At present, as things
are situated, one of the most important duties of the magistracy is to protect the rights of
conscience." Id. The Presbyterian Synod of New York and Philadelphia declared that, "It
having been represented to Synod, that the Prebyterian Church suffers greatly in the opinion
of other denominations from an apprehension that they hold intolerant principles, the Synod
do ...declare, that they ever have, and still do renounce and abhor the principles of
intolerance; and we do believe that every member of society ought to be protected in the
full and free exercise of their religion." Records of the Presbyterian Church in the United States
of America 499 (1904), as quoted in James H. Smylie, Protestant Clegy, the First Amendment
and Beginnings of a Constitutional Debate, 1781-91 in Elvyn A. Smith, ed, The Religion of the
Republic 116, 141-42 (Fortress, 1971). See also David Parsons, A Sermon 13 (Mass election
sermon 1788) (Evans 21360).
In related language, Americans could request that government equally protect individuals
in their religious liberty. For example, an Anti-Federalist minority in the Maryland ratifica-
tion convention proposed as an amendment to the Constitution: "That there be no national
religion established by law; but that all persons be equally entitled to protection in their
religious liberty" (April 21, 1788), Elliot, 2 Debates 553. Of course, Federalists argued that,
even without a bill of rights, the Constitution provided equal protection: "Partiality to any
sect, or ill treatment of any, is neither in the least warranted by the constitution, nor
compatible with the general spirit of toleration; an equal security of civil and religious rights,
is therefore given to all denominations, without any formal stipulations; which, indeed,
might suggest an idea, that such an equality was doubtful. If the constitution must at all
have any amendment on this subject, it should be to guarantee to every state in the union
perfect liberty of conscience; because it is much more probable that superstition, mingled
with political faction, might corrupt a single state, than that bigotry should infect a majority
of the states in Congress." [Nicholas Collin], Remarks on the Amendments to the Federal Constitu-
tion (No 9), in Federal Gazette (Phila) (Nov 18, 1788, No 42).
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and to protect them in the free exercise of religion." '118 Therefore,
when dissenters came to argue against establishments that govern-
ment should not legislate concerning religion, some of these dis-
senters-at least, many Presbyterians in Virginia-hastened to
add as a caveat that government should, of course, be able to pro-
vide protection for the inalienable natural right of free exercise. 
11 9
For example, in 1777, a petition from the Presbytery of Hanover
asked that "the civil magistrates no otherwise interfere [in religion],
than to protect them all [i.e., "every individual"] in the full and
free exercise of their several modes of worship." ' ° Similarly, in
1785, the Presbyterians of Virginia petitioned that "it would be an
unwarrantable stretch of prerogative in the legislature to make laws
concerning it [i.e., religion], except for protection.' 21 Perhaps, to
permit legislation protecting the free exercise of religion, the First
Amendment merely forbade legislation "respecting an establish-
ment of religion."
' 122
118 Memorial of the Presbyterians of Virginia (Aug 13, 1785), in American State Papers 113.
19 This was not exclusively a Presbyterian position. Thomas Paine wrote that "[als to
religion, I hold it to be the indispensible duty of all government, to protect all conscientious
professors thereof, and I know of no other business which government hath to do therewith."
Paine, Common Sense 108-9.
In contrast, however, many dissenters wanted government to promote and, in this sense,
protect religion rather than just the free exercise of religion, provided the goverment did
not discriminate among Christian or, at least, Protestant sects. Buckley, Church and State in
Revolutionary Virginia 177 (re Presbyterians); McLoughlin, 1 New England Dissent 610. For
example, the New York and Philadelphia Synod of the Presbyterian Church said, in 1792,
that "Civil Magistrates may not assume to themselves the administration of the word and
sacraments . . or, in the least, interfere in matters of faith. Yet, as nursing fathers, it is
the duty of civil magistrates to protect the church of our common Lord, without giving the
preference to any denomination of christians above the rest." The Constitution of the Presbyte-
rian Church in the United States of America 35 (1792) (Evans 24711). Incidentally, in their
introduction to their 1787 draft, the Synod had revealed some sympathy for the more liberal
position: "They do not even wish to see any religious constitution aided by the civil power,
further than may be necessary for protection and security, and, at the same time, may be
equal and common to all others." A Draught of the Form of the Government and Discipline of the
Presbyterian Church in the United State of America iii (1787) (Evans 20658).
' Memorial of the Presbyterians of Hanover to the the General Assembly of Virginia
(April 25, 1777), in American State Papers 97.
121 Memorial of the Presbyterians of Virginia to the General Assembly (Aug 13, 1785),
in American State Papers 114. Immediately preceding the passage quoted in the text was the
following: "We never resigned to the control of government our right of determining for
ourselves in this important article [i.e., religion], and acting agreeably to the convictions of
reason and conscience in discharging our duty to our Creator. And therefore ...." Ac-
cording to Eckenrode, this Memorial was drafted by William Graham. Eckenrode, Separation
of Church and State in Virginia 107.
... Indeed, already in 1784 Madison had attributed to anti-establishment forces in Virginia
the position that there should be no legislation concerning an establishment of religion. In
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With numerous minor variations, the types of analysis reviewed
above were used to claim at least equal civil rights. Of course,
some dissenters demanded, not merely equal civil rights, but, more
generally, an absence of legislation respecting religion. Many other
dissenters ungenerously insisted upon equal civil rights only for
Christians-or, alternatively, only for Protestants-rather than for
all persons.'23 Large numbers of dissenters even were willing to be
content with a lesser right than that which they might request in
general terms. Subject to these caveats, however, dissenters em-
ployed some common modes of analysis and described their hopes
for at least an equality of civil rights-an equality both of restraints
on natural liberty and of privileges.
a letter to Richard Henry Lee, Madison summarized the opposition to an assessment bill as
being based, among other grounds, "on the general principle that no Religious Estabts. was
within the purview of Civil authority." J. Madison, letter to Robert Henry Lee (Nov 14,
1784), in Robert S. Alley, ed,James Madison on Religious Liberty 53 (Prometheus, 1985). He
continued by pointing out that the Presbyterians "do not deny but rather betray a desire
that an Assessment may be estabt. but protest agst. any which does not embrace all Reli-
gions . . . . Id at 54. When attributing to opponents of assessment the principle that
"religious establishments" were not within the "purview" of civil authority, Madison may
have been summarizing the views of Baptists and western and other Presbyterians who were
reluctant to compromise on the question of establishment. Certainly, some such Presbyteri-
ans in the 1780s held that government should not interfere with religion, except to protect
the free exercise of it. For such a position, taken about nine months after Madison wrote
his letter, see text at note 121.
Madison's subsequent writings seem to confirm that he considered his own position to be
different from the principle that "religious establishments" were not within the "purview of
civil authority." Madison's notes for the debates on the 1784 assessment bill state: "Re!: not
within purview of Civil Authority." R. A. Rutland et al, eds, 8 Papers ofJames Madison 198
(U of Chi, 1973). Similarly, a year later, an ameliorated assessment bill provoked Madison
in his famous Memorial and Remonstrance to say that "religion is wholly exempt from
[government's] cognizance." Memorial and Remonstrance, in American State Papers 121.
Madison may have been emphasizing the unqualified character of his claim.
Of course, the radical anti-establishment position adopted by Madison coincided with the
Federalist view that the federal government, being a government of delegated powers, had
no power with respect to religion. In the Virginia ratification convention, Madison said:
"There is not a shadow of right in the general government to intermeddle with religion. Its
least interference with it would be a most flagrant usurpation." J. Madison in Va Rat
Convention (June 12, 1788), in Elliot, 3 Debates 330. Some historians have claimed that the
"no law respecting" language merely reflected the federal character of the government of
the United States. E.g., Joseph M. Snee, Religious Disestablisbment and the Fourteentb Amend-
,nent, Wash U L Q 371 (1954). This is belied by the extensive evidence that such language
had been used for some time at the state level to describe one of the most radical of the
anti-establishment positions. See text at notes 109-11 & 117-22.
123 Thus, they could consistently assume that civil government should inculcate the princi-
ples of Christianity. Even those who sought equal rights for persons of all religions could
explain that government was able to promote the principles of Christianity to the extent
such principles were in accord with natural religion. On this basis, many claimed that
government could enforce observance of the Sabbath.
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Among the most intriguing discussions about equal civil rights
were the arguments of dissenters and their supporters in states in
which establishments and establishment constitutions had con-
ceded only the right of free exercise or free exercise and equal
protection. Disappointed with these guarantees, dissenters and
their confederates attempted to couch their demands for equal civil
rights in terms of the meager language available to them. In Vir-
ginia, where the 1776 Declaration of Rights merely guaranteed free
exercise and did not prohibit an establishment, it is possible to
trace in considerable detail how dissenters and their supporters
adapted their arguments to make the best of what little had been
yielded to them.
For example, many dissenters in Virginia claimed equality by
denouncing "separate privileges." During the Revolution, various
state bills of rights, including Virginia's, prohibited separate privi-
leges, emoluments, or honors, unless in exchange for services-
these prohibitions being addressed to the fear that aristocratic or
economic interests separate from the common interest of society
would seek to enrich themselves through legisla'ion. 12 Not having
a better constitutional foundation for their claihns to equal privi-
leges, many Virginia dissenters rested their cae on the separate
privileges clause of the Declaration of Rights.1 5 For various rea-
1"4 According to the Virginia-clause,_,-fnian, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or
separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of publick
services; which, not being descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate, legislator, or
judge to be hereditary." Va Decl of Rights of 1776, § 4. See text at notes 216-17.
32' For example, Presbyterians petitioned: "['A]e ask no ecclesiastical establishment for
ourselves, neither can we approve of them and grant it to others: this, indeed, would be
giving exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges to one set (or sect) of men, without
any special public services, to the common reproach or injury of every other denomination."
Memorial of the Presbytery of Hanover to the General Assembly of Virginia (Oct 24, 1776),
in American State Papers 94; see also id at 100 & 118. With an unusual touch of dry humor,
Baptists petitioned "That your Memorialists firmly believe as they are taught in the Declara-
tion of Rights 'that no Man or set of Men are entituled to exclusive or seperate Emoluments
or Privileges from the Community, but in Consideration of publick Services' [and] That
they cannot see that for a Person to call himself a Church-Man and to conform to the Rites
and Ceremonies of the Church of England, is doing the State any publick Service." Memo-
rial of the Baptist Association (June 3, 1782), Va State Library, Mfm of Misc Ms 425. See
also the following petitions from Va State Library, Mfm of Ms 425: Memorial of the
Committee of Several Baptist Associations, Assembled at Dover Meeting-House, Oct 9,
1784 (Nov 11, 1784); Petition of the Inhabitants of Cumberland County (Oct 26, 1785);
Petition of the Inhabitants of the County of Buckingham (Oct 27, 1785); Petition of the
Inhabitants of the County of Henry (Oct 27, 1785); Petition of the Inhabitants of the County
of Surry (Oct 26, 1785); Memorial & Remonstrance of the Inhabitants of the County of
Charlotte (Oct 27, 1785); Petition of the Inhabitants of the County of Isle of Wight (Oct
28, 1785). Note that the petitions of October 26 and 27 listed here employed versions of a
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sons, however, such arguments were of limited appeal or use-
fulness. Among other things, although "separate interests" and
"unequal laws" were ideas applicable to religious interests, they
were traditionally associated with social and economic interests.
Even with respect to economic interests, moreover, at least some
Americans were becoming cautious about prohibiting unequal laws
or special privileges for separate interests; many Americans ac-
cepted the inevitability of separate interests and sought political as
much as merely legal obstacles to unequal laws.12 6 Last but not
least, dissenters wanted a greater equality than mere "equal laws."
To provide equal civil rights, laws had to avoid making any distinc-
tion among different religions; the laws had to treat individuals the
same, regardless of religion. In contrast, equal laws were laws that
did not unjustly benefit or penalize any separate interest, and this
was not the strict equality needed by dissenters.
127
Even more interesting than the anti-establishment use of the
separate-interests language was the anti-establishment attempt to
claim equal civil rights in terms of the free exercise of religion.
George Mason's draft religion clause for the 1776 Virginia Declara-
tion of Rights adverted to toleration rather than a right of free
exercise and did not preclude an establishment. In response, Madi-
son drafted an alternative clause, similar to that which would ap-
pear in most state constitutions, asserting the free exercise of reli-
gion as a right rather than something merely to be tolerated. He
also, however, sought to make an equality of privileges seem a
necessary consequence of the far more acceptable right of free exer-
cise. Madison wrote that:
all men are equally entitled to the full and free exercise of it
[i.e., religion], accord[ing] to the dictates of Conscience: and
therefore that no man or class of men ought on account of
religion to be invested with peculiar emoluments or privileges:
nor subjected to any penalties or disabilities .... 128
single text. For evidence that Jefferson may have had a hand in some of these petitions, see
Declaration of the Va Association Baptists (Dec 25, 1776), in Thomas Jefferson, I Papers,
660, Julian P. Boyd, ed (Princeton U, 1950).
125 See, of course, Federalist No 10.
1 Thus, much later, Emerson wrote about "the Spartan principle 'of calling that which
is just, equal; not that which is equal, just.'" Ralph W. Emerson, Politics, in his Essays:
Second Series 193, 197 (1854).
"28 He indicated that it should continue: "unless, under colour of religion, any man disturb
the peace, the happiness, or safety of society." Robert Scribner & Brent Tatter, eds, 7
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Madison described equal emoluments and an absence of penalties
as a necessary result of the equal right to the free exercise of re-
ligion.
Madison's proposal failed. Supporters of Virginia's Anglican es-
tablishment recognized the implications of the phrase concerning
"peculiar emoluments or privileges"-that it was "a prelude to an
attack on the Established Church."' 29 They therefore insisted on
dropping the second half of Madison's language. As a result, the
Declaration protected only the natural right: "all men are equally
entitled to the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of
conscience .... " 130
In the next session of the Virginia legislature, dissenters peti-
tioned for equal civil rights. For example, on October 16, 1776, a
petition was presented in which some dissenters described their
desire for "every religious denomination being on a level" and their
hope that the legislature would interfere "only to support them in
their just rights and equal privileges."'131 On October 22, two peti-
tions were presented-from Albermarle, Amherst, and Buck-
ingham counties-praying that "every religious denomination
may be put upon an equal footing."' 3 2 Another, on November 9,
from the Committee of Augusta County, complained of "unequal
treatment. "
133
Some of the 1776 Virginia petitions acknowledged that the Dec-
laration of Rights, in speaking of "free exercise . . . according
to ... conscience," had not abolished the establishment, and these
petitions asked the legislature to finish the task. In what may have
been the first petition of the session on behalf of dissenters, the
legislature was requested "to complete what is so nobly begun."
' 134
Revolutionary Virginia: Independence & the Fifth Convention, 1776, A Documentary History 457
(U Press of Va, 1983) ("Revolutionary Virginia").
129 7 Revolutionary Virginia 457.
130 Va Const of 1776, Decl of Rights, § 16.
131 Charles F. James, Documentary History of the Struggle for Religious Liberty in Virginia 69
(Da Capo, 1971 reprint of 1900 edition) Uames, "Struggle for Religious Liberty in Virginia").
l"' Id at 70.
13 Id at 74.
134 Id at 68-69. Such acknowledgements continued long after 1776. In 1780, Baptists
seeking legislative reforms said that "the Completion of Religious Liberty is what as a
Religious Community your Memorialists are particularly interested in." Memorial of the
Baptist Association Met at Sandy Creek in Charlotte, Oct 16, 1780 (Nov 8, 1780), Va State
Library, Mfm of Misc Ms 425. In 1784, the Presbytery of Hanover petitioned: "The security
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Before the end of the month, however, some petitions exhibited a
rather lawyerly tendency to demand in terms of what was granted
that which had been denied. Some, as noted above, argued that
the "separate privileges" clause had prohibited an establishment of
religion. Others, however, made arguments more similar to Madi-
son's that the free exercise of religion required equal privileges.
1 35
As the historian H. J. Eckenrode noted, these petitions "advanced
the theory that the Bill of Rights had put an end to the estab-
lishment.'
136
of our religious rights upon equal and impartial ground, instead of being made a fundamental
part of our constitution as it ought to have been, is left to the precarious fate of common law. A
matter of general and essential concern to the people is committed to the hazard of the
prevailing opinion of a majority of the assembly at its different sessions." Memorial of the
Presbytery of Hanover to the General Assembly of Virginia (May 1784), in American State
Papers 101. In 1785, the Presbyterians of Virginia petitioned: "We regret that full equality
in all things, and ample protection and security to religious liberty were not incontestably
fixed in the Constitution of the government." Memorial of the Presbyterians of Virginia to
the General Assembly (Aug 13, 1785), in id at 118.
13 Some dissenters argued against an establishment that their hopes had "been raised &
confirmed by the Declaration of your Hon[ora]ble House in the last Article of rights which
we beg leave to recite, viz. 'That Religion or the Duty we Owe to our Creator .... ' It will
hence unavoidably follow that No Laws which are indefensible & incompatible with the
Rights of Conscience should be suffered to remain unrepealed." They believed that "reli-
gious liberty in its fullest extent" was one of the "rights of human Nature." Petition of the
Dissenters from the Ecclesiastical Establishment, Berkeley County (Oct 25, 1776), Va State
Library, Mfm of Misc Ms 425. Others petitioned that "it would be a violation of the rights
of the Good People of this state[.] our Bill or Rights Particularly Points out that religion is
the duty we owe to our Creator and the manner of dischargeing it can only be directed by
reason and Conviction not by Force or violence, therefore as all men are Equally Intitled
to the free Exercise of Religion according to the dictates of Conscience &c &c We your
Petitioners beg leave to represent ... that we think ... that even to force a man to support
this or that teacher of his own religious Persuation, [sic] is a depriving him of that liberty
of giving his Contributions to the Particular Pastor whose Morals he would make his Patron
[sic?], whose Powers he feels most Persuasive to Rightousness would be wrong, Cruel, and
Oppressive." Petition of Sundry Freeholders and other Inhabitants of the County of Bedford
(Oct 27, 1785), Va State Library, Mfm of Misc Ms 425.
136 Eckenrode, Separation of Church and State in Virginia 47; Buckley, Church and State in
Revolutionary Virginia 24. Already en October 11, 1776, "a letter from Augusta County
quoted the free exercise clause ... and asked that it be carried into effect immediately by
placing all religious groups on the same basis 'without preference or preeminence' given to
any one church." Va Gaz (Purdie, Oct 11, 1776), as quoted in id at 24. Presbyterians of
Hanover, Virginia, based their complaints against the establishment on the Declaration of
Rights and, in the following paragraph, noted that they "annually pay large taxes to support
an establishment from which their consciences and their principles oblige them to
dissent,-all which are confessedly violations of their natural rights, and in their conse-
quences a restraint upon freedom of enquiry and private judgment." Memorial of the Presby-
tery of Hanover to the General Assembly of Virginia (Oct 24, 1776), in American State Papers
92. In 1785, Presbyterians claimed of a proposed statute: "The bill is also a direct violation
of the Declaration of Rights, which ought to be the standard of all laws. The sixteenth
article is clearly infringed .... "Memorial of the Presbyterians of Virginia to the General
Assembly (Aug 13, 1785), in id at 116.
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What was tendentious in ordinary petitions was an opportunity
for ingenuity in the writing of Madison and Jefferson. '37 Already
in 1776, as has been seen, Madison proposed unsuccessfully that
the free exercise of religion required that there be no "peculiar
emoluments or privileges." In 1779, in his Virginia Act for Estab-
lishing Religious Freedom, Jefferson took a similar approach, and,
because Jefferson provided a lengthier explanation than had Madi-
son, his proposal can be examined in greater detail. Eventually
enacted in 1785, Jefferson's statute declared, among other things,
that the profession of religious opinions by men "shall in no wise
diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil capacities." '138 The prefatory
clauses explained
that our civil rights have no dependence on our religious opin-
ions, more than our opinions in physics or geometry; that,
therefore, the proscribing any citizen as unworthy the public
confidence by laying upon him an incapacity of being called to
the offices of trust and emolument, unless he profess or re-
nounce this or that religious opinion is depriving him injuri-
ously of those privileges and advantages to which in common with his
fellow-citizens he has a natural right; .. 139 [italics added].
If civil government had been established for exclusively secular
ends, and if religion was, moreover, not susceptible to civil control,
then, indeed, it could be argued that civil government had no
power to deny a man office because he would not swear, for exam-
ple, to the 39 Articles. Yet it was a paradox-a clever and arresting
solecism-to assert that the refusal of office was a denial of "privi-
leges and advantages" to which a man had a natural right. Ac-
cording to the state-of-nature theory discussed in part I and that
was so popular in America, a denial of a right that did not exist in
the state of nature would not normally be a denial of a natural
right. Nonetheless, the prefatory clauses of Jefferson's statute sug-
gested that a denial of such a right on grounds of religion could be
viewed as an infringement of natural right, because the exercise of
religion was a natural right. This suggestion of the preface was
' Many petitions may have drawn upon the ingenuity of these two Virginians but
without their sophistication.
138 Jefferson's language about civil capacities probably reflected his familiarity with En-
glish debates about religious liberty.
139 12 William Waller Hening, ed, Collection of the Laws of Virginia 85 (U Press of Va, 1969
reprint of 1823 edition).
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repeated in the body of the Act, and, indeed, this second pro-
nouncement reveals why, even when successfully achieving equal
civil rights, Jefferson vent out of his way to stretch traditional
notions of natural right:
And though we well know that this Assembly, elected by the
people for the ordinary purposes of legislation only, have no
power to restrain the acts of succeeding Assemblies, constituted
with the powers equal to our own, and that therefore to declare
this act irrevocable would be of no effect in law, yet we are
free to declare, and do declare, that the rights hereby asserted
are of the natural rights of mankind, and that if any act shall
be hereafter passed to repeal the present or to narrow its opera-
tion, such act will be an infringement of natural right. "
To restrain future Assemblies, Jefferson declared that a denial of
civil rights on grounds of religion-including a denial of some
rights existing only under civil government-would be a violation
of natural right. Jefferson was appropriating for equal civil rights
the inviolability associated with an aspect of natural liberty, partic-
ularly the inalienable natural right of free exercise of religion.
In 1785, Madison came close to repeating the sophisticated sole-
cism that he and Jefferson each had made in, respectively, 1776
and 1779, but Madison appears to have been quite careful in 1785
to avoid saying that a denial of equal civil rights was a violation of
natural right. In his Memorial of 1785, Madison argued against
legislation that he described as contrary to, among other things, the
natural right of free exercise of religion guaranteed by the Virginia
Declaration of Rights. Conceivably, therefore, Madison's Memorial
may be understood to suggest that he thought the bill's unequal
privileges violated the natural right of free exercise. Yet, in the
Memorial, Madison did not directly say this, and, indeed, at one
point he seems to have gone out of his way to avoid such a state-
ment. Immediately after denouncing the bill's violations of the
equal natural right of free exercise, he warned against the special
exemptions and other privileges the bill created:
As the Bill violates equality by subjecting some to peculiar
burdens, so it violates the same principle, by granting to others,
peculiar exemptions. Are the Quakers and Menonists the only
sects who think a compulsive support of their Religions unnec-
'4 Id at 86.
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essary and unwarrantable? . . . Ought their Religions to be
endowed above all others with extraordinary privileges by
which proselytes may be enticed from all others?' 4 '
Note that Madison did not say that peculiar exemptions or privi-
leges would violate the natural right of free exercise; rather, they
would violate the "principle" of "equality." By cleverly shifting the
foundation of his argument from the equality of the natural right
of free exercise of religion to the principle of equality, he avoided
the somewhat strained position he and Jefferson had earlier es-
poused. 1
42
It has been seen that opponents of establishments frequently
stretched the conventional understanding of separate privileges or
of free exercise in order to justify their claims for equal civil rights.
Strikingly, however, they attempted to use the idea of equal protec-
tion for this purpose much less frequently. Only very occasionally
did they claim equal civil rights in terms of equal protection. It
will be recalled that Ebenezer Frothingham wrote about equal pro-
tection in order to justify equal civil rights. According to Froth-
ingham, persons of different sects "ought equally to be protected
by ... civil Power, in their proper Rights and Privileges, and each
one be left to support their own Worship . . . ." Civil power, he
added, "knows nothing about the different Professions there is [sic]
among Mankind.' 43 Later, other opponents of establishments
sometimes demanded equal civil rights on grounds of equal protec-
tion. For example, during ratification of the Massachusetts Consti-
tution, the town of Leicester described that Constitution's compul-
sory support for religion as a violation of conscience and a
"Persecuting or Compeling" of individuals. This, they said, "is
inconsistent with the Last Paragraph [according to which] Every
Denomination of religious Societys Demeaning themselves Peace-
14 James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance, in 8 Papers 300, Robert A. Rutland, ed
(U of Chi, 1977). On the political maneuvers of Madison in 1784 and 1785, see Norman K.
Risjord, Chesapeake Politics 1781-1800 205-10 (1978).
142 Later, however, when not writing to garner political support for legislation, Madison
continued to assert that an establishment was a violation of natural right. For example. in
1792, Madison used a very broadly defined notion of property to argue that a tax in support
of religion was a taking of property. James Madison, "Of Property," American State Papers
158. His argument was as follows: property embraces everything to which a man may attach
a value and have a right; a person has a property of particular value in his religious opinions;
government is instituted to protect property, including the rights of individuals; if govern-
ment imposes a test or taxes individuals to support religion, it violates the property rights
individuals have in their opinions.
113 Ebenezer Frothingham, The Articles of Faith and Practice 296 (1750) (Evans 6504).
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ably and as Good Subjects Should be Equally under the Protection
of Law."' 144 Relatively few Americans, however, demanded equal
civil rights in terms of equal protection with as much clarity as did
the men of Leicester. 1
45
In sum, the exigencies faced by dissenters sometimes prompted
them and their supporters to base their claims for equal civil rights
on unconventional and, in this sense, strained interpretations of
less generous but more widely accepted standards. They some-
times argued that establishment privileges were separate privileges
or a denial of a natural right. They also occasionally said that equal
protection included equal privileges; yet they made this assertion
relatively infrequently and rarely in an unambiguous fashion.
Dissenters understood that they needed guarantees of equal civil
rights rather than only equal protection. In Massachusetts, in the
decades following the adoption of the 1780 Constitution, dissenters
repeatedly went to court to challenge the constitutionality of reli-
gious assessments, but they did so on the basis of language other
than that relating to equal protection-and even so they ultimately
failed. Where they had the power-in Delaware, Pennsylvania,
"4 Popular Sources of Political Authority 836. McLoughlin describes Leicester as one of the
Massachusetts towns in which Baptists, although a minority, were on relatively "good
terms" with their neighbors. McLoughlin, I New England Dissent 516 & 628.
141 For what may be another Massachusetts example, see Popular Sources of Political Author-
ity 694. In Virginia, dissenters and their supporters appear occasionally to have used this
argument but not clearly or systematically. E.g., the Presbytery of Hanover said: the legisla-
ture should be "the common guardian and equal protector of every class of citizens in their
religious as well as civil rights." Memorial of the Presbytery of Hanover to the General
Assembly (May 1784), in American State Papers 103. Yet, in the same Memorial, the Presby-
tery also said that "an equal share of the protection and favour of government to all denomi-
nations of Christians, were particular objects of our expectations and irrefragable claim." Id
at 100. This bifurcated analysis was in accord with the conventional understanding of equal
protection. In his Memorial, Madison may have treated equal protection as an equality of
civil rights: "Such a government will be best supported by protecting every citizen in the
enjoyment of his religion with the same equal hand which protects his person and property;
by neither invading the equal rights of any sect, nor suffering any sect to invade those of
another." J. Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance, in id at 126. Whether this passage
employs the conventional understanding of equal protection is not altogether clear.
The argument that equal protection was an equality of legal rights-of both natural rights
and privileges enjoyed under government-was revived, as one might expect, shortly after
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. E.g., in 1872, Senator
Oliver Morton of Indiana argued that "the word 'protection,' as there used .... is substan-
tially in the sense of the equal benefit of the law .... " See Earl A. Maltz, The Concept of
Equal Protection of the Laws-A Historical Inquiry, 22 San Diego L Rev 499, 528 (1985).
"6 McLoughlin, I New England Dissent 636-59, especially 637, 639; Isaac Backus, A Door
Opened for Equal Christian Liberty 4-5 [1783]; Kendall v Kingston, 5 Mass 524, 529 (1809);
Barnes v Inbabitants of 1st Parish of Falmouth, 6 Mass 401, 416-17 (1810) (the whole of the
Christian denominations clause quoted but" the equal protection language apparently not
relied upon). Many of the challenges in Massachusetts are described in Nathan Dane, 2
A General Abridgment of American Law 329-48 (ch 48) (1823).
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North Carolina, South Carolina, New Jersey, and New York-
opponents of establishments sought and obtained constitutional
guarantees of equal privileges or equal civil rights. In contrast to
establishments, which used equal protection clauses to preserve
unequal privileges, opponents of establishments insisted that privi-
leges also should be equal-that there should be an equality of civil
rights.
Dissenters and other opponents of establishments tended to pro-
claim their egalitarian aspirations in relatively perspicuous lan-
guage, and this account of how they sought equal civil rights rather
than merely free exercise and equal protection can best be con-
cluded in their own words. For example, in 1790, in New Hamp-
shire, where the Constitution of 1784 promised equal protection
rather than equal. civil rights with respect to religion, a dissenting
Anglican minister, John Cosens Ogden, was asked to preach the
election sermon. He praised the tolerance of American govern-
ments and noted that "all religions are most justly tolerated, and
ought and are promised to be protected." But he gently suggested
that there should be a still greater equality:
[A]ll are to enjoy every advantage, which law can afford to
preserve, and whose professors are each determined to defend
and maintain their own privileges. Upon this head, the conduct
of our civil rulers in every part of this continent, for many
years, has been founded upon the purest justice, and most per-
fect policy, in not only protecting and guarding all from spoil
and incursions, but striving to remove all cause of heartburn-
ings, and jealousies, by preferring one before another, either
by an open or implied partiality .... ,4
After declaring his hope for "a more equal practice in Newen-
gland," he went on to complain of unequal state support for minis-
ters: "If God ...extends his care to all, let us not be inattentive
to his will, nor appear to limit his mercies or our favours by any
unnecessary partialities; or debar them an equal opportunity to
inculcate the great duties we owe each other."' 48 In a 1791 Fourth
' John C. Ogden, A Sermon 17-18 (NH election sermon 1790) (Evans 22747). He then
praised the legislature for encouraging the principle of "protecting all denominations of
professors" and attributed "the honour done me in calling me to lead the devotions of this
day" to the "beginning [of] a more equal practice in Newengland, according to the opinion
and wish of so large a part of our country ..." Id at 19.
141 Id at 20.
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of July sermon, the sometime congressional chaplain, William Linn
of New York City, voiced a similar appreciation of equality when
discussing the United States Constitution. He praised the new
Constitution and then proceeded to exclaim about the extent of
religious liberty: "Here no particular modes of faith, or worship
are established .... Every one stands upon equal footing, and can
prove successful, only by the piety, virtue, learning, and liberality
of its professors."
' 149
IV. EQUALITY AND DIVERsrrY
The eighteenth-century Americans who struggled over
standards of religious equality understood that their debate con-
cerned not only their legal rights but also the character of their
society, and, in defense of their different positions, each side ar-
gued that its own standard of equality would allow Americans to
overcome the discord so often associated with religious diversity.
Americans were attempting to delineate the civil consequences of
149 William Linn, The Blessings of America 18-19 (Fourth of July sermon given at request
of Tammany Society 1791) (Evans 23504). In the ellipses, he said: "No undue preference
is given to one denomination of religion above another." In fact, it may be doubted whether
Linn expected any religious preferences under the U.S. Constitution. Incidentally, note
that, in a July 4 sermon in 1794, David Ramsay-President of the South Carolina Senate-
preached: "While the government, without partiality to any denomination, leaves all to
stand on equal footing, none can prove successful, but by the learning, virtue, and piety of
its professors." David Ramsay, An Oration Delivered on the Anniversary of American Indepen-
dence ... in St. Michael's Church in Charleston, South Carolina 9 (London, Daniel Isaac ["swinish
multitude"] Eaton 1795). Earlier, a petition to the Virginia General Assembly, presented
on October 11, 1776, asked that "all church establishments be pulled down ... and each
individual [be] left to rise or sink by his own merit and the general laws of the land." James,
Struggle for Religious Liberty in Virginia 69. The Dutch Reformed Church concluded the
preface to the publication of its Constitution by observing that "Whether the Church of
Christ will not be more effecutally patronized in a civil government where full freedom of
consience and worship is equally protected and insured to all men, and where truth is left
to vindicate her own sovereign authority and influence, than where men in power promote
their favorite denominations by temporal amendments and partial discriminations, will now,
in America, have a fair trial." The Constitution of the Reformed Dutch Church, in the United
States vii-viii (1793) (Evans 26065). Even before ratification of the Bill of Rights, the Rev.
Shuttleworth-an establishment minister-preached to the Vermont legislature: "[That
which most of all distinguishes this excellent constitution, and adds a glory to the whole,
is that religious liberty, candour, and catholicism therein exhibited .... The legislature of
our nation .... are setting us the example; [they] have put all denominations of christians
on a level." Samuel Shuttlesworth, A Discourse 14 (Vt election discourse 1791, printed 1792)
(Evans 24788). The Rev. Abraham Booth mimicked this sort of analysis in his description
of the "privileges and honors enjoyed by the subjects of th[e heavenly] kingdom," which,
he said, would not be unequal: "Nor are they confined to a few distinguished favorites of
our celestial Sovereign; for they are common to all his real subjects." Abraham Booth, An
Essay on the Kingdom of Christ 99 (1791) (Evans 23213).
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religious disagreement, including the relationship of contentious
religious groups to the larger polity, and therefore, not surpris-
ingly, their vi6ws on diversity and equality were connected to their
perceptions of social unity. Having been challenged to explain how
a harmonious, unified political society was to be achieved if it were
to contain diverse and discordant religious sects, dissenters insisted
that an equality of civil rights would remove the sources of contro-
versy. In contrast, some establishment ministers, once they had
accepted as inevitable and even attractive a degree of legal equality,
suggested that legal equality-even an equality of all civil rights-
could not, by itself, produce unity. On this ground, they urged
Americans to recognize the Christian sentiments and morals they
had in common and, at least by implication, justified government
support for religion as a means of encouraging shared opinions.
Thus, dissenters who claimed equal civil rights and establishments
that defended a lesser equality understood and sometimes justified
their positions in terms of their somewhat different conceptions of
unity in a diverse society.
Establishment writers had long argued that separation from the
established church undermined the unity and harmoniousness of
society. Particularly during the Great Awakening, they pointed to
the dangers of separation. In Connecticut, for example, Benjamin
Lord went to the extreme of associating the colony's religious divi-
sions with a selfish, anarchical individualism: "In the Exercise of
Anarchy, Men seem to be dissolving Community it self, and going
back to the state of Nature: to do every one what is Right in his
own Eyes; which a greatly privileg'd People are often, but too
prone unto. As if a Government form'd for Liberty, to the Subjects,
gave them a License, to act for themselves abstracted from Rela-
tion to Society and without concern for the common Good.' ' 0
150 Benjamin Lord, Religion and Government Subsisting Together in Society, Necessary to their
Compleat Happiness and Safety 27 (Conn election sermon for 1751, printed 1752) (Evans 6868).
He continued: "Verily, 'tis a Principle near akin to Anarchy, that prompts men in a Commu-
nity, to act, as Individuals with levelling Designs; forgetting how sacred are the bonds of
civil Society, which the have taken upon them, and objecting against any settled form of
Government at all." Id at 27-28. According to Lord, separation was an assertion of private
interest against the interest of society: "If Persons are Ignorant of the Distinction there is
between the State of Men; as Individuals, and as Members of Community: If they are Insensi-
ble of the Bonds of Society, and the sacred Obligations arising thence, to act with unselfish,
steddy Views of the common Good: But are ready to separate their own private Interest
from that, and so practically Renounce their Relation to the Body Politic; this hurts it
greatly. If they Imagine, they may seek their own private Good, abstracted from any Regard
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Religious divisions were, for Lord, a threat to social and political
unity.
In contrast, dissenters frequently defended their ambitions for
equal civil rights on the ground that legal equality would produce
social harmony. Establishment writers occasionally employed this
argument to justify equal protection or, sometimes, an equal estab-
lishment of Christianity,'' but, on behalf of their greater degree
of equality, dissenters could take the approach more frequently
and more effectively. Frothingham wrote:
I think it will not weaken the hands of civil rulers, that rule for
God, to have different professions [of religious belief] in a town
to the whole Community; or, as if their own particular Interest must be the Standard by
which, to measure the public Good; and hence, frame their Schemes of Conduct to suit
them, only, this is Mischievous to Society. For now, when they come to act as Members
of Society, the great Question with them is, What is good for me? and what will suit my
Interest? Not what is good for the Community, or proper for them? And this governs their
Vote and Conduct; which is a Violation of the duty of Members, a betraying their Trust,
and breaking their solemn bonds .... And this, I suppose upon a just Examination, will
be found one great spring of the hurtful Divisions in Church and State." Id at 48-49.
Although Lord's language was extreme, even for Connecticut, it sounded a widely known
theme. In Connecticut, the Rev. Bartlett preached that "there is nothing, tends more directly
and effectually, to cast a Blemish upon Christianity, than the following seducing Teachers,
and receiving such Errors from them, as tend to break the Bands of christian Charity, and
to crumble christian Societies and Communities into Sects and Parties; and to lay a Founda-
tion for unchristian Strifes, Divisions, Separations, and Schisms ..... Moses Barlett, False
and Seducing Teachers 46 (1757) (Evans 7842).
I' E.g., in Massachusetts, Zabdiel Adams defended the supposedly equal support for
Protestant denominations as a means of ending dissension: "Nothing gives life and spirit to
any corporate body; nothing induces them ["constituents"] to submit to burdens with greater
alacrity than to find they are necessary and levied in equal proportions." Zabdiel Adams,
A Sennon 29 (Mass election sermon [1782]) (Evans 17450). In Virginia, petitfoners for an
equal establishment of Christians argued "That a System of Worship Simple Pure & Toler-
ant Formed On the Broad Basis of Gospel Liberty & Christian Charity-Divested of past
Prejudices & Bigotry-And Dictated by a true Catholick Spirit would meet with a General
Acceptance and Approbation .... No Proud or lordly Prelate, No bigoted Presbytery can
Awe your Deliberations: ...That you may Form such a System as may Reconcile all
those Petty Jars & truifling Differences which ... have hitherto so unhappily Divided the
Protestants Amonst us.... promote an Happy Union by Comprehending All the Sincere
& pious Christians of every Denomination at present Among us ... lay a Foundation for
the Exercise of Christian Love ... and exhibit such a Spectacle to the Wondering World
as hath not appear[e]d since the first Ages of Christianity." Petition of Sundry Inhabitants
of the County of Amherst (Nov 27, 1783), Va State Library, Mfm of Misc Ms 425. In
Connecticut, Benjamin Lord used such arguments on behalf of equal protection. See text
at note 81. More generally, Governor Wolcott of Connecticut wrote that "the late Bishop
of London was of Opinion, that the Religious State of this Country is founded upon an equal
Liberty of all Protestants; none can claim a national Establishment, nor any Superiority over
the rest .... as far as I can know anything about it, this Government is of the Same opinion
& that this is the best Foundation of Love & Peace. [Y]et it is certain the Charter grants us
a Power to govern the People religiously," which he thought meant "a Power to Set up the
Gospel & Support it & to oblige the people to attend the Publick ordinance of it ......
Roger Wolcott to E. Punderson Gan 30, 1752), The Wolcott Papers 145 (1916).
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or colony. For consider persons in different professions, finding
themselves favoured with an equal share of liberty, with the
rest of their neighbors, and fellow subjects, it will in my opin-
ion have a. natural tendency to knit their affections, and dutiful
regard to their rulers, stronger, if it can be, than if they was
all of one opinion in religion.... 152
Indeed,
instead of the colony's being ruined by enacting full and free
liberty of conscience, it is the most likely, if not the only rem-
edy to save it from confusion, and final ruin: for such a liberty
has a natural tendency to unite all parties in good neighbor-
hood, to strive together in all civil things for the good of the
whole civil body, and the contrary for its ruin.1
53
According to Frothingham and many other dissenters, only "an
equal share of liberty" could unify a diverse society.
154
152 Ebenezer Frothingham, A Key to Unlock the Door 155-56 (1767) (Evans 10621)."[N]ow
for civil rulers to set up and establish the sect that pleases them, and deprive all the rest of
their equal share of liberty, and force their neighbours to go against the light of their
consciences, . . . Sure I am, that nothing is more likely to alienate good subjects from due
affection, and dutiful regard to their civil rulers, than such a practice;. Id at 156.
113 Id at 159.
154 E.g.: "Upon Trial it hath been found that where Ministers have been settled by the
Power of the established Constitution, in many Instances it hath occasioned warm Debates,
Divisions, and Separations unavoidably .... Strict Congregational Churches in Connecti-
cut, An Historical Narrative 15 (1781) (Evans 17115). "It is inequality that excites jealousy
and dissatisfaction." William Tennent, Mr. William Tennent's Speech on the Dissenting Petition
19 (1777) (Evans 15612). In Virginia, some Presbyterians petitioned that by removing un-
equal civil rights with respect to religion, the legislature "will remove every real ground of
contention, and allay every jealous commotion on the score of religion." Memorial of the
Presbytery of Hanover to the General Assembly (May 1784), in American State Papers 105.
Baptists urged "the Expediency of removing the Ground of Animosity, which will remain
while Preference is given, or particular Favours are granted in our Laws to any particular
Religious Demoninations." Memorial of the Baptist Association (June 3, 1782), Va State
Library, Mfm of Misc Ms 425. Baptists expressed their "hope... that no Species of religious
Oppression may remain to . . . alienate the Affections of the different Denominations
from each other." Address of the Ministers and Messengers of the Churches of the Baptist
Denomination Associated in Amelia County, May 12, 1783 (May 31, 1783), Va State Li-
brary, Mfm of Misc Ms 425. Dissenters argued that if "every Religious Denomination"
were "on a Level," then "animosities may cease." Petition of Dissenters (Oct 16, 1776) (the
so-called "Ten-Thousand Name" Petition"), Va State Library, Mfm of Misc Ms 425.
Charles Carroll-a Catholic-wrote that "were an unlimited toleration allowed and men of
all sects were to converse freely with each other, their aversion from difference of religious
principles would soon wear away." Charles Carroll, letter to Edmund Jennings, Aug 13,
1767, in Unpublished Letters of Charles Carroll of Carrollton 143, Thomas M. Field, ed (U.S.
Catholic Historical Soc, 1902). A sympathetic establishment minister preached: "With re-
spect to articles of faith or modes of worship, civil authority have no right to establish
religion. The people ought to choose their own ministers, and their own denomination, as
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A prominent Baptist minister, Samuel Stillman, not only argued
that legal equality was the means to achieve unity amid diversity
but also that unequal law was the cause of a diversity of interests.
Like other dissenters who attacked establishments by demanding
greater equality, Samuel Stillman accepted the common eigh-
teenth-century assumption that "[u]nion in the state is of absolute
necessity to its happiness" and that this unity was something "the
magistrate will study to promote." Like other dissenters, he argued
that unity would exist only under a plan of "ajust and equal treatment
of all of the citizens":
For though christians may contend amongst themselves about
their religious differences, they will all unite to promote the
good of the community, because it is their interest, so long as
our laws now permit them; but as far as religion is connected with the morals of the people,
and their improvement in knowledge, it becomes of great importance to the state; and
legislators may well consider it as part of their concern for the public welfare, to make
provision that all the towns may be furnished with good teachers . . . .Perhaps a little
addition to the law already in force in this state might sufficiently secure the continuance
of religious instruction, enlarge rather than diminish liberty of conscience, and prevent
envyings, contentions, and crumbling into parties." Samuel Langdon, A Sermon 47-48 (NH
election sermon 1788) (Evans 21192). See also Nathaniel Ward, The Simple Cobler of Aggawam
in America, in Clarence L. Ver Steeg & Richard Hofstadter, eds, Great Issues in American
History 207 (1969).
Sometimes such views about equality were associated with arguments that diversity would
create a competition for virtue among sects. Concerned that other sects feared Presbyterians,
the Synod of New York and Philadelphia declared in a Pastoral Letter: "No denomination
of Christians among us have any reason to fear oppression or restraint, or any power to
oppress others. We therefore recommend charity, forbearance, and mutual service. Let the
great and only strife be who shall love the Redeemer most, and who shall serve him with
greatest zeal." A Pastoral Letter from the Synod of New York and Philadelphia ... May 24, 1783
(11783]) (Evans 44445). Jefferson wrote: "Difference of opinion is advantageous in religion.
The several sects perform the office of a Censor morum over each other." Thomas Jefferson,
Notes on the State of Virginia Query XVII, at 198-99, Paul L. Ford, ed (1894). According to
a New Hampshire Anglican, ". . . let us beware of infidelity and Laodicean indifference;
and show our gratitude to God and our country, and prove our love to religion and its
professors, by each living up to the rules and professions of his own order; and the emulation
be, who shall best know, defend, and practice the truth." John C. Ogden, A Sermon 18 (NH
election sermon 1790) (Evans 22747). See also note 158.
In response to dissenters' demand for an equality of privileges, Warburton had argued
that a complete equality was a danger to the state, because sects would struggle for suprem-
acy. William Warburton, Alliance Between Church and State, in Warburton, 7 Works 99-100.
Similarly, after arguing that the established church "has shewn no Disposition to restrain
[dissenters] in the Exercise of their Religion," some of the established clergy in Virginia
argued that "[t]hey cannot suppose, should all Denominations of Christians be placed upon
a Level, that this Equality will continue, or that no Attempt will be made by any Sect for
the Superiority; & they foresee that much Confusion, probably civil Commotions, will
attend the Contest." Memorial of a Considerable Number of the Clergy of the Established
Church in Virginia (Nov 8, 1776), Va State Library, Mfm of Misc Ms 425.
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they all enjoy the blessings of a free, and equal administration
of government. 15
Extending this analysis, that equal treatment could produce a unity
of interests, Stillman drew the even more dramatic conclusion that
unequal rights were what created a division of interests:
[I]f the magistrate destroys the equality of the subjects of the
state on account of religion, he violates a fundamental principle
of a free government, establishes separate interests in it, and
lays a foundation for disaffection to rulers, and endless quarrels
among the people."16
According to Stillman, legal inequalities created "separate in-
terests. "
1 5 7
'5' Samuel Stillman, A Sermon 30 (Mass election sermon 1779) (Evans 16537). In the
election sermon of the previous year, Phillips Payson had argued that "[t]he variety and
freedom of opinion is apt to check the union of a free state." Phillips Payson, A Sermon 22
(Mass election sermon 1778) (Evans 15956).
"56 Id. He continued: "Happy are the inhabitants of that commonwealth, in which every
man sits under his vine and fig-tree, having none to make him afraid.-In which all are
protected, but none established." Id at 30.
IS Stillman made explicit what was at least suggested by the writings of many others.
E.g., in Virginia, Baptists said that, by neglecting to remove injustices, the legislature "does
but increase suspicion and disaffection." Memorial of the Baptist Association met at Noels
Meeting House, May 8, 1784 (May 26, 1784), Va State Library, Mfm of Misc Ms 425. It
also was argued that "when one is by law exalted to dominion above the rest, this lays the
foundation of envy, and debate, and emulation, and wrath, and discord, and confusion; if
not of war, bloodshed, and slaughter, in the end:-Being all indulged alike, as children of
the same family (though differing in size, feature, complexion, &c.) what cause can they
have to quarrel with one another?" The Freeman's Remonstrance Against an Ecclesiastical Estab-
lishment ... By a Freeman of Virginia 5 (1777) (Evans 43750).
Incidentally, the "Freeman" was not the only dissenter to make the argument about
differences of size or complexion. See, e.g., William Tennent, Mr. Tennent's Speech, on the
Dissenting Petition 7-8 (1777) (Evans 15612). In New England it was written that: "'It is
great pity .... as charity is our distinguishing mark as christians, that we exercise it much
less in religion, than in the common affairs of life. Agreeable to which, says an author, I
do not believe that there are two men upon earth who think exactly alike upon every subject;
and yet our different tastes in meat, drink, building and dress make not the least difference
in humans society; nor is it likely that they ever will, unless we establish by law, and tack
preferments to one particular mode of eating, drinking, building and dressing .... " Some
Remarks upon Mr. President Clap's History 56-57 (1757) (Evans 7881), as quoted by Isaac
Foster, A Defence of Religious Liberty 184 (1780) (Evans 16775). See also Isaac Watts, A New
Essay on Civil Power in Things Sacred, in 6 Works of. . .Isaac Watts 42 (1811); Jefferson as
quoted in note 158.
Nor was the warning about potential bloodshed unique. E.g., in 1794, in response to a
statute that used the proceeds from the sale of western lands to support Christian sects,
Connecticut's Baptists met in Hartford during the meeting of the next General Assembly
and declared that they were prepared "to shed their blood" on behalf of their liberty. Ezra
H. Gillett, Historical Sketch of the Canse of Civil Liberty in Connecticut, 1639-1818, 4 Historical
Magazine 28 (2nd Sec, July 1868) (citing interview with participant in 1794 meeting).
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Just as dissenters viewed diversity and equal civil rights as com-
patible with the unity of society, so establishment clergymen per-
ceived the unity of society in a way that reflected their distress
about religious differences and their conviction that establishment
was a means of producing rather fhan destroying harmony. Estab-
lishment clergymen emphasized, among other things, the need for
Christian charity. In conjunction with their arguments for equal
civil rights, various dissenters had urged a tolerance of religious
differences,"'8 but members of establishments turned this theme
against them. Particularly after conceding what they thought a
generous degree of equality, 59 many establishment clergymen felt
that the strident self-righteousness and contentiousness of dissent-
ers was unseemly at best. They exhorted dissenters to be more
humble, charitable, tolerant, and, in these senses, more
Christian. 
6 0
"s' Stillman urged establishments to accept the inevitability of diversity: "In fine. Seeing
the body of christians, however divided into sects and parties, 'are entitled precisely to the
same rights,' it becomes them to rest contented with that equal condition, nor to wish for
pre-eminence. Rather they should rejoice to see all men as free, and as happy as themselves.
[new 1] They should study to imbibe more of the spirit of their divine Master, to love as
brethren, and to preserve the unity of the spirit in the bonds of peace. In the present state
of ignorance and prejudice, they cannot expect to see eye to eye. There will be a variety of
opinions and modes of worship among the disciples of the same Lord; men equally honest,
pious, and sensible, while they remain in this world of imperfection. Let them therefore be
faithful to their respective principles, and kind, and forbearing towards one another." Sam-
uel Stillman, A Sermon 37-38 (Mass election sermon 1779) (Evans 16537). From a rather
different perspective, Thomas Paine described the diversity of sects as a test of Christian
kindness: "it is the will of the Almighty, that there should be diversity of religious opinions
among us: It affords a larger field for our christian kindness. Were we all of one way of
thinking, our religious dispositions would want matter for probation; and on this liberal
principle, I look on the various denominations among us, to be like children of the same
family, differing only, in what is called their Christian names." Paine, Common Sense 109.
Jefferson asked: "But is uniformity of opinion desireable? Nor more than of face and stature."
T. Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia 198, ed Paul L. Ford (1894).
Incidentally, note that, at Harvard, in 1784, Isaias-Lewis Green argued affirmatively on
the question: "An diversitas opinionum, inter homines, ad felicitatem corum [copy defec-
tive]." Harvard University, Quaestiones Sub Reverendo Josepho Willard (1784). Nathan Read
argued affirmatively on the question: "An tolerantia cujusque religionis ad veram religionem
promovendam tendat." Id.
s9 Although an attempt to preserve unequal privileges, the establishment of Christianity
or, at least, Protestantism in various states was also a tangible manifestation of establishment
latitudinarianism.
160 E.g.: "It is however greatly to be lamented that there is not a more catholick and
comprehensive spirit among different denominations of christians. Bigotry and censorious-
ness sour the temper and interrupt the happiness of society.... among people of knowledge,
though of different communions, a harmonious intercourse commonly takes place. With
madmen and enthusiasts there can be no agreement, except among people as distracted as
themselves." Zabdiel Adams, A Sermon 42 (Mass election sermon [1782]) (Evans 17450).
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Some of the establishment clergy who pleaded for charity and
moderation in disputes among Christians suggested that legal
equality-whether equal protection or equal civil rights-could
not, by itself, harmonize the conflicting interests and passions of
diverse sects. Whereas Stillman and other dissenters tended to em-
phasize that individuals "cannot expect to see eye to eye" and that
they therefore should "be faithful to their respective principles,
and kind, and forbearing toward one another," 161 some establish-
ment clergy declared their hopes for an amelioration of differences
among Christians. 162 They urged their fellow Christians to accept
According to Ezra Stiles, religious denominations, having "no superiority as to secular
powers and civil immunities, they will cohabit together in harmony, and I hope, with a
most generous catholicism and benevolence. The example of a friendly cohabitation of all
sects in america, proving that men may be good members of civil society, and yet differ in
religion." Ezra Stiles, The United States Elevated to Glory and Honor 55 (Conn election sermon
1783) (Evans 18198). Speaking of religious disputes among "people who before lived in
harmony," Jonathan Boucher-a loyalist and a relatively tolerant Anglican-preached that,
"though religious disputes ought, of all others, to be carried on with good temper and
mildness, they seem, as conducted by these persons, apt to excite bitterness and rancour."
Jonathan Boucher, "On Schisms and Sects" (1769), in A View of the Causes and Consequences
of the American Revolution 81 (1797). He also noted that, "[a]gainst the ministers of the
established Church their censures are particularly sharp and severe." Id at 82. (This was
preached in various places, including "once (not in any church, but sub dio) in the Back
Woods, near the Blue Ridge." Id at 46, n.)
161 See note 158.
162 Of course, they assumed that sects other than their own required moderation. Zabdiel
Adams hoped the diversity of sects would ameliorate fanaticism: "If coercion would bring
mankind to a uniformity of sentiment, no advantage would result therefrom. It is on the
contrary best to have different sects and denominations live in the same societies. They are
a mutual check and spy upon each other, and become more attentive to their principles and
practice. Hence it has been observed that where Papists and Protestants live intermingled
together, it serves to meliorate them both. The same may be observed of any other sects."
Zabdiel Adams, A Sermon 41-42 (Mass election sermon [1782]) (Evans 17450). Nathan
Strong preached: "If we look thro the christian sectaries, who differ in ceremonies and
words, candor will perceive that the greatest number of them unite, in the weighty matters
of faith, piety, religion and justice, towards GOD and towards men. A diffusion of knowl-
edge is now advancing a liberal spirit. May the Great Head of the Church hasten the period,
when those who think alike, concerning a divine love, justice, faith and truth, may join
their hands and hail a future meeting in Heaven, where ceremonies and modes of expression
will not separate brethren. Experience hath taught, that tolerancy in these things is the most
powerful means of union ...." Nathan Strong, A Sermon 21 (Conn election sermon 1790)
(Evans 22913). For earlier discussions in Massachusetts about Christian unity, see, inter
alia, McLoughlin, 1 New England Dissent 278-300.
Of course, such sentiments were not confined to establishment writers or New England.
Nonetheless, these opinions appear to have had particular appeal to writers who-whether
because of their religious traditions or their political circumstances-either did not fear an
acknowledgment of unity or, at least, felt the resentment of dissenters. For a Catholic
example from Maryland, see John Carroll, Letter to Joseph Berington (July 10, 1784), 1
John Carroll Papers 148 (Notre Dame, 1976). For an Anglican example from Virginia, see
Petition from Amherst County quoted in note 15 1.
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the unity of their faith-an old theme with which increasing num-
bers of dissenters did not disagree.
Even without a reconcilation of sectarian differences, some of
the establishment clergy urged at least a recognition of America's
common Christianity or, even less ambitiously, its common religi-
osity and morals. They emphasized shared religious values not
merely as a means of overcoming sectarian differefices but also as
a solution to the broader problem of separate or private interests
in American society. In Connecticut, for example, the Rev. Nathan
Strong eloquently described the varieties of private interests and
then preached:
It is the business of government to hold the balance between
them, to check the overbearing and point them to a common
good, and for this it needs the assistance of some pervading
social bond, and this bond can be no other than religion...
In all rational society there needs some cementing principle
of the heart, by which the minds who compose it may be
united, have one interest, one common good, and one happi-
ness....
Christian love in its comprehension of virtues, is the supreme
tie of social connexion.163
Strong was not alone. After noting that "a community like ours"
was "spread out over such an immense continent, divided by so
many local governments, prejudices and interests," the Rev. David
Tappan of Massachusetts observed: "A people so circumstanced,
can never be firmly and durably united, under one free and popular
government, without the strong bands of religious and moral prin-
ciple, of intelligent and enlarged patriotism." 1" By acknowledging
16 Nathan Strong, A Sermon 11-12 (Conn election sermon 1790) (Evans 22913). The
preceding passage was as follows: "The great end of political associations is best answered
where there is the most perfect union, and those principles are most essential to government,
which have the greatest tendency to produce union. The interests of individuals, are by the
emergencies of time thrown into many situations. We live with many others whose passions
are complicated, various and pointed to their own personal ends. Every lesser district, every
family, and individual in the family, hath interests of its own. If these private interests have
a supreme influence the utmost evils will ensue." Id at 11.
" David Tappan, A Sermon 37 (Mass election sermon 1792) (Evans 24481). He disclaimed
a desire for establishment. He quoted: "Take away the law-establishment, and religion
re-assumes its original benignity. In America a Catholic Priest is a good citizen, a good
character, and a good neighbor; an Episcopalian Minister is of the same description; and
this proceeds from there being no law-establishment in America." Id at 20. Nonetheless,
he thought there was "in many respects, a natural alliance between intelligent, virtuous
Magistrates and Ministers, in a free and christian State." Id. For sentiments concerning
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the Christianity, religiosity and morals they had in common, these
Americans attempted to bind together a vast and variegated nation,
and they thereby contributed to the establishment-the voluntary
or moral establishment-of a virtuous, religious, and Christian na-
tion. 16 5 Although developed in New England, "[t]he enormous
practical success of the voluntary social establishment reached the
farthest corners of the expanding nation; it dominates the Protes-
tant mind in large sections of the nation to this day."
' 166
Yet what may have been platitudinous in discussions of the di-
versity of interests in general was still somewhat controversial with
respect to religious divisions. Establishment writers often empha-
sized the importance of shared values, and they thereby disparaged
the necessity of shared rights. By implication, unequal rights were
the necessary means of establishing shared values and unity. In
republican unity and the role of the people in the Christian polity, see Alan Heimert,
Religion and the American Mind 540-49 (1966).
"6' Elwyn A. Smith, The Volntary Establishment of Religion, in Elwyn A. Smith, ed, The
Religion of the Republic 154, 155 (1971); Sydney E. Ahlstrom, I A Religious History of the
American People 463-65 (1975); see also Carol Weisbrod, Charles Guiteau and the Christian
Nation, 7 J L & Relig 187 (1989). It may be suspected that the idea of a Christian nation
was merely a nationalist and Protestant rejection of Catholocism. It appears, however, to
have developed, at least in part, as a response to sectarian diversity chiefly among Protes-
tants. Even when discussing a somewhat later period than that considered here, Perry Miller
wrote of the attempt by some Americans to make "the voluntary principle.., a mechanism
not of fragmentation but of national cohesion." Perry Miller, The Life of the Mind in America
44 (Harcourt Brace 1965). See also id at 70-72.
The clergy who addressed the problems of diverse interests and sects occasionally spoke
in terms of common religiosity and morals rather than in terms of a common Christianity.
An emphasis on virtue rather than Christianity was more typical of the very frequent
assertions in election sermons that nations, Christian or infidel, would be blessed or punished
in this world according to their virtue or, in some accounts, according to their conformity
to natural religion. This idea could be expressed in terms of a national religion: "Let no
man take an alarm as if by a national religion, I would recommend the establishment of any
modes or forms in preference to others .... By a national religion I would be understood
to mean, an acknowledgement of the being, perfections and providence of one supreme
GOD; a sense of his moral government both in this and a future State; and a careful
observance of the eternal laws of justice, truth and mercy in all our public conduct." Jeremy
Belknap, An Election Sermon 34 (NH election sermon 1785) (Evans 18927). Of course, non-
establishment clergy could still be worried about the possibility of a national establishment.
For example, Abraham Booth of New York said: "If all the subjects of Christ be real saints,
it may justly be queried whether any National religious establishment can be a part of his
kingdom .... is it not plain, that a National church is inimical to the spirit of our Lord's
declaration. My kingdom is not of this world? Does not that.., saying compel us to view the
church and the world in a contrasted point of light." Abraham Booth, An Essay on the Kingdom
of Christ 38-39 (1791).
'" Elwyn A. Smith, The Voluntary Establishment of Religion, in Elwyn A. Smith, ed, The
Religion of the Republic 154, 156 (1971).
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contrast, dissenters frequently argued that equal civil rights would
produce harmony among individuals of different religions. Al-
though hardly adverse to a recognition of America's common
Christianity, dissenters wanted to preserve their distinctiveness-
they wanted to be "faithful to their respective principles"-and
therefore they stressed common rights rather than a common
Christianity as the means of achieving unity.
Thus, Americans pursued their dispute about religious diversity
and different standards of equality within the context of a wider
disagreement about harmoniousness and unity in American soci-
ety. Dissenters and establishments not only formulated standards
of equality that preserved their interests and reflected their perspec-
tives on religious diversity but they also sometimes justified their
positions concerning equality in terms of the social unity that they
said would result from their distinct approaches to diversity.
Whereas those who lacked legal equality said unequal civil rights
were a source of discord, those who benefited from unequal privi-
leges saw these as the means of establishing the shared religious
values that would produce harmony in American society. By mak-
ing such arguments, which contrasted shared rights to shared val-
ues, these Americans seem to have developed-at least for pur-
poses of this dispute-rather different assumptions about what
constituted unity and harmony among persons of varied denomina-
tions.
In Congregationalist New Hampshire, an Anglican, John Cosens
Ogden, optimistically combined the positions of dissenting and
establishment writers.167 He had an interest in equality typical of
dissenters, and yet he adhered to the establishment position that
an equality of rights alone could not produce harmony. After not-
ing that "[w]e have one common country and kindred to provide
for," and, after explaining the political usefulness of piety and
moral behavior, he spoke about the significance of a common re-
ligion:
"' Similarly, when arguing in the Federalist that the states "should never be split into a
number of unsocial, jealous, and alien sovereignties,"John Jay had found evidence of Ameri-
can unity in sentiments and in rights: "Similar sentiments have hitherto prevailed among
all orders and denominations of men among us. To all general purposes, we have uniformly
been one people. Each individual citizen everywhere enjoying the same national rights,
privileges, and protection." John Jay, The Federalist 9 (No 2) (Everyman, 1937). For Jay, the
unity of Americans was manifest in their similar sentiments and similar rights.
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A similarity of religion, language, and laws, have ever availed
much to spread peace and prosperity: and unless the first binds
our hearts in love, and restrains our unruly passions, we shall
ever be exposed to confusion and tumult." 8
What all Christians had in common-Christian sentiment and vir-
tue-were particularly important in a nation in which diverse sects
were to be treated equally:
The preservation of a religious, pure heart, is not less impor-
tant; but becomes much more so in a country where all religions
are most justly tolerated, and ought and are promised to be
protected .... 169
He then demanded, as seen in part III, a greater equality of rights
for dissenters and reminded his audience that dissenters were "de-
termined to defend and maintain their own privileges.""17 Nonethe-
less, Ogden also emphasized the importance of a "similarity of
religion." He appears to have thought a harmonizing similarity-in
particular, "a religious and pure heart"-was possible and even
necessary amid the sectarian diversity he defended.
As dissenters sensed their victories, they came to acknowledge
the possibility that the nation could be unified by its religious
sentiments. Until the New England establishments abandoned
their special privileges, their claims that they sought a moral rather
than a legal establishment remained suspect, at least within their
own states. In the 1790s, however, and especially in the early
nineteenth century, as Americans abolished their remaining estab-
lishments, they recognized with gratification their voluntary or
moral establishment of a Christian nation. 171 They considered
themselves blessed by a unity of Protestant sentiment and by an
equality of rights-a unity that, although now based on mere senti-
ment rather than doctrine, was enough to bind Americans together,
68 John C. Ogden, A Sermon 17 (NH election sermon 1790) (Evans 22747).
169 Id. Of course, it is no coincidence that Ogden was an Anglican.
170 Id at 18. See text at note 147.
171 Until the influx of large numbers of Catholics in the nineteenth century, many Ameri-
cans felt little need to emphasize the Protestant character of their Christian nation. Of
course, the growing religious diversity of nineteenth-century America prompted numerous
challenges to the establishment of Protestant Christianity-not least to its remaining legal




and an equality of rights that, by removing the grounds for dis-
sention, allowed Americans to acknowledge their religious unity.
V. AN EPILOGUE CONCERNING EQUAL PROTECrION
Thus far, I have examined the ideas of equal protection
and equal civil rights as standards developed by eighteenth-century
Americans to address their religious diversity. In the nineteenth
century, however, Americans employed the idea of equal protec-
tion in connection with racial differences and eventually even
adopted that standard in the United States Constitution. They
thereby gave that idea a prominence and legal significance that
remains with us and that makes any information about equal pro-
tection in the nineteenth century seem unusally interesting.
An epilogue to this history of equal protection in the eighteenth
century is especially warranted because other histories of equal
protection commence their accounts in the 1830s. Equal protection
has its origins, we are sometimes told, in Andrew Jackson's 1832
Bank veto. '72 Howard Jay Graham, Jacobus Ten Broek, and others
have added that the ideas of protection and equal protection were
developed in the antislavery debates of the mid-1830s.' 13 In light
of the mid-nineteenth-century focus of this older scholarship, two
basic questions need to be examined: First, how did nineteenth-
century Americans define equal protection? In particular, did they
employ an idea of equal protection similar to that used by their
predecessors? Second, if nineteenth-century Americans did draw
upon the earlier notion of equal protection, how did they come to
do so? How did an idea used in eighteenth-century discussions of
religious diversity come to play a role in nineteenth-century de-
bates about slavery and eventually in the U.S. Constitution?
... E.g., J. R. Pole, The Pursuit of Equality in American History 146 (U of Calif, 1979).
173 Howard J. Graham, The Early Anti-Slavery Background of the Fourteenth Amendment, in
Everyman's Constitution; Ten Broek, Equal Under Law; William M. Wiecek, The Sources of
Antislavery Constitutionalism in America, 1760-1848 155 (1977). Professors Earl A. Maltz and
Steven J. Heyman have pointed out that the notion of protection was discussed in prior
centuries, but they seem to be unaware of the eighteenth-century debates concerning equal
protection. Earl A. Maltz, The Concept of Equal Protection of the Laws-A Historical Inquiry,
22 San Diego L Rev 501 (1985); Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty of Government 41 Duke
L J 507 (1991). Raoul Berger was aware of the the equal protection clause in the 1780
Massachusetts Constitution but did not pursue it. Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary 168
(Harvard, 1977) (Berger, "Government by Judiciary").
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What, then, was the nineteenth-century definition of equal pro-
tection? Although the evidence bearing on this question is extensive
and requires further study, the materials I have examined suggest
the possibility that Americans in the nineteenth century typically
defined the idea of equal protection very much as they had in the
eighteenth. Of course, historians unaware of the eighteenth-
century history of equal protection have not even purported to
discuss the relationship between the eighteenth- and the nine-
teenth-century understandings of that idea, but they have taken
positions on various aspects of the meaning of equal protection in
the nineteenth century and their views must now be considered.
Howard J. Graham, Jacobus Ten Broek and Steven J. Heyman
have argued that the protection involved in the idea of equal protec-
tion was a right of individuals to have government protect rights
not only by passing laws but also by taking otherwise discretionary
actions. 1 4 in support of their position, these historians point to
instances in which Americans argued that they needed police or
other executive intervention to "protect" their rights.175 For exam-
ple, when abolitionists were beset by mobs, they complained about
the failure of the states to apply the laws against murder, arson, and
other injurious behavior; they pointed out that, when the victims of
popular violence were abolitionists, the law was not enforced, and,
therefore, they asked that government provide equal protection of,
for example, their right of free speech and press.'76 Some of these
instances involved a failure of judicial process-an issue that, as
will be discussed below, came to be addressed in terms of equal
protection.' 77 In other instances, however, abolitionists com-
plained, not about unequal legal restraints, not about a failure of
judicial process, but about unequal government intervention to pre-
vent violence or otherwise to enforce legal restraints.1 78 So too,
" Howard J. Graham, The Early Anti-Slavery Background of the Fourteenth Amendment, in
Everyman's Constitution 153; Ten Broek, Equal Under Law 21, 51-52; Steven J. Heyman, The
First Duty of Government, 41 Duke L J 507, 545 (1991).
175 See, e.g., notes 178 & 180.
176 E.g., Ten Broek, Equal Under Law 37-38. See note 181 & accompanying text.
177 See text at notes 207-10.
178 Ten Broek, for example, quotes James G. Birney, who complained of mob violence
against abolitionists: "Law has lost its honor; it is in the dust; none do it reverence; its
authority to restrain, to punish, to protect, is mocked at."James G. Birney, Letter to Joshua
Leavitt and Others (Jan 10, 1842), in Dwight L. Dummond, ed, 2 Letters of James Gillespie
Birney 1831-1857 653 (Peter Smith, 1966 reprint of 1938 edition), quoted in Ten Broek,
Equal Under Law 37.
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Chancellor Kent identified the "preventive" arm of the government
as a "further" form of protection: "While the personal security
of every citizen is protected from lawless violence by the arm of
government and the terrors of the penal code, and while it is
equally guarded from unjust and tyrannical proceedings on the
part of the government itself, by the provisions [of constitutions],
every person is also entitled to the preventive arm of the magistrate,
as a further protection from threatening or impending danger."
' 179
Tracing a similar usage, Heyman has drawn attention to the 1858
Congressional debates about police forces in the District of Colum-
bia, during which some Congressmen discussed the necessity of
police "protection" for life, liberty, and property. 8 ' Clearly, nine-
teenth-century Americans sometimes used the term "protection"
to refer to their need for executive-branch intervention.
Nonetheless, it should be noted that the abolitionists and others
who complained about unequal executive enforcement of the law
tended to talk about the necessity of protection or equal protection
from government but did not typically demand for themselves
equal protection of the laws or equal legal protection. As noted in
Parit I, eighteenth-century Americans frequently said that individu-
als obtained protection for their natural liberty from government.
Although they typically focused on protection of the laws for natu-
ral rights, their language was not entirely free from ambiguity. On
the one hand, many of their discussions indicate that they under-
stood protection for natural liberty to be provided by laws that
restrained a portion of it; on the other hand, they often spoke in
generalities that permitted protection to be understood more
broadly to include government enforcement of such laws. This
broader usage of the word "protection" as a term of art in the
state-of-nature theory certainly was in accord with the unspecial-
ized or ordinary usage of the word "protection," and, conse-
quently, nineteenth-century writers could easily talk about unequal
government enforcement of laws in terms of the obligation of gov-
ernment to provide protection or equal protection. They tended,
179 James Kent, 2 Commentaries Pt IV, Lect xxiv, at *15.
" Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty of Government, 41 Duke LJ 507, 544-45 (1991). For
example, Heyman quotes Senator Crittenden, who said that Congress had an obligation "to
provide for an adequate and efficient police in this city, so as to preserve the peace and
secure the lives and property of individuals." Id, quoting Congressional Globe, 35th Cong. 1st
Sess. 1465 (1858).
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however, not to address this problem in terms of equal protection
of the laws. 18'
Moreover, Americans who talked about ending slavery by secur-
ing "equal protection"-particularly, Americans who sought to
end slavery by securing "equal protection of the laws"-were not
typically speaking about executive action to enforce laws protecting
natural liberty. Although the unequal policing of the laws was the
problem of protection that most seriously affected abolitionists in
their efforts against slavery, it was hardly the problem of protection
that most seriously affected slaves or ex-slaves. Prior to 1868 and
(for some purposes) even later, the law itself, not merely the execu-
tive enforcement of the law, was what was unequal. As Henry B.
Stanton said in 1837, when speaking of domestic relations among
slaves, "[tihere is not the shadow of legal protection for the family
state among the slaves of the District.' ' 82 In other words, the un-
equal protection of the laws was the more obvious inequality with
respect to slavery. Indeed, the equal protection of the laws was one
of the things that distinguished free persons from slaves. Northern
abolitionists remained free men and women even when deprived
of government protection, in the sense of government enforcement
of the laws. In contrast, slaves remained slaves even when provided
with such protection, for they did not have a more basic type of
protection, the equal protection of the laws. It is no coincidence
18 For example, William Goodell sarcastically wrote that "we are generously offered
protection on condition that we shall renounce our principles and cease to disseminate
them .... We are to he protected, not in the enjoyment of our civil and religious liberties
as free citizens; but if we will relinquish those rights, then we are to be unmolested in our
persons and our property . . . .[New 1 The protection we ask is a protection different
from all this; and it is a protection we supposed we had a right to claim, as free American
citizens . . . .the protection most highly appreciated by us, is that which protects the
freedom of speech and of the press ...." Ten Broek, Equal Under Law 38, n 6, quoting
The Emancipator (July 22, 1834). Lovejoy pleaded to a committee of the people of Alton: "I,
Mr. Chairman, have not desired, or asked any compromise. I have asked for nothing but
to be protected in my rights as a citizen-rights which God has given men, and which are
guaranteed to me by the constitution of my country. . . . the question to be decided is,
whether I shall be protected in the exercise and enjoyment of those rights-that is the question,
sir;-whether my property shall be protected, whether I shall be suffered to go home
to my family at night without being assailed, and threatened with tar and feathers, and
assassination .... " Id, quoting Joseph C. and Owen Lovejoy, Memoir of the Rev. Elijah
Lovejoy; Who Was Murdered in Defence of the Liberty of the Press, at Alton, Illinois 279-80 (1838).
In addition to the abolitionists, note Kent's Commentaries and the 1858 police debate quoted
in text at notes 179-80. For other illustrations see Ten Broek, Equal Under Law 38-39 &
notes, and Heyman, The First Duty of Government, 41 Duke L J 507, 537-45. Of course,
Ten Broek and Heyman take a rather different view of the evidence than is presented here.
18 Quoted in Ten Broek, Equal Under Law 46.
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that Stanton recommended that slaves be given equal legal pro-
tection:
[T]he slave should be legally protected in life and limb, in his
earnings, his family and social relations, and his conscience.
To give impartial legal protection in that District, to all its
inhabitants would annihilate slavery. Give the slave then, equal
legal protection with his master, and at its first approach slavery
and the slavery trade flee in panic, as does darkness before the
full-orbed moon. 183
Although abolitionists were often denied equal protection, in the
sense of equal government enforcement of the laws protecting their
natural rights, slaves were denied the equal protection of the laws,
and this was essential to their status as slaves. 
184
Graham, Ten Broek and Heyman also suggest that protection
was a particular degree of protection.18 Yet it was the failure of
the idea of protection to indicate any particular degree of protection
that made the idea of equal protection so much more precise and
so much more useful as a legal standard. In political declarations,
some Americans demanded, for example, "complete and ample
protection.' ' i 6 They had to specify that their protection was to be
complete and ample because the word "protection" did not, by
itself, necessarily refer to an extensive protection.187 On the basis
of a similar understanding of the word, Southerners sometimes
justified their peculiar institution by explaining that their laws af-
forded protection for each individual-not the same protection for
l83 Quoted in Ten Broek, Equal Under Law 46-47.
184 Thus, Birney asked: "What is our object? Liberty .... We contend for liberty as she
presents herself in the Declaration of American Independence . . . . We struggle for her
reception, her installation. We long to see the first work of her reign-the abolition of
slavery, and the protection of every human being in the land by just and impartial laws."
James G. Birney, letter to Joshua Leavitt and Others (Jan 10, 1842), in Dwight L. Dumond,
ed, 2 Letters of James Gillespie Birney 1831-1857 645 (Peter Smith, 1966 reprint of 1938
edition). Incidentally, note that abolition and protection by impartial laws was hardly the
sum of Birney's goals, but it would be, he thought, the "first" manifestation of liberty.
18s Howard J. Graham, The Early Anti-Slavery Background of the Fourteenth Amendment, in
Everyinan's Constitution 152; Ten Broek, Equal Under Law 21, 51-52; Heyman, The First Duty
of Government, 41 Duke L J 545.
" E.g., Democratic Platform, § 4 (1840), in Thomas H. McKee, ed, The National Conven-
tions and Platforms of All Political Parties 1789-1905 41 (Friedenwald Co, 1906). This was
"complete and ample protection from domestic violence, or foreign aggression." Id.
,87 Even "complete and ample protection" was so imprecise that it was more often em-
ployed as a political slogan rather than as a legal standard.
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blacks as for whites, but, nonetheless, protection, varying from
one class of persons to another according to what was appro-
priate."'8 Hence, the significance of "equal" protection. 189
Nineteenth-century Americans tended not even to consider pro-
tection, as such, a legally-enforceable right. Many nineteenth-
century writers assumed, as was conventional already in the eigh-
teenth century, that civil government and its legal restraints on
natural liberty were the means by which individuals obtained pro-
tection for their remaining natural liberty and that if government
and its laws failed to provide adequate protection, they could be
altered by the people. Therefore, when exposed to murder, theft,
and other assaults on those portions of their natural liberty that
typically were protected by legal restraints, nineteenth-century
Americans argued that government should protect them. But this
is not to say that nineteenth-century courts enforced this right of
protection or that many Americans expected the courts to do so.1'9
Graham, Ten Broek, and Heyman have not provided any evidence
that Americans typically understood protection to be more than
the idea of protection drawn from the state-of-nature analysis-the
protection individuals obtained for their natural liberty by sacrific-
ing some of that liberty to government and its laws.
The nineteenth-century idea of equal protection was also similar
to that of the eighteenth century in that it concerned an equality
of natural liberty protected by civil laws rather than an equality
of all legal rights, including privileges. Just as eighteenth-century
Americans differentiated between equal protection and equal civil
rights, so too, as Professor Maltz has pointed out, nineteenth-
century Americans distinguished equal protection from an equality
of all legal rights. 191 For example, whereas some opponents of slav-
8 William Sumner Jones, Pro-Slavery Thought in the Old South 113-15 (U of NC, 1935);
see also Earl M. Iviatz, Fourteenth Amendment Concepts in the Antebellum Era, 32 Am J Legal
Hist 305, 329-31 (1988). Another approach was to say that slaves were not members of
civil society. For an early example, see 7 Revolutionary Virginia 454, n 16.
"' Incidentally, both eighteenth- and nineteenth-century sources not infrequently use the
phrase "the same protection" as a synonym for "equal protection." This may illuminate the
significance of the word "equal" in the latter phrase.
' Heyman suggests that protection was a potentially enforceable right but cites no case
in which such a claim succeeded. Heyman, First Duty of Government, 41 Duke LJ 538-41.
Instead, he argues, among other things, that statutes, such as the American versions of the
English Riot Act of 1714, were what "reaffirmed the community's duty of protection and
made it the basis of a legal action." Heyman, 41 Duke LJ at 542.
91 Earl M. Maltz, Fourteenth Amendment Concepts in the Antebellum Era, 32 Am J Legal
Hist 305, 324; Earl M. Maltz, The Concept of Equal Protection of the Laws-An Historical
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ery were content to argue for equal protection, others also advo-
cated equal privileges.'92 Of course, free blacks tended to demand
equal rights or equal privileges rather than mere equal pro-
tection. 
193
Consistent with the claims for equal protection were arguments
similarly based on assumptions about the equal freedom of humans
in the state of nature. Typical of these related arguments was Wil-
liam Thomas's observation that "[w]e declare that 'all men are born
free and equal.' . . . . [W]e can find no difference between black
and white, as respects their natural rights." 94 In language as varied
as that of William Channing and Abraham Lincoln, Americans
frequently spoke of their common humanity and natural free-
dom.' 95 Although not stated in terms of "equal protection," this
Inquiry, 22 San Diego L Rev 499, 506-7 (1985). In contrast, most historians of the Four-
teenth Amendment largely ignore this distinction. E.g., William E. Nelson, The Fourteenth
Amendinentfrom Political Principle to Judicial Doctrine (Harvard U, 1988) (Nelson, "Fourteenth
Amendment").
According to both Graham and Ten Broek, nineteenth-century Americans typically de-
fined equal protection in terms of protection for natural rights, yet both historians apparently
attribute to abolitionists a very broad understanding of what constituted natural rights.
These historians apparently consider natural rights to have included important privileges in
addition to the liberty existing in the state of nature.
Of course, some nineteenth-century Americans adopted definitions of natural liberty
that deviated from the conventional version described in the text here. For example, some
Americans argued that agency and therefore representation was a natural right, and, subse-
quently, some opponents of slavery made use of this argument.
192 See Earl M. Maltz, 22 San Diego L Rev 499, 506 (1985). Of course, defenders of
slavery could also use the idea of equal protection. See Ten Broek, Equal Under Law 42;
Earl M. Maltz, 32 Am J Legal Hist 305, 329-34 (1988). Incidentally, Ten Broek says
"slavery and the concomitant discriminations against free Negroes and abolitionists were to
be described by abolitionists, as early as 1835, as denials of rights to the equal protection
of the laws .... Ten Broek, Equal Under Law 34. In fact, the analysis of equal protection
was not first applied to the question of slavery in the 1830s, let alone by the abolitionists.
For example, see a Fourth of July oration published at Gettysburg, David M'Conaughy,
The Nature and Origin of Civil Liberty 5-6 (1823).
The 1833 Declaration of Sentiments of the American Anti-Slavery Society did not clearly reqf1ire
equality, although it may have been so understood: "Every man has a right to his own
body-to the products of his own labor-to the protection of law-and to the common
advantages of society." Declaration of Sentiments of the American Anti-Slavery Convention
(1833), in William L. Garrison, Selections from the Writings and Speeches of. . . 68 (Negro
Universities, 1968 reprint of 1852 edition). Note the ambiguity of "common advantages,"
which left room for some unequal rights. Note also that Garrison was familiar with the use
of the idea of equal protection in the context of religious freedom. William L. Garrison,
Penal Observance of the Sabbath, in id at 101.
1'3 See, e.g.: Philip S. Foner & George E. Walker, eds, I & 2 Proceedings of the Black State
Conventions, 1840-1865 (Temple U, 1979-80); C. Peter Ripley, ed, 3-5 The Black Abolitionist
Papers (U of NC, 1991).
"' Defensor [i.e., William Thomas], The Enemies of the Constitution Discovered, orAn Inquiry
into the Origin and Tendency of Popular Violence 109 (1835).
195 Charles Edward Merriam observed the contrasting ways in which these and other
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type of argument attacked slavery by assuming that all individuals
had equal natural rights not only in the state of nature but also
under civil government-the same assumption upon which the idea
of equal protection was founded. Consequently, the argument
about the equal humanity of each individual could easily merge
into discussion of equal protection. 19 6 Thus, William Channing,
who gently criticized the extreme measures of abolitionists, wrote
of human rights: "The great end of civil society is to secure
rights . . . .The community is bound to take the rights of each
and all under its guardianship. It must substantiate its claim to
universal obedience by redeeming its pledge of universal protec-
tion." '197 If all men are equally human, he argued, then the liberty
they have as humans-that is, the liberty they have as individuals,
independent of government-should be protected by government,
regardless of race. Although not an equality of all rights held under
civil laws, an equality of natural rights-or, more important for
our puposes, an equality of protection for natural rights-would
bring slavery to an end.
This very traditional understanding of equal protection as a min-
imal degree of equality-the equality all persons should have as
individuals-is apparent in the debates about the Fourteenth
Amendment. In Congress and elsewhere, Americans repeatedly
associated equal protection with "life, liberty and property"-these
Americans espoused this position, quoting Lincoln as saying that "[t]he Fathers 'did not
mean to say all were equal in color, size, intelligence, moral development or social capacity.'
What they did mean was that 'all men are equal in the possession of certain inalieable rights
among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.' "Charles E. Merriam, A History
of American Political Theories 222 (Kelly, 1969 reprint of 1903 edition), quoting Abraham
Lincoln, 1 Works 232 (1894). For Channing, see text at note 197.
196 This is not to say, however, that these arguments were the same or were considered
to be equally efficacious. See John Jay's views in note 215.
' William E. Channing, Slavery 48 (1835). See also id at 17-19, 37, & 39. For his views
on abolitionists, see id, ch 7. Note that he thought obedience and protection were reciprocal
obligations.
Note also that, by Channing's time, some Americans had altered their vocabulary and
spoke of human or personal rights rather than of natural rights. Although not exclusively
or even chiefly a historical theory, the state-of-nature analysis was, in the eighteenth century,
increasingly questioned for its historical inaccuracy. Some Americans responded to this
difficulty by talking about human, individual or personal rights-meaning the rights an
individual had as a human or person, independent of civil society and government. Inciden-
tally, they thereby adopted at least one phrase-"personal rights"-already used for other
purposes and so managed to avoid an irrelevant historical inaccuracy by employing langu-
gage likely to cause significant analytic confusion.
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being well understood as the components of natural liberty.198 Al-
though, as one might expect, Congressmen and Senators some-
times spoke about equal protection without defining it and some-
times loosely said, without elaboration, that an equal protection
clause would provide for equality, 99 their particular examples
tended to be consistent with the standard definition of equal protec-
tion-with the idea of equal protection of the laws for natural
rights.2"' That equal protection concerned natural rights-life, lib-
erty, and property20 1 -was the assumption upon which Senator
Howard could say: "Is it not time, Mr. President, that we extend
to the black man, I had almost called it the poor privilege of the
equal protection of the law? '202 Today, we may, perhaps, regret
that our predecessors established in our Constitution only a mininal
degree of equality. Yet this should no more surprise us than that,
to do so, they first had to fight a civil war.
Alexander Bickel, Alfred H. Kelly, William E. Nelson, Louis
H. Pollock and William W. Van Alstyne have emphasized that
equal protection of the laws was a vague, amorphous and therefore
potentially expansive idea.20 3 In taking this position, these scholars
have suggested that the indeterminacy of the 1866 understanding
of equal protection of the laws permitted judicial development of
equal protection doctrine-that the text of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment in effect authorized judicial formation of the requirements of
the Equal Protection Clause.2°4 Yet, to support their conclusion,
198 Berger, Government byJudiciary 169-92; Earl M. Maltz, Civil Rights, the Constitution and
Congress, 1863-1869 93-120 (U of Kansas, 1990).
199 For another possible explanation, see note 235.
200 See, e.g., speech of Senator Howard at Congressional Globe 2766 (1866), discussed by
Berger, Government byJudiciary 174.
201 Berger, Government byJudiciary 166-92; Earl M. Maltz, Civil Rights, the Constitution and
Congress, 1863-1869 93-120. See also the quotations in Herman Belz, A New Birth of Freedom
140-41 (Greenwood, 1976). Belz, however, appears to assume that equal protection was an
equality of all non-political rights held against government. Id at 142-43.
20I Congressional Globe 2766 (1866).
'03 Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 Harv L
Rev 1, 60-61 (1955); Alfred H. Kelly, The Fourteenth Amendment Reconsidered: The Segregation
Question, 54 Mich L Rev 1049, 1084-86 (1954); Nelson, The Fourteenth Amendment 8, 9, 21
(1988); Louis H. Pollock, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor
Wechsler, 108 U Pa L Rev 1 (1959); William W. Van Alstyne, The Fourteenth Amendment,
The 'Right' to Vote, and the Understanding of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, Supreme Court Review
33, 72 (1965).
201 See note 203. For example, Nelson writes that his history "directs judges to cease
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these scholars hardly look beyond the post-Civil War Congressional
debates. Kelly, for example, writes that "equal protection had vir-
tually no antecedent legal history.""2 ' As has been seen, however,
the earlier evidence about equal protection is extensive, and it does
not suggest the sort of vagueness Bickel, Pollock, Kelly, and others,
following them, have claimed. Although Nelson cites various mid-
nineteenth-century discussions of equality, he does not even at-
tempt to distinguish among the various different standards of
equality Americans may have been discussing. By now it should
be clear that Americans claimed more than one type of equality,
and that equal protection of the laws cannot simply be lumped
together with other standards of equality. Far from being a vague
and therefore flexible commitment to equality in general, equal
protection of the laws was a specific type of equality, and it was
defined with relative precision.
20 6
In only one respect did the nineteenth-century definition of equal
protection differ from the eighteenth-century definition: In the
nineteenth century, the words "equal protection" often referred to
the idea of equal judicial protection of legal rights. Yet even this
usage did not greatly alter the idea of equal protection, which
remained a contrast to equal civil rights. Englishmen and Ameri-
cans had often said that courts should treat individuals equally-
that is, with the same process. More generally, they assumed that,
although established to protect natural rights, government, includ-
ing its courts, should protect all rights held under law. In the
late eighteenth century, being increasingly familiar with the phrase
"equal protection," some Americans began to speak of equal protec-
tion by the courts for legal rights-that is, all such rights as a
person had under law. This notion of equal protection-equal judi-
searching in the amendment's legislative history for specific binding resolutions of the partic-
ular issues they face." Nelson, Fourteenth Amendment 11. See also text at 242.
25 Alfred H. Kelly, The Fourteenth Amendment Reconsidered: The Segregation Question, 54
Mich L Rev 1049, 1052 (1954). Incidentally, Kelly, who contributed to the NAACP brief
in Brown v Bd. of Ed., has subsequently written that it "manipulated history in the best
tradition of American advocacy, carefully marshalling every possible scrap of evidence in
favor of the desired interpretation and just as carefully doctoring all the evidence to the
contrary, either by suppressing it when that seemed plausible, or by distorting it when
suppression was not possible." Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair,
Supreme Court Review 119, 144 (1965).
206 Of course, there is an extensive literature on the ways in which the idea of equality and
other, similar ideas can be vague. Particularly elegant is Nelson Goodman, Seven Strictures on
Similarity, in Experience and Theory 19 (U of Mass, 1970).
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cial protection for such legal rights as one had-amounted to an
equality of process or an equality before the courts. As Maltz has
shown, this definition of equal protection was not unusual in mid-
nineteenth-century America.
20 7
Increasingly, Americans appear to have combined this notion of
equal protection by the courts-an equality of process-with the
idea of equal protection for natural rights. American advocates of
equal protection for natural rights often appear to have assumed an
equal protection by the courts. In nineteenth-century America,
however, the idea of equal protection by the courts typically con-
cerned an equal protection of all civil rights, whether originally
natural or acquired only under government, and Americans some-
times explicitly combined this broad idea of equal judicial protec-
tion with the older idea of equal protection for natural rights. Thus,
nineteenth-century Americans continued to use the phrase "equal
protection" to refer to an equal protection of natural rights, 208 but
they also, instead, sometimes used those words to refer to an equal-
ity of judicial process 20 9 or a combination of these two ideas. Inci-
dentally, the phrase "equal protection" was also occasionally used
in its ordinary sense rather than as a label for a specific idea about
natural rights or about judicial protection. 210 In general, there is
207 Earl M. Maltz, Fourteenth Amendment Concepts in the Antebellum Era, 32 Am J Legal
Hist 305, 324-25.
20. The Federal Circuit Court for the District of New Jersey said of a property owner
that "he may devote [his property] to whatever purposes he pleases, in which the law
protects him equally with any other proprietor." Bonaparte v Camden & A.R. Co., 3 F Cas
821 (Cir Ct NJ 1830) (Fed Case 1,617). When a "negro John Brooks" was charged with
disturbing and hindering "the congregation of the African meeting-house in Washington
county.., by cursing and swearing, and loud and profane talking and noise," the Circuit
Court for the District of Columbia overruled a motion in arrest of judgment. Among other
things, it observed that although it might be said that the Christian religion was not a part
of the commmon law, "[elvery religious sect is equally protected by our laws." US v Brooks,
24 F Cas 1244 (Cir Ct DC 1834) (Fed Case 14,655).
209 For an early example, note that, in Chisholm v Georgia, Chief Justice Jay said that "by
securing individual citizens as well as States, in their respective rights," the extension of the
judiciary power of the United States in that case "performs the promise which every free
Government makes to every free citizen, of equal justice and protection." Chisholm v Georgia,
2 US 419, 479 (1793). This was the equal protection by the courts for such rights as a
person had under civil laws. For a much earlier, English example, see John Rogers, A
Vindication of the Civil Establishment of Religion 83 (1728).
210 E.g., in Wisconsin, the Democratic members of the 1846 Constitutional Convention
resolved in favor of, inter alia, "[e]qual, just, and humane protection to the social rights
alike to debtors and creditors." Resolutions (Dec 30, 1846), in Milo M. Quaife, ed, The
Struggle Over Ratification 1846-1847, 206 (1920).
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little difficulty distinguishing the different uses of "equal pro-
tection."
Equal protection was not, evidently, a very different idea in the
nineteenth century than it had been in the eighteenth. It required
a type of equality rather than a particular degree of substantive
rights, and the equality it required was an equal protection for
natural rights, plus, occasionally, an equality of judicial process.
Because equal protection did not require an equality of privileges,
it often was contrasted to an equality of all rights. One kind of
equal protection was the equal protection of the laws, and this type
of equal protection did not include a right to executive-branch
intervention. Moreover, in the absence of some constitutional or
other positive law providing a legal right to equal protection,
Americans did not consider the "right" of equal protection legally
enforceable. Although there were other, nonspecialized definitions
of the phrase "equal protection," and although this term was some-
times used imprecisely, the evidence suggests that, in mid-
nineteenth-century America, the phrase "equal protection" could
and, typically, was understood as a term of art in the state-of-
nature analysis with the standard definition described here. It was
this standard definition that Americans appear to have taken for
granted in the 1860s.
If nineteenth-century opponents of slavery employed a notion of
equal protection similar to that used by eighteenth-century Ameri-
cans in debates about religious liberty, it may be asked how the
idea of equal protection was transmitted to the campaigners against
slavery or, for that matter, to other Americans, such as the champi-
ons of the South who claimed equal protection for their natural
right of property. All of these Americans could use the same idea
of equal protection, because they were drawing upon a notion that
had long been part of theoretical discussions about politics and
law. Having employed the idea of equal protection to address their
religious differences, Americans, particularly Federalists, used that
idea beginning c. 1790 to justify differences in acquisitions and
wealth. In so doing, these Americans adopted the idea of equal
protection as part of their general political theory, and they thereby
came to use equal protection as a broadly applicable standard of
equality not tied to any particular characteristic or type of diver-
sity. Consequently, in the 1820s and '30s, when ever-larger num-
bers of Americans wrestled with the issue of slavery, they could
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"apply, among other notions of equality, the idea of equal pro-
tection.
Like the establishment clergy in the previous decades, Federal-
ists in the 1790s sought to stave off demands for equal rights, and
one of the ways they could do so was by promoting the alternative
type of equality, equal protection, which they, among others, had
discussed in connection with religious liberty.21' Unlike the estab-
lishment clergy, however, these Federalist advocates of equal pro-
tection were less concerned about the preservation of unequal privi-
leges than about the possibility that, under the guise of "equal
rights," government would, in fact, provide inadequate or unequal
protection. Federalists particularly feared the notion of equal rights
when it was associated with demands for equal political rights or
was asserted as the basis for an equalization of property. To be
precise, they suspected that "French"-style equal rights would lead
to severe and even, perhaps, unequal restraints on property or
other natural rights,212 and they tended to employ the idea of equal
protection as a defense against this leveling egalitarianism. They
emphasized that government was designed to protect natural lib-
erty equally and extensively-leaving individuals to pursue their
natural liberty according to their various unequal talents and cir-
cumstances. 213 For example, after descanting on the different re-
211 In some states, Federalists were closely associated with the religious establishments.
Of course, although Federalists in the 1790s found the idea of equal protection particularly
useful for some of their arguments, it is not suggested that they were the only persons who
found the idea attractive. The idea reflected commonly held assumptions. Incidentally, note
that one Anti-Federalist said he favored "the peaceable and equal participation in the rights
of nature." "A Columbian Patriot," Observations on the New Constitution and on the
Federal and State Conventions (1788), 4 Complete Anti-Federalist 274.
21' The alternative possibility, that government would attempt to equalize the condition
of individuals by providing either massive or unequal benefits, was not frequently even
considered. Warburton wrote that "society could not reward, though it should discover the objects
of its favour; the reason is, because no society can ever find a fund sufficient for that purpose,
without raising it on the people as a tax, to pay it back to them as a reward." William
Warburton, Alliance Between Church and State, in Warburton, 7 Works 35. In a similar vein,
James Witherspoon told his classes at Princeton: "It has been often said, that government
is carried on by rewards and punishments; but it ought to be observed, that the only reward
that a state can be supposed to bestow upon good subjects in general is protection and
defence. Some few, who have distinguished themselves in the public service, may be distin-
guished by particular rewards; but to reward the whole is impossible, because the reward
must be levied from those very persons to whom it is to be given." Witherspoon, Lectures,
Lect XII, at 141.
213 This aspect of Federalist thought was not always discussed in terms of "equal protec-
tion." For example, in Federalist No 10, Madison discussed protection, but his approach to
the factionalism caused by inequality did not rely uporta simple legal requirement, such as
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wards men would reap on account of their unequal talents,214 Zeph-
aniah Swift-the future Chief Justice of Connecticut-insisted
that "[w]hether men possess the greatest, or the smallest talents,
they have equal claims to protection, and security in their exer-
tions, and acquisitions.
'" 215
By applying the notion of equal protection to differences other
than those of religion, Federalists popularized an understanding
that the idea of equal protection concerned differences in general.
Already in the seventeenth century, it had been argued that "every
man" should be "alike protected in the enjoynment of propriety and
exercise of honest Industry." 216 At least some Federalists appear to
have been aware of such generalized discussions of equal protection
equal protection. When speaking of "men in society, previous to civil government," Wilson
discussed "the laws of God and nature" and said that,"[b]y these laws, rights, natural
or acquired [i.e., acquired before establishment of government-more commonly called
'adventitious rights'], are confirmed, in the same manner, to all; to the weak and artless,
their small acquisitions, as well as to the strong and artful, their large ones. If much labor
employed entitles the active to great possessions, the indolent have a right, equally sacred,
to the little possessions, which they occupy and improve." James Wilson, The Works ofJames
Wilson, 241, Robert G. McCloskey, ed (Belknap, 1967). (Incidentally, in examining this
passage, Professor Jenifer Nedelsky appears to be of the opinion that it concerned the laws
of civil government. Jenifer Nedelsky, Private Property and the Limits of American Constitution-
alism 105.) Although the approach described here was typically employed by Federalists, it
was also used by others. See, e.g., "Federal Farmer," 2 Complete Anti-Federalist 261. For an
early antecedent, see Thomas Hobbes, Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Government and
Society, Of Dominion, ch xiii, § 11 in 2 Works 174, ed William Molesworth (1841).
214 "Men at their birth are all vested with equal rights, but are endowed with unequal
powers. There is a great difference between their intellectual, as well as corporeal faculties,
which is the origin of the inequality of mankind.... The man who possesses uncommon
talents for accumulating property, will grow rich, while the opposite character, with equal
advantages will remain poor. Those who are blest with the powers of eloquence .... will
acquire a fame that cannot be reached by men of moderate capacity .... Zephaniah Swift,
1 A System of the Laws of the State of Connecticut 17 (1795).
215 Id. For his discussion of religious liberty, see id at 144. Chief Justice John Jay distin-
guished equal protection from the protection and equal rights declared in bills of rights. It
will be recalled that many state constitutions contained, typically in their bills of rights,
statements that all men had equal liberty or rights in the state of nature and that governemnt
was established to protect such liberty. In a charge to a grand jury, Jay argued that such
declarations were not, by themselves, adequate: "It is not sufficient to tell men by a Bill of
Rights, that they are free, that they have equal Rights, and that they are entitled to be
protected in them-men will not believe they are really free, while they experience oppres-
sion-they will not think their title to equal Rights, realized, until, they enjoy them; nor
will they esteem that a good Government, whatever may be its Name, which does not
uniformly, impartially and effectually protect them." John Jay, Charge to the Grand Jury
of the Circuit Court for the District of Virginia, May 22, 1793, 2 Documentary History of the
Supreme Court 390.
,16 Englands Safety in the Laws Supremacy 5 (1659).
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and of related early debates about monopolies, and Federalists now
used the concept of equal protection in a similarly generalized way.
A particularly lengthy and elegant example of the Federalist ap-
proach to equal protection may be taken from an anonymous essay
on equality published in 1804 in the Connecticut Courant. It is some-
what atypical (though hardly unusual) for its association of equal
protection with the idea of equal or equitable laws-that is, laws
that were not partial to separate or private interests. Whereas the
idea of equal protection (or, for that matter, equal civil rights) was
familiar from a controversy in which equality was demanded with
respect to a particular characteristic-religion-the notion of equal
laws had long been discussed with regard to the full variety of
interests in society. In other words, for a long time, Americans
had associated equal protection with religious differences and had
associated equal laws with the problem of differing interests in
general. Thus, the Courant's essayist may have been inclined to
draw upon the idea of equal or equitable laws precisely because he
was elucidating equal protection as an idea concerning differences
in general. Otherwise, however, he was orthodox in his argument
that inequality was inevitable and that equal protection left individ-
uals with an equal and very extensive degree of natural freedom.
The essayist began his analysis by noting that republican laws
should recognize the rights of human nature without partiality. All
men, according to the Courant,
have equally a right to the gifts of nature and to all their honest
acquirements, whether of learning or property, and to enjoy,
or in any wise appropriate the fruits of their industry as they
themselves may deem proper .... These rights of human na-
ture, which, under arbitrary governments, are either withheld
or granted with a partial hand, are recognized expressly or
virtually by those republics which acknowledge the people to
be the source of power. While such free republics continue
pure, they are constantly making a practical acknowledgement
of the equal rights of human nature by the equity of their laws
and the impartiality of their courts of justice; meteing the same
measure to the rich and poor, protecting good citizens and pun-
ishing evil doers, without any respect of persons.
2 17
217 Dissertations on the Deceptive Arts of Demagogues No 7 (concerning equality), in 40 Conn
Courant, No 20, p 1 (Sept 19, 1804).
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This "equity" or nonpartiality of law with respect to the rights
of human nature was compatible with the natural inequality or
differences of humans:
In various other respects, men are created unequal, and by the
improvement, the neglect, and the misimprovement of their
talents, as well as by innumerable providential occurrences, the
native inequalities between them are further diversified and
considerably increased .... This order of nature tends to effect
a necessary degree of subordination and at the same time, so
to diversify the occupations and pursuits of men as to promote
the general interests of society .... Yet, [even] if all men were
equal in the gifts of nature, in their educations, and in their
industry and prudence, there still would be great inequalities
in their circumstances, effected by causes hidden from their
sight and beyond their controul21 8
Thus, individuals were unavoidably unequal both in their abilities
and in their circumstances. By protecting individuals equally or
nonpartially in their natural freedom, republican laws left individu-
als free to pursue their own interests and to make the best of their
varied abilities and circumstances:
Now amidst all the diversity of human talents, amid the con-
stantly shifting circumstances of men living under a free gov-
ernment when every one has the power of self-direction as to
the improvement of his talents and the pursuits of life, the true
republican equality consists in the whole body politic guarding
with the same care all its members, by enacting equitable [i.e.,
nonpartial] laws and executing those laws with strict impartial-
ity. This kind of equality is practicable and salutary; ... it is
the great spur to general industry, and is a spring of life to a
free commonwealth. In such a state of things, the rich and the
poor are equally protected in their persons and reputations, in
their honest acquisitions and in all their rights; and they are at
liberty to employ for their own benefit the faculties which have
been given them by the God of nature.2"9
According to the Courant's essayist, equal protection permitted and
was the means of attaining a high degree of individual liberty in
civil society. With equal protection, Federalists thought they could





that idea their egalitarian response to the demands for equality that
appeared to portend an equalization of condition.
220
220 A few other illustrations may be useful. Supreme Court Justice William Cushing
charged a grand jury: "The great end of government, you know, is peace and protection;
peace with nations, protection against foreign force:-peace and order within; protection of
individuals, of all classes of men, whether poor or rich, in the undisturbed enjoyment of
their just rights, which are comprehended under a few, but important words-security of
person and property, or, if you please, rights of man." William Cushing, Charge to the Grand
Jury of the Circuit Court for the District of Rhode Island (Nov 7, 1794), in 2Documentary
History of the Supreme Court 491. He also said that: "Where people are not permitted to enjoy
these blessings, security of person and property, unmolested, there is tyranny, whether it arises
from monoarchy, aristocracy, or a mob. Where all men are equally and promptly protected
in the free exercise of these rights, there is liberty and equality;-liberty, to do whatever
just laws made by a free respresentative allow; equality, that is, as to right of protection
respecting the great objects of life, liberty and property, when not forfeited to the state by
criminal conduct; respecting property, which a man has fairly and honestly obtained-not
that which is unrighteously taken or forced from another;-not equality in regard to quan-
tity; for that seldom, if ever, can happen, owing, under providence, to the infinitely various
faculties and diligence of different individuals;-not a right for the indolent to rob the
laborious-to share equally the fruits of the virtuous industry of others; such ideas being
founded in extravagance of enthusiasm and delusion, or in downright dishonesty and deprav-
ity of mind-subversive of the first principles of justice, and the great ends of society." Id
at 492. In response to the idea of "equality," Jonathan Maxcy wrote: "When the road to
acquisition is equally open to all-when the laws equally protect every man's person and
property-all men will not make exertions equally great-all will not possess the same spirit
of enterprize-all will not obtain accession of wealth, of learning, virtue and honour, equally
extensive and important.... That men in the social state are equal as to certain rights-that
they ought to be protected in their persons and property, while they conduct [themselves]
as good citizens, will undoubtedly be admitted. This, however, is a very different kind of
equality from that which the promulgers of this pernicious doctrine [of equality] intended
to introduce." Jonathan Maxcy, An Oration (1799), in 2 American Political Writing 1048.
According to Noah Webster, "That one man in a state, has as good a right as another to
his life, limbs, reputation and property, is a proposition that no man will dispute. Nor will
it be denied that each member of society, who has not forfeited his claims by misconduct,
has an equal right to protection. But if by equality, writers understand an equal right to
distinction, and influence; or if they understand an equal share of talents and bodily powers;
in these senses all men are not equal." Noah Webster, An Oration on the Anniversary of the
Declaration of Independence (1802), in 2 American Political Writing 1229. According to Timothy
Ford, "To what then does this term equality relate? I will answer in the words of the French
constitution; 'men are born and always continue free, and equal in respect of their rights.'
Thus, my personal liberty is equal to that of any other man; my life is equally sacred and
inviolable, my bodily powers are equally my own; my power over my own actions is equally
great and equally secured from external restraint; my will is equally free; what I acquire, be
it greater or less, I have an equal right to possess, to use and to enjoy. I have an equal claim
upon the protection of the laws; an equal right to serve my country, and an equal claim to
be exempted from service...." "Americanus" [i.e., Timothy Ford], The Constitutionalist
(1794), in 2 American Political Writing 930. For the significance of Ford's use of the phrase
"personal liberty," see note 197. Responding to claims for equalization of property and of
political rights, Fisher Ames wrote: "The philosophers among the democrats will no doubt
insist that they do not mean to equalize property, they contend only for an equality of
rights. If they restrict the word equality as carefully as they ought, it will not import that
all men have an equal right to all things, but, that to whatever they have a right, it is as
much to be protected and provided for as the right of any persons in society. In this sense
nobody will contest their claim. . . . [new l As the common law secures equally all the
rights of the citizens, and as the jacobin leaders loudly decry this system, it is obvious that
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In connection with their argument that equal protection was the
sort of equality desireable under a free government, Federalists
sometimes modified the standard description of the purpose of gov-
ernment so that it incorporated the notion of equal protection. For
example, in a charge to a grand jury, John Jay said that "impartially
to give Security & Protection to all" was "among the most impor-
tant Objects of a free Government." '221 The end of government,
once described simply as the protection of life, liberty, and prop-
erty for every individual, increasingly could be described as "the
equal protection of life, liberty, and property, to every individ-
ual."222 By the middle of the nineteenth century, some state consti-
tutions had declared of the "people" that "Government is instituted
for their equal protection and benefit." '223
Eventually, Americans used the notion of equal protection not
only to define the purpose of republican government but also to
define "civil liberty." Increasingly, during the eighteenth century,
Americans described liberty or civil liberty as the natural liberty
enjoyed under civil laws. Americans were educated in the assump-
tion that civil government was instituted to protect natural liberty,
they extend their views still farther .... Am I then to have, in the new order of things, an
equal right with you? Certainly not, every democrat of any understanding will reply. What
then do you propose by your equality? You have earned an estate; I have not; yet I have a
right, and as good a right as another man, to earn it. I may save my earnings and deny
myself the pleasures and comforts of life till I have laid up a competent sum to provide for
my infirmity and old age. All cannot be rich, but all have a right to make the attempt; and
when some have fully succeeded, and others partially, and others not at all, the several
states in which they then find themselves become their condition in life; and whatever the
rights of that condition may be, they are to be faithfully secured by the laws and govern-
ment. This, however, is not the idea of the men of the new order of things ...... Fisher
Ames, Equality II, in The Palladium (Nov 20, 1801), in 1 Works of Fisher Ames 240-42,
William B. Allen, ed (Liberty Classics, 1983). See also Nathaniel Chipman, Sketches of the
Principles of Government 177-82 (1793). Of course, some of the individuals who used this
analysis were not strictly Federalists.
221 John Jay, Charge to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District of Virginia,
May 22, 1793, 2 Documentary History of the Supreme Court 381.
122 Constitutional History, 29 North Am Rev. 265, 280 (1829). A Connecticut minister
argued: "The end of government is the general happiness. It is not that a few may riot in
affluence at the expense of the rest; but that all may enjoy equal security and liberty."
Joseph Lathrop, The Happiness of a Free Government and the Means of Preserving It 10 (July 4th
sermon 1794) (Evans 27200). In 1828, South Carolina protested against the tariff that its
unequal and oppressive operation was "incompatible with the principles of a free government
and the great ends of civil society, justice, and equality of rights and protection." SC Protest
Against the Tariff, Dec. 19, 1828, in Richard Hofstadter, ed, Great Issues in American History
277 (1958).
223 Ohio Const of 1851, Art 1, § 2; Kan Const of 1855, Art 1, § 2. The latter was the
anti-slavery constitution produced in Topeka.
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and therefore they could easily conclude that civil liberty was the
natural liberty held under the laws of civil government.22 4 Indeed,
some of them may have found this narrow definition of civil liberty
a convenient response to the growing demands for equal civil
rights. In a variant of this definition of civil liberty, Americans
described civil liberty as the largest possible degree of natural free-
dom held under civil laws-not a particular set of civil rights, but
rather, more generally, the character of the liberty desirable under
civil government and its laws. In the terse phrase of an anonymous
pamphleteer, "Civil liberty is the exemption from useless re-
straint."221 Of course, such a notion of civil liberty could be defined
in terms of protection. For example, a Federalist wrote that "[w]hen
people enter into society, they must, in order to obtain protection,
give up some part of their natural liberty, in order to secure the
rest-the more we retain in our hands, consistent with that protec-
tion, which is necessary for society, will be so much the better,
and this is called civil liberty."226 Similarly, if the purpose of gov-
ernment was equal protection, civil liberty could be defined in
terms of equal protection for the greatest possible natural freedom.
In 1822, for example, Daniel Chipman wrote:
To establish civil liberty, and render the enjoyment of it certain
and uniform with all classes of people, is, or ought to be the
224 For example, James Iredell told a grand jury: "Let it be remembered that civil Liberty
consists not in a Right to every Man to do just what he pleases-but it consists in an equal
Right to all the Citizens to have, enjoy, and to do, in peace Security and without Molesta-
tion, whatever the equal and constitutional Laws of the Country admit to be consistent with
the public Good." John Jay, Charge to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District
of New York (April 12, 1790), in 2 Documentary History of the Supreme Court 30. See also
Thomas Rutherforth, Institutes of Natural Law, bk II, ch vii, at 444 (1832) (first published
17S6).
22 [Zephaniah Swift?], The Security of the Rights of Citizens of Connecticut 9 (1792) (Evans
24776) (citing Paley on Moral and Political Philosophy). For the tentative attribution to Swift,
see Pierce W. Gaines, ed, Political Works of Concealed Authorship 1789-1810 32.(Shoe String
1965). Of course, this approach was drawn from the other side of the Atlantic. Blackstone
had written that "Political, therefore, or civil liberty, which is that of a member of society,
is no other than natural liberty so far restrained by human laws (and no further) as is
necessary and expedient for the general advantage of the public." W. Blackstone, 1 Commen-
taries 125 (1765). See also Thomas Rutherforth, Institutes of Natural Law, bk II, ch vii, at
444-45 (1832) (explaining the necessity of this modified definition). Francis Lieber observed
that "when the term Civil Liberty is used, there is now always meant a high degree of
mutually guaranteed protection ...." Francis Lieber, Civil Liberty and Self-Government 24
(1859), cited by Heyman, The Fint Duty of Government 41 Duke LJ 507, 530.
226 "Publicola" [Archibold Maclaine], "An Address to the Freemen of North Carolina"
(Mar 20, 1788), 16 Documentary History 437. For a nineteenth-century example, see quotation
of Lieber in note 225. See also James Kent, 2 Commentaries pt IV, lect xxiv, at *1.
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great end of all governments; that is, to secure all classes of
society alike in the enjoyment of their rights, without any other
restraint upon natural liberty, than that which is imposed upon
all by equal and expedient laws for the general safety and wel-
fare of the whole community.227
Later, Francis Lieber was more succinct: "Liberty of social man
consists in the protection of unrestrained action in as high a de-
gree as the same claim of protection of each individual admits
of .... "228
Incidentally, the definition of civil liberty in terms of protection
for a large degree of natural liberty was not without its costs.
Among other things, it contributed to a redefinition of the phrase
"civil rights." In the eighteenth century, the phrase "civil rights"
had often been used to refer variously to all rights held under the
laws of civil government, to the portion of such rights acquired
under the laws of civil government, or to the natural rights held
under the laws of civil government. As noted in Part III, the first
and broadest definition had been reflected in dissenters' claims of
equal civil rights. 229 Already in the eighteenth century, however,
and expecially in the nineteenth, the phrase "civil rights" increas-
ingly came to be understood to refer only to the natural rights
protected by civil laws and, sometimes, certain rights of process.
230
Of course, Americans still occasionally used the phrase "civil
rights" to refer to all rights under civil laws or to privileges, but,
227 Daniel Chipman, An Essay on the Law of Contracts for the Payment of Specific Articles iii
(1822). In 1791, the Rev. Israel Evans said that "where the rights of man are equally
secured in the greatest degree, there is the greatest happiness-AND THAT IS OUR
COUNTRY." Israel Evans, A Sermon 18 (NH election sermon 1791) (Evans 23358).
22 Francis Lieber, Civil Liberty and Self-Government, as quoted by Thomas M. Cooley, A
Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest Upon the Legislative Power of the States of the
American Union 485 n 2 (1890). Lieber continued: "or in the most efficient protection of his
rights, claims, interests, as a man or citizen, or of his humanity manifested as a social being."
Id.
229 See text at notes 105-6. See also Samuel Pufendorf, Of the Relation Between Church and
State § 13, at 27 (1719).
230 The increasingly dominant natural-rights definition and some of the ambiguities are
revealed in this definition by Zephaniah Swift: "Civil rights may therefore be defined to be
the exercise and enjoyment of natural rights, in that limited qualified manner which is
prescribed by law and is necessary to their security, and the peace and good order of society,
and by reason of which he acquires certain other civil rights, resulting from the social state."
Zephaniah Swift, I A System of the Laws of the State of Connecticut 176-77 (1795).
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by the nineteenth century, they typically no longer did so. 231 As a
result, by the 1860s, "equal civil rights" normally denoted only an
equality of natural rights and judicial process. On this basis, when,
in 1866, Congress enacted guarantees of various natural rights and
judicial process, it could say that the bill assured Americans of
their "civil rights," 232 and, shortly afterward, Senators and Repre-
sentatives could say that the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment required an equality of civil rights. 233 Thus, in
the middle of the nineteenth century, the phrases "equal civil
rights" and "equal protection" both referred to an equality of judi-
cial process and of the natural rights protected under civil govern-
ment. Unlike for the phrase "equal protection," for the phrase
"equal civil rights," this was a truncated definition. Of course, even
this diminished meaning has since been lost, and the phrase "civil
rights" now refers, not to legal rights, nor even to protected natural
rights, but more vaguely to important or fundamental rights.
Just as Federalists and others used the idea of equal protection
to define, in powerfully egalitarian terms, republican equality, the
231 This may be why dissenters increasingly did not talk about their demands in terms of
"equal civil rights." Apparently to avoid ambiguity, they often asked for "equal rights" or
for a combination of free exercise and "equal privileges."
232 An Act to Protect All Persons in the United States in their Civil Rights, and Furnish
Means of Their Vindication (1866), 14 Statutes at Large 27 (1866). In explaining the Civil
Rights Bill, Representative Wilson asked, "What are civil rights? I understand civil rights
to be simply the absolute rights of individuals, such as [in the language of James Kent] 'the
right of personal security, the right of personal liberty, and the right to acquire and enjoy
property.'" Congressional Globe 1117 (1866). As has been shown by Berger and Maltz, this
was the standard interpretation of the Civil Rights Bill. Berger, Government by Judiciary
27-28, 169-7 1; Earl M. Maltz, Civil Rights, the Constitution, and Congress, 1863-69 67-68.
233 Berger, Government by Judiciary 172. As Berger points out, Americans also said that
the Civil Rights Bill would require equal protection. Id at 169-70.
In connection with suffrage for former slaves, Republican Representative James W. Pat-
terson of New Hampshire spoke of the military heroism of "these despised chattels" and
asked: "Have not such deeds redeemed the race from dishonor and distrust, and entitled
them, not only to a protection of their civil rights, but to an impartial enjoyment of the
privileges of citizenship?" Id at 2695 (1866). Democratic Representative Lewis W. Ross of
Illinois said of the Freedmens' Bureau that he was "unwilling to vote a tax on my constituents
to support in idleness any class of people, white or black." He was "opposed to any law
discriminating against ["the unfortunate colored people"] in the security and protection of
life, liberty, person, property and the proceeds of their labor. These civil rights all should
enjoy. Beyond this I am not prepared to go." Id at 2699 (1866).
Incidentally, Raoul Berger has concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protec-
tion "was limited to the rights enumerated in the Civil Rights Act of 1866." Berger, Govern-
inent by Judiciary 169. This seems to suggest that a constitutional right was defined in terms
of a statutory enumeration of rights. For another interpretation, see my text.
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purpose of government, and the extent of civil liberty, so too, some
Americans used the idea to describe the limited economic role of
government. For example, at South Carolina College, the President
and Professor of Political Economy, Thomas Cooper, used the
idea against monopolies. Although a privilege for the monopolist, a
monopoly was also an unequal restraint on the talents, industry,
and, more generally, the natural liberty of other individuals. Ac-
cording to Cooper (who appears to have been familiar with some
of the pre-eighteenth-century discussions of equal protection) indi-
viduals forming government would "endeavour to provide" for "the
equality of protection in the earning and enjoyment of the fruits
of their honest industry."23 4 In rather stronger language, an anony-
mous essay of 1841 emphatically disclaimed any role for govern-
ment, except equal protection. It asserted that "human legisla-
tion . . . has conferred neither rights, nor privileges, nor
powers-but protected all, and all alike." '235 According to the essay,
"The boast of the laws should be ...that they have neither ad-
vanced nor retarded any man; but that they let him alone to work
out his happiness in the exercise of his own true nature ...
234 Thomas Cooper, Lectures on the Elements ofPolitical Economy 249 (1830). When explaining
the benefits of abolishing monopolies, the eighteenth-century English controversialist, Josiah
Tucker, noted that "[t]he Government and Administration, which ...considers itself as
the equal Protector of, and equally related to all its Subjects, would soon find the Effects of
its Paternal Care in the growing Industry of the People." Josiah Tucker, The Elements of
Commerce and Theory of Taxes, in Josiah Tucker, A Selection from His Economic and Political
Writings, ed, Robert Livingston Schuyler, 180 (Columbia U, 1931).
235 "A Phrenologist," On Rights and Government, 9 Democratic Rev 568, 575 (Dec 1841).
The author was, apparently, a New Yorker, who combined in his writing the state-of-nature
analysis, a severe version of laissez-faire theory, and considerable religious enthusiasm. Most
remarkable was a passage in which he said that man "comes into society with the capital
which God has given him, and he demands 'free trade.'" Id at 576. He also said: "The most
perfect human laws claim no higher merit, than that they have followed nature; not having
conferred the rights of humanity, but guarantied and defended them; not having bestowed
any powers upon any man, but having kept him free from obstruction in the exercise of his
natural faculties." Id at 575.
Incidentally, by assuming that government should protect individuals in their natural
rights and should not confer privileges, this author could quite consistently say that his
scheme treated all persons equally. For example, he wrote that "the laws shall be general in
their scope and application, equal and impartial to all." Id at 575. Also: "if the laws ... apply
to all men alike, or are general, affecting all men alike, then all men are equally regarded,
protected, and punished by those laws, and legal equality is established." Id at 575. In other
words, if a government confined itself to equal protection and thus did not give any privi-
leges, such a government could be said to have laws that were "equal and impartial to all."
This understanding of the limited role of government may, perhaps, explain some of the
occasional statements, during the Congressional debates about the Fourteenth Amendment,
to the effect that the Equal Protection Clause would require states to treat individuals alike,
regardless of racial differences.
[1992
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY EQUALITY 389
Government has nothing to bestow upon any man; it can only
serve to protect him in all he hath."'236 The essay not only argued
that government should provide equal protection but also explicitly
stated that equal protection was the sole purpose of government.
It was in the context of the Federalist-derived analysis of equal
protection that Andrew Jackson demanded equal privileges in his
1832 Bank veto. 37 Using language that could have been borrowed
from a Federalist, Jackson acknowledged equal protection:
Distinctions in society will always exist under every just gov-
ernment. Equality of talents, of education, or of wealth, cannot
be produced by human institutions. In the full enjoyment of
the gifts of heaven, and the fruits of superior industry, econ-
omy, and virtue, every man is equally entitled to protection by
law.
Only after he had accepted the inequality of individuals and the
equality of protection, did Jackson insist on equal privileges:
But when the laws undertake to add to these natural and just
advantages, artificial distinctions, to grant titles, gratuities, and
exclusive privileges .... the humble members of society....
who have neither the time nor the means of securing like favors
to themselves, have a right to complain of the injustice of their
government.... If [government] would confine itself to equal
protection, and as Heaven does its rains, shower its favors alike
on the high and the low, the rich and the poor, it would be an
unqualified blessing....
... Many of our rich men have not been content with equal
protection and equal benefits.
2 38
The equality demanded by Jackson consisted of both equal protec-
tion and equal "favors," "benefits," or "privileges." Jackson did not
argue against equal protection any more than did religious dissent-
ers of the previous century or abolitionists of the coming decade.
236 Id at 575-76.
... Amos Kendall and others drafted it.
238 Andrew Jackson, Bank Veto (1832), in The Addresses and Messages of the Presidents of the
United States 409-10 (1839). A locution similar to Jackson's had been employed by Virginia's
Presbyterians in 1785 when complaining about a proposed assessment in support of Chris-
tianity. The assessment, they wrote, "exalts to a superior pitch of grandeur, as the church
of the State, a society which ought to be contented with receiving the same protection from
government which the other societies enjoy, without aspiring to superior notice or regard."
Memorial of the Presbyterians of Virginia to the General Assembly (Aug 13, 1785), in
American State Papers 117.
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Like many of them, he simply asked for an additional degree of
equality. 39
By insisting upon both equal protection and equal "favors," Jack-
son drew upon and encouraged popular suspicions about the distri-
bution of economic benefits from an increasingly wealthy and pow-
erful federal government."4 While government was understood to
have been created to provide protection, and while government
distributed relatively few economic privileges, Americans could
still aspire, with respect to economic matters, simply to have equal
protection. Indeed, by urging that government should confine itself
to equal protection, some Americans signaled the limited role they
desired for government.24' Nonetheless, Americans perceived that
government was increasingly a source of substantial economic fa-
vors, and therefore many Americans now demanded that these
privileges, like protection, be equal.
Opponents of slavery also frequently discussed equal protection
and equal privileges, and, as had Jackson, they thereby employed
ideas familiar from earlier debates. After using the notion of equal
239 For another illustration of the dependence of Jacksonian analysis upon Federalist dis-
cussions of equal protection, see William Leggett (Evening Post, Nov 21 & Dec 13, 1834),
in Democratick Editorials, Lawrence H. White, ed, 3, 7-9 (1984).
Jackson assumed that unequal benefits would involve "artificial distinctions." In the de-
bates about religious liberty, dissenters sought equality with respect to a single characteris-
tic, religion, and therefore they could be relatively clear about the equality they sought. In
contrast, Jackson was discussing equality generally rather than with respect to a single
characteristic, and therefore he had to speak of an end to "artificial distinctions."
Abolitionists, unlike Jackson, were concerned about inequalities with respect to a single
characteristic, yet they often conformed to the Jacksonian approach. That is, they opposed
"artificial distinctions" and sought a right to "common advantages." For example, in 1833,
the Declaration of Sentiments of the American Anti-Slavery Society proclaimed: "Every
man has a right to his own body-to the products of his own labor-to the protection of
law-and to the common advantages of society." Declaration of Sentiments of the American
Anti-Slavery Convention (1833), in William L. Garrison, Selections from the Writings and
Speeches of... 68 (Negro Universities, 1968 reprint of 1852 edition). These abolitionists said
that each individual had a right to common advantages rather than all advantages because
they were not seeking to have race treated differently than any other characteristic. Indeed,
only because the equal rights standard was considered generally applicable could abolition-
ists convincingly argue that individuals should have equal rights regardless of race.
240 Of course, the Jacksonian requests for equal government benefits were different from
many of the earlier demands for equal rights so abhorred by Federalists. By adopting
Federalist language about equal protection, the Jacksonians made clear that they were not
attempting to reduce all individuals to an equality of condition.
241 Drawing upon Jackson's language, a leading Jacksonian editor, William Leggett, wrote
of government that he desired that "its duties shall be strictly confined to its only legitimate
ends, the equal protection of the whole community in life, person, and property." William
Leggett (Evening Post, April 22, 1834), in Democratick Editorials 24.
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protection in their disputes about religious differences, Americans
had applied the idea to other differences, such as those of skill,
character, and wealth, and they thereby had emphasized that it
was generally applicable to the varied distinctions among individu-
als. For this reason, opponents of slavery could convincingly argue
that individuals deserved equal protection without regard to race.
Thus, by the time Congress proposed the Fourteenth Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution, the idea of equal protection had long
been part of American legal and political theory and clearly was
applicable to the difficulties facing the nation.
In closing, we should remind ourselves that older ideas of equal-
ity may have been rather different from those to which we are
accustomed. Too often, historians have examined the development
of the notion of equality without attempting to distinguish among
the different types of equality that earlier Americans discussed.
Conflating ideas eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Americans
distinguished, some historians have talked about a single notion
of equality. For these historians, the different formulations about
equality employed by early Americans and the different implica-
tions of those formulations are simply evidence that the idea was
ill-defined and amorphous. In the words of one commentator,
"[e]quality was thus a vague ...idea in mid-nineteenth-century
America .... Equality could mean almost anything."
242
Another approach, however, is possible, and it sheds light not
only on the Fourteenth Amendment but also on eighteenth-century
ideas of equality and religious liberty. By tracing how late eigh-
teenth-century Americans responded to their problems of religious
diversity, this account has differentiated at least two constrasting
standards of equality. Far from being the same, equal protection
and equal civil rights were, in the eighteenth century, the carefully
defined standards of competing religious interests.
Just as debate about religious freedom provoked Americans to
pursue contrasting ideas of equality, so these notions of equality
contributed much to American understandings of religious free-
dom. In their struggles over the legal implications of their religious
differences, eighteenth-century Americans often discussed their re-
ligious freedom and their religious discord in terms of equality,
24 Nelson, Fourteenth Amendment 21.
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some seeking equal civil rights and others, equal protection. Al-
though Americans who participated in these debates frequently
disagreed as to which standard of equality could secure their free-
dom and harmonize their differences, they apparently concurred
that the standard of equality they adopted would affect the capacity
of their society to overcome and survive its divisions.
